is this Ti/Ni differentiation valid?

[aestrivex]

copied from the philosophy thread:

+ start from different points, but can make similar conclusions (though some are quite different). Also, particular schools of philosophy aren't going to have people of the same type anyway.

goes from 'I think, therefore I am' - if a type can be certain of anything, it is when it makes a thought about something at a given moment, that thought is genuine, even if nothing else is. From there, types build a framework of knowledge on this, which they hold to be more valid than anything else (otherwise it is replaced).

seems to be 'the universe is here, therefore I also possibly exist'. So, types see themselves as a small cog in the running of the universe - they see everything as predetermined by 'universal' laws - the individual is a minor part in this.

types see nothing as truly knowable outside their own experience - while INTps are limited by universal laws, INTjs are limited by local\internal laws.

Both INTps + INTjs can become convince of an idea (become religious etc.), but for different reasons. INTjs might see a supreme being as the only possible cause of their internal, personal thinking, whereas INTps might consider that laws as universal as the universe itself could only have been created by a supreme being. So both types can be 'delusional'. But INTps can seem like 'mystics' because they attempt to go locally experienced rules (or laws) to find the universal laws outside human experience - they go into the void. The universal laws, being universal must exist - but are not necessarily observable by mere mortals etc. etc.

do INTj/ps identify with their respective dominant functions here?

[Jonathan]

copied from the philosophy thread:

+ start from different points, but can make similar conclusions (though some are quite different). Also, particular schools of philosophy aren't going to have people of the same type anyway.

goes from 'I think, therefore I am' - if a type can be certain of anything, it is when it makes a thought about something at a given moment, that thought is genuine, even if nothing else is. From there, types build a framework of knowledge on this, which they hold to be more valid than anything else (otherwise it is replaced).

seems to be 'the universe is here, therefore I also possibly exist'. So, types see themselves as a small cog in the running of the universe - they see everything as predetermined by 'universal' laws - the individual is a minor part in this.

types see nothing as truly knowable outside their own experience - while INTps are limited by universal laws, INTjs are limited by local\internal laws.

Both INTps + INTjs can become convince of an idea (become religious etc.), but for different reasons. INTjs might see a supreme being as the only possible cause of their internal, personal thinking, whereas INTps might consider that laws as universal as the universe itself could only have been created by a supreme being. So both types can be 'delusional'. But INTps can seem like 'mystics' because they attempt to go locally experienced rules (or laws) to find the universal laws outside human experience - they go into the void. The universal laws, being universal must exist - but are not necessarily observable by mere mortals etc. etc.

do INTj/ps identify with their respective dominant functions here?

The descriptions here are symbolic of Socionic truths regarding these two functions. However, I also find them misleading. Because one is a perceiving function, and the other a judging function, you really can't compare them on the same terms. -dominant types, both ILI and IEI, may use also. Therefore, all these types may sometimes identify with the description in certain circumstances.

I don't think all types view themselves as a cog in a machine.

The basic point, that 's thought is self justifying, and that with seeks to discover "the way things really are," instead of just "dictating" reality, is valid.

[Socionics Is A Cult]

Yeah, well, I'm an idiot. I didn't really do that with INFp and ISTj in mind (oops). My metaphors weren't really thought properly either. 3\10 for effort = fail.

[Phaedrus]

do INTj/ps identify with their respective dominant functions here?

My comments on that in the Philosophy thread are based on the premise that we compare the types INTj and INTp. Jonathan's objection, that a judging function is contrasted with a perceiving function, is a valid one, and I'm not sure that we can explain all these differences in perspective with reference to just two functions.

The main difference in philosophical outlooks between INTjs (Subjectivists) and INTps (Objectivists) is, I think, primarily due to the difference between and , not and , even though as a creative function is different from as an accepting function, and probably heavily influenced by .

Immanuel Kant is an example of a philosophical outlook, which focuses on the limits thinking, the limits of meaning. Such an approach often leads to anti-realist (more often called "Idealist" in philosophical terminology) views on reality, that is also often linked with relativism in one or several areas.

Karl Popper is an example of a philosophical outlook, which focuses on solving philosophical problems. It focuses on truth instead of meaning, which it sees as secondary. (In the perspective one cannot pose questions of truth until the question of meaning is addressed and answered.) The approach usually leads to realist views on reality.

The difference between Realism and Idealism (anti-realism) can roughly be explained as the difference between the belief that the world has a structure in itself (with or without us knowing it) and the belief that it is due to our language (or our way of thinking) that the world can be said to have a structure. (Notice the phrase "can be said" -- meaning) The world's "structure" (and therefore also any question of truth) is dependent on us (our thinking categories, our "language games", our culture, or some other framework) in the perspective.

The attitude towards philosophical problems is usually more serious (and Serious too, I think) than the attitude. According to a philosopher like Popper, philosophical problems are genuine problems that we should try to solve (which means finding the true answers to them). If Wittgenstein is an INTj (as Rick thinks) he is a good example of a more "Merry" attitude, where philosophical problems are seen as confusions due to a misuse of ordinary language. The problems should not be solved but rather dissolved, when we realize that we are mislead by our own thinking. Such a "Merry" attitude is of course less interested in questions of Truth than in questions of Meaning.

[Socionics Is A Cult]

^ What he said .

[Jonathan]

The difference between Realism and Idealism (anti-realism) can roughly be explained as the difference between the belief that the world has a structure in itself (with or without us knowing it) and the belief that it is due to our language (or our way of thinking) that the world can be said to have a structure. (Notice the phrase "can be said" -- meaning) The world's "structure" (and therefore also any question of truth) is dependent on us (our thinking categories, our "language games", our culture, or some other framework) in the perspective.

The attitude towards philosophical problems is usually more serious (and Serious too, I think) than the attitude. According to a philosopher like Popper, philosophical problems are genuine problems that we should try to solve (which means finding the true answers to them). If Wittgenstein is an INTj (as Rick thinks) he is a good example of a more "Merry" attitude, where philosophical problems are seen as confusions due to a misuse of ordinary language. The problems should not be solved but rather dissolved, when we realize that we are mislead by our own thinking. Such a "Merry" attitude is of course less interested in questions of Truth than in questions of Meaning.

I agree with your analysis on how the functions would relate to different approaches. thinking is clearly more problem-solving focused, whereas thinking seems more like syntactical analysis.

However, one might get the impression from this that people of the different types approach the same questions in these different ways, because of their type. That leaves out the complicating issue of appropriateness.

For example, some questions lend themselves to being seen as matters to be solved concerning external reality. Socionics is a good example. When Augusta wrote about Socionics, she didn't see it as merely a syntactic problem; it's clear she was trying to understand how things actually work. Similarly, Tcaud, who people tend to accept as LII, has been grappling with solving real problems regarding attempting to type people he's met who he thinks don't fit into the system without some sort of modification.

On the other hand, in the case of some matters in philosophy, "dissolving" the questions is probably the correct approach. There probably are some paradoxes that are actually confusions based on how people are thinking about the situation. In this case, defining things clearly may help resolve the problem.

Socrates, who a number of Socionists feel is ILI (though some forum members here seem to lean toward LIE...still Gamma), tended to ask clarifying questions that probed how people were thinking of a problem. Often, the other person in the dialog had a sense of certainty about an issue, and Socrates showed that situation was more ambiguous than the other person thought (one case for Socrates being an irrational type, although maybe this is a case for crea-Ni too). He did this by getting into definitions of terms.

In the cases encountered in Plato's dialogues, focusing on how people are defining things was the correct and appropriate approach, because the problem was that people hadn't properly analyzed the source of their convictions.

So, while in your theory,your distinction makes sense, in practice, it's a little more complicated.

One other interesting thing that seems related. In another thread, Slava suggested that Te rather than Ti may be more inclined to focusing on syntactic manipulation. I know juxtaposing this may seem like a leap (I don't have to time to get much into the connection/implications right now). It just suggests that sometimes ones intuition on which one is which (Te vs. Ti) may be thrown off depending on one's vantage point:

Thats sorta similar to how Te types use systems and dont examine nor care how the internal components inside of it make it do what it does. And how Ti types need to know the components of a system to be able to string it together. Ti would then understand the internal working of the system and coul then modify it so that it has the same functionality, while the Te types only modify that which is external to the components they are presented (wich have subsystems)... its probably the same with Se vs Si

So if I care about how things work...e.g., if I always insisted on proving everything in math class and hated to memorize formulas....then I must be a type?

types don't care about how anything works?

Well it depends what frame of reference you look at it from. From the Ti frame of reference we see a box with components inside but we want to see the essence of that box so that we can connect other boxes to it at the lowest levels instead of at the highest abstraction levels. I'm sure Te sees it the same exact way, however what is highest level for Te is lowest level for Ti. So when you are talking about math, you are dealing with terms that are defined by a stack of other terms and thus the symbolic manipulation and replacement would be more of a Te thing. Where as Ti would memorize the forumlas and use them as tools.

[Ms. Kensington]

Well, as an INTj i do indentify with much of Phaedrus's post, and not just the Ti portions, in relation to what my motivations are with philosophy. It is strange, because if you superficial-ize it a few levels it seems as if the attributions made to a Ti type are actually those of a Te (+ Ni) type, which supports the following idea ---

Was it also Phaedrus who said that once you get into topics of interest or subjects, like "truth" you are getting into the areas where socionics won't be of much help? And now Jonathan, you appear to be saying this also is difficult when one thinks about not just certain subject matters but also the approach to thinking about certain subjects?

[Phaedrus]

For example, some questions lend themselves to being seen as matters to be solved concerning external reality. Socionics is a good example. When Augusta wrote about Socionics, she didn't see it as merely a syntactic problem; it's clear she was trying to understand how things actually work. Similarly, Tcaud, who people tend to accept as LII, has been grappling with solving real problems regarding attempting to type people he's met who he thinks don't fit into the system without some sort of modification.

Socionics is not a branch of philosophy, and I don't think that anything of what I said has much relevance in other areas outside of philosophy. Maybe if Augusta or someone else actually thinks that Socionics is not a science and should not try to be a part of the natural sciences, that could suggest that the person is not a thinker. Social constructivism and similar relativistic approaches are rather popular today, for example in most forms of feminism, and I see all of them as belonging to the Relativist group, even though many of those who adhere to such theories are not INTjs of course. Biological explanations of human behaviour and neuro science in general I see as belonging to the Objectivist group. Their approach is much more ; they want to study the empirical evidence, not dismissing what we can observe as language or social constructs.

On the other hand, in the case of some matters in philosophy, "dissolving" the questions is probably the correct approach. There probably are some paradoxes that are actually confusions based on how people are thinking about the situation. In this case, defining things clearly may help resolve the problem.

I agree. For example the belief in the existence of a free will is based on confusion in my opinion. A free will is similar to a square circle. It cannot exist because the concept itself is logically incoherent. Bertrand Russell and other thinkers want to clarify problems and concepts (once again compare The Semantics of the Information Elements on Rick's site). Russells famous essay On Denoting is a perfect example of that. But there is a difference between his approach and Wittgenstein's if we compare their attitudes towards the whole project.

Russell and Popper see philosophy as closely linked to science. They think that it is a good thing to use scientific methods to solve philosophical problems, which also can be seen as an expression of their seriousness. Those who belong to the other group of philosophers usually see philosophy as something very different from science. Some of them may see philosophy as an art form, some of them, for example Wittgenstein, compare philosophy to psychoanalysis. For him philosophy was very much an activity, a special kind of practice that has very little to do with science.

The same polarity can be seen in science. The Relativists want to make a distinction between the natural sciences and the social sciences or the humanities. They think that the methods are not the same and that we should not try to impose the methods from physics and other branches of the natural sciences when we study human behaviour and artefacts. The Objectivists don't talk about different kinds of science. For them there is only one Science, the scientific method is one and the same, and it should be used in as many areas of human understanding as possible.

Socrates, who a number of Socionists feel is ILI (though some forum members here seem to lean toward LIE...still Gamma), tended to ask clarifying questions that probed how people were thinking of a problem. Often, the other person in the dialog had a sense of certainty about an issue, and Socrates showed that situation was more ambiguous than the other person thought (one case for Socrates being an irrational type, although maybe this is a case for crea-Ni too). He did this by getting into definitions of terms.

Yes, and Socrates did it with the same "scientific" approach as Russell and Hume (to just name a few) had. Socrates believed that you can be objectively right or wrong about definitions. He wanted to find the objectively correct way of thinking. He believed that there was an objective truth to find in these matters. His approach was much more serious than that of the sophists.

It is true that Karl Popper dismissed every question of that kind as irrelevant. He didn't want to talk about definitions, only about problems. But Popper and Socrates shared the same spirit, and they agreed on the important aspect of this: that the referents are much more important than the words we use to talk about the referents (the objects) in the world. The Relativist attitude, if taken to its extreme, results in a dismissal of the referents as totally unimportant or even non-existent. That phenomenon can be observed in the works of, for example, Richard Rorty.

Thats sorta similar to how Te types use systems and dont examine nor care how the internal components inside of it make it do what it does. And how Ti types need to know the components of a system to be able to string it together. Ti would then understand the internal working of the system and coul then modify it so that it has the same functionality, while the Te types only modify that which is external to the components they are presented (wich have subsystems)... its probably the same with Se vs Si

So if I care about how things work...e.g., if I always insisted on proving everything in math class and hated to memorize formulas....then I must be a type?

types don't care about how anything works?

Well it depends what frame of reference you look at it from. From the Ti frame of reference we see a box with components inside but we want to see the essence of that box so that we can connect other boxes to it at the lowest levels instead of at the highest abstraction levels. I'm sure Te sees it the same exact way, however what is highest level for Te is lowest level for Ti. So when you are talking about math, you are dealing with terms that are defined by a stack of other terms and thus the symbolic manipulation and replacement would be more of a Te thing. Where as Ti would memorize the forumlas and use them as tools.

Everything Slava says here seem to be perfectly in line with my own understanding of the differences between and . Do you recall the analogy with atoms and galaxes? I don't care whether the galaxy approach is or , but it is definitely the approach I have towards these things. I want to understand things at the highest general level possible. I try to gather information in "clusters". Therefore it is natural for me to compare big clusters ("galaxes" or at least "solar systems") like theories. I am much less interested in the internal workings of a theory than the question whether the theory as a whole is true or false and whether it can tell us something on a very general level.

Those with a approach seem to be more inclined to be experts on one single theory and learn every subtle detail of its inner workings. An example of such a theory is Marxism. With a attitude you become less interested in the question whether Marxism is a true theory or not. It is more likely that you don't ask yourself such questions, because you tend to think that questions of truth are only legitimate and possible to ask from within a certain framework anyway. Marxism is such a framework, psychoanalysis is another. If you are a type, for example an INTj, you stick to your system, your model, and try to explore every possible consequence of the premises upon which the system is built. What you don't do is questioning the whole system. You don't go outside of the system, you view everything from within the system. The same phenomenon can be seen in the attitudes of many INTjs and other types on this forum towards Socionics. They are usually more interested in fine-tuning the model than in questioning it from an external (= from outside the model) perspective. You and I are less attached to the theory, so it is easier for us to compare it with other theories and steal pieces of information from other sources as well (compare how the differences between INTjs and INTps are described in Socionics, for example in Ganin's articles).

Also notice that Slava mentions that wants to use formulas as tools. In my experience, those with the approach want to use a model, such as Marxism, psychoanalysis, feminism, hermeneutics etc., to interpret things. They use it to put a raster on reality. In that way it becomes a tool for them, and that can be compared with how Wittgenstein wanted to use his philosophical approach, his philosophical "method" as a tool to get rid of confusion. It is not a method to find truth, because the truth has already been found. The theses are already set more or less in stone. What is left to do is to use the theory (the model, the system) on reality and "prove" that everything is as the theory says that it should be. Isn't that very similar to how Jung describes introverted thinking?

[FDG]

But why are you only utilizing purely useless abstract systems? If you only talk about marxism, psychoanalisys and feminism, stuff that has zero relevance to the real world, nobody that uses his/her Ti in order to solve REAL problems will relate.

[aestrivex]

But why are you only utilizing purely useless abstract systems? If you only talk about marxism, psychoanalisys and feminism, stuff that has zero relevance to the real world, nobody that uses his/her Ti in order to solve REAL problems will relate.

feminism does not deserve to be grouped into that category.

[Phaedrus]

But why are you only utilizing purely useless abstract systems? If you only talk about marxism, psychoanalisys and feminism, stuff that has zero relevance to the real world, nobody that uses his/her Ti in order to solve REAL problems will relate.

feminism does not deserve to be grouped into that category.

What category? I mentioned marxism, psychoanalysis, and feminism, because all three want to put a theoretical filter on reality. None of them is based on emprical observations. Instead they assume that some theoretical framework is correct and build from that. All three of them also belong to the category "false theories" -- but that is rather irrelevant here.

[aestrivex]

i would strongly differentiate feminism from the ideas of marxism and psychoanalysis.

feminism is not based on empirical observations about reality, granted. what that has to do with feminism "assuming some theoretical framework" i have no idea at all. if the concept "men are not inherently better than women" is a theoretical framework, i'm a jellied eel.

[Phaedrus]

what that has to do with feminism "assuming some theoretical framework" i have no idea at all. if the concept "men are not inherently better than women" is a theoretical framework, i'm a jellied eel.

Feminism is a cluster of slightly different theories, but almost all of them are versions of social constructivism. There are many theoretical assumptions in such relativisms, including some kind of anti-realism in the sense that language (meaning) is more fundamental than truth, and that the world has no structure in itself. Almost every kind of feminist theory has grown from the same philosophical tree as marxism and fascism, which means that its roots can be traced back at least to Hegel. Scientifically speaking feminism is of course no better than astrology or creationism.

[aestrivex]

thats ridiculous.

[MysticSonic]

How is social constructivism relativistic? Your definition of relative is starting to sound like a filter that would classify the holding of any sort of universal as a relativistic point of view.

[Phaedrus]

thats ridiculous.

Well, it's true anyway.

How is social constructivism relativistic? Your definition of relative is starting to sound like a filter that would classify the holding of any sort of universal as a relativistic point of view.

This discussion is starting to drift somewhat. You can read about all this in various books discussing these issues. But I'll give you a starting point for further investigations.

I don't make a clear distinction between "constructivism" and "constructionism", and I don't know of any area where it would be very important to make one. Constructivism in general is explained in one of my philosophical dictionaries thus (my, probably not perfect, translation):

"constructivism, opinion in the philosophy of mathematics originating from Kant. According to him mathematical knowledge is synthetical a priori and depends on the construction of mathematical objects in the perception of pure space and time. It got its classical formulation in the beginning of the 20th century and until the intuitionists Brouwer and Heyting. Mathematical objects exist only in so far as we construct them. Therefore we can only claim the existence of a mathematical object, if we are in possession of an effective method for constructing it in principle; we also can only deny its existence, if we can show effectively that the assumption that it exists leads to an inconsistency. Since we can neither prove nor disprove for example every mathematical proposition of existence, we cannot claim the universal validity of the Law of Excluded Middle. In mathematics, therefore, not classical but intuitionistic logic is valid. Later, constructivism is represented by, among others, E. Bishop and the Erlangen school. Constructivism stands as a model for the semantic anti-realism of Dummett. In that shape constructivism has gained a new language-philosophical basis."

In a book for students called An Introduction to Social Constructionism, the author Vivien Burr lists (and discusses in more length than I will do here) four key assumptions that any social constructionist must believe in:

1. A critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge
2. Historical and cultural specificity
3. Knowledge is sustained by social processes
4. Knowledge and social action go together

Then she says that if we look more closely at these four tenets, we will see that they contain a number of important features. I quote:

"1. Anti-essentialism: Since the social world, including ourselves as people, is the product of social processes, it follows that there cannot be any given, determined nature to the world or people. There are no 'essences' inside things or people that make them what they are. [...]

2. Anti-realism: Social constructionism denies that our knowledge is a direct perception of reality. In fact it might be said that we construct our own versions of reality (as a culture or a society) between us. Since we have have to accept the historical and cultural relativism of all forms of knowledge, it follows that the notion of 'truth' becomes problematic. Within social constructionism there can be no such thing as an objective fact. [...]

3. Historical and cultural specificity of knowledge: If all forms of knowledge are historically and culturally specific, this must include the knowledge generated by the social sciences. The theories and explanations of psychology thus become time- and culture-bound and cannot be taken as once-and-for-all descriptions of human nature. [...]

4. Language is a pre-condition for thought: Our ways of understanding the world come not from objective reality but from other people, both past and present. We are born into a world where the conceptual frameworks and categories used by the people in our culture already exist. [...]

5. Language as a form of social action: By placing centre-stage the everyday interactions between people and seeing these as actively producing the forms of knowledge we take for granted and their associated social phenomena, it follows that language too has to be more than simply a way of expressing ourselves. When we talk to each other, the world gets constructed.

6. A focus on interaction and social practices [...]

7. A focus on processes [...]"

As you can see, of the seven listed features 1 is not compatible with modern neuroscience and neurobiology, 2 is a direct contradiction of an objectivist, realist view of the world, 3 is a direct expression of one version of relativism, 4 is what I have been talking about in relation to and the focus on Meaning in the continental tradition of philosophy, 5 and 6 are very similar to, and probably heavily influenced by, the ideas of the later Wittgenstein, and 7 is a general feature of several lines of thought emanating from Hegel (but of course you can also focus on processes without being a Hegelian).

[Mariano Rajoy]

Ascribing thought to disparate types is even more problematic than ascribing behaviour to disparate types.

[MysticSonic]

While I do, essentially, agree with your distinction between the relativistic and objectivist types(in as far as we're discussing NTs), I am not so certain that such positions are the result of Ti and Te themselves as much as they are the result of each types desires/temperament. I do not know how to currently express my thoughts on this clearly, but I will state that I am defining temperament as one's perspective on what knowledge is to be used for and how knowledge is used.

For example, ENTjs are always objectivists simply because ENTjs are generally forceful, hard-headed, and opinionated, and as such cannot allow themselves to view their own positions as unobjective. They don't NEED to focus on the context of what a piece of knowledge is posited in and how the piece of supposed knowledge relates to the context.

This is a really vague explanation of my opinion on the matter, but I believe it would suffice to say that the objectivist/subjectivist dichotomy fails to be an aspect of the traits of Ti and Te simply by referencing types who obviously aren't subjectivist and heavily Ti(ESTp, and, most pointedly, ISTj.)

[Jonathan]

While I do, essentially, agree with your distinction between the relativistic and objectivist types(in as far as we're discussing NTs), I am not so certain that such positions are the result of Ti and Te themselves as much as they are the result of each types desires/temperament. I do not know how to currently express my thoughts on this clearly, but I will state that I am defining temperament as one's perspective on what knowledge is to be used for and how knowledge is used.

For example, ENTjs are always objectivists simply because ENTjs are generally forceful, hard-headed, and opinionated, and as such cannot allow themselves to view their own positions as unobjective. They don't NEED to focus on the context of what a piece of knowledge is posited in and how the piece of supposed knowledge relates to the context.

This is a really vague explanation of my opinion on the matter, but I believe it would suffice to say that the objectivist/subjectivist dichotomy fails to be an aspect of the traits of Ti and Te simply by referencing types who obviously aren't subjectivist and heavily Ti(ESTp, and, most pointedly, ISTj.)

That's a good point; most of the discussion about tendencies toward absolutism vs. relativism (or at least relativism in the extreme cases) here has centered on Alpha/Gamma. ESTp and ISTj both have Se in their quadra values (ego block, actually), and that may have an impact in terms of orientation toward an external world.

[Socionics Is A Cult]

I think the general distinction of Alpha NTs and Gamma NTs reflected in absolutism\relativism in relation to the universe show the extremes of these views - we've had a huge thread almost poetically about such philosophies, but a ISTj would probably think 'who gives a shit?' . Beta + Delta are probably best measured on a different dichotomy - if they fit on absolutism\relativism one, their types will be some kind of bridge between absolute reality and internal reality, plus relative reality and internal reality (or something - making their reality a practical reality in the here-and-now would be Beta ST, Delta ST would be making a practical reality from internal perceptions of the universe?).

EDIT: Maybe Beta ST = nihilism (though technically not a 'school' of philosphy?), Delta ST = cynicism (I think Phaedrus said he liked Cynicism + Stoicism - Stoicism is more INTp ( ), Cynicism more ISTp ( ) from what little I know (but on the universal level, similar ).

[FDG]

I think the general distinction of Alpha NTs and Gamma NTs reflected in absolutism\relativism in relation to the universe show the extremes of these views - we've had a huge thread almost poetically about such philosophies, but a ISTj would probably think 'who gives a shit?' . Beta + Delta are probably best measured on a different dichotomy - if they fit on absolutism\relativism one, their types will be some kind of bridge between absolute reality and internal reality, plus relative reality and internal reality (or something - making their reality a practical reality in the here-and-now would be Beta ST, Delta ST would be making a practical reality from internal perceptions of the universe?).

EDIT: Maybe Beta ST = nihilism (though technically not a 'school' of philosphy?), Delta ST = cynicism (I think Phaedrus said he liked Cynicism + Stoicism - Stoicism is more INTp ( ), Cynicism more ISTp ( ) from what little I know (but on the universal level, similar ).

I don't follow any school of philosophy. The one I am nearer would be epicureanism.