Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from
philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been
subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which
consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful
but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting
of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no
discernible meaning (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). Across multiple
studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a
variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural
belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more
conventionally profound (e.g., “A wet person does not fear the rain”) or mundane (e.g.,
“Newborn babies require constant attention”) statements. These results support the
idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is
not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive
vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias
toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-
profound bullshit receptivity.
Keywords: bullshit, bullshit detection, dual-process theories, analytic thinking,
supernatural beliefs, religiosity, conspiratorial ideation, complementary and alternative
medicine.