Søren Kierkegaard

[Dioklecian]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard

"There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious. The metaphysical is abstraction, and there is no human being who exists metaphysically. The metaphysical, the ontological, is, but it does not exist, for when it exists it does so in the esthetic in the ethical, in the religious, and when it is, it is the abstraction from or a something prior to the esthetic, the ethical, the religious. The esthetic sphere is only a transition sphere, and therefore its highest expression is repentance as a negative action. The esthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the religious the sphere of fulfillment, but, please note, not a fulfillment such as when one fills an alms box or a sack with gold, for repentance has specifically created a boundless space, and as a consequence the religious contradiction: simultaneously to be out on 70,000 fathoms of water and yet be joyful. Just as the ethical sphere is a passageway-which one nevertheless does not pass through once and for all-just as repentance is its expression, so repentance is the most dialectical. No wonder, then, that one fear it, for if one gives it a finger it takes the whole hand. Just as Jehovah in the Old Testament visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children unto the latest generations, so repentance goes backward, continually presupposing the object of its investigation. In repentance there is the impulse of the motion, and therefore everything is reversed. This impulse signifies precisely the difference between the esthetic and the religious as the difference between the external and the internal."






quotes:

"What I really need is to get clear about what I must do, not what I must know, except insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to find a purpose, to see what it really is that God wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die."

"Above all do not forget your duty to love yourself; do not permit the fact that you have been set apart from life in a way, been prevented from participating actively in it, and that you are superflous in the obtruse eyes of a busy world, above all, do not permit this to deprive you of your idea of yourself, as if your life, if lived in inwardness, did not have just as much meaning and worth as that of any human being in the eyes of all-wise Governance, and considerably more than the busy, busiest haste of busy-ness - busy with wasting life and losing itself."

"The eternal fears no future, hopes for no future, but love possesses everything without ceasing, and there is no shadow of variation. As soon as he returns to himself, he understands this no more. He understands what bitter experiences have only all too unforgettably inculcated, the self-accusation, if the past has the kind of claim upon his soul that no repentance can entirely redeem, no trusting in God can entirely wipe out, but only God himself in the inexpressible silence of beatitude. The more of the past a person’s soul can still keep when he is left to himself, the more profound he is."

"To be a teacher does not mean simply to affirm that such a thing is so, or to deliver a lecture, etc. No, to be a teacher in the right sense is to be a learner. Instruction begins when you, the teacher, learn from the learner, put yourself in his place so that you may understand what he understands and the way he understands it."

"Seek first God's Kingdom, that is, become like the lilies and the birds, become perfectly silent — then shall the rest be added unto you."

"The more one suffers, the more, I believe, has one a sense for the comic. It is only by the deepest suffering that one acquires true authority in the use of the comic, an authority which by one word transforms as by magic the reasonable creature one calls man into a caricature."

[felafel]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard

dio, posting a wikie link on here doesn't help in the least (we can all wikie Kirkie on owr own

For what i can recall, infj, intp and intj have all been suggetsed for him.

[aestrivex]

rick has him INFp. i don't know too much about him.

[Rick]

rick has him INFp. i don't know too much about him.

That's one of my less responsible typings, done after a superficial review of short bios and pictures. I'm open to alternatives.

[Logos]

It is possible that he is an INFp still though, but I believe that he is probably an INFj. The logic of his philosophy proposes a system of faith built upon over and , which are the functions which attempt to rationalize religion, something that Kierkegaard vehemently opposed.

[science as magic]

i agree with infj

[Dioklecian]

rick has him INFp. i don't know too much about him.

That's one of my less responsible typings, done after a superficial review of short bios and pictures. I'm open to alternatives.

It seems sensible to me.

[Dioklecian]

It is possible that he is an INFp still though, but I believe that he is probably an INFj. The logic of his philosophy proposes a system of faith built upon over and , which are the functions which attempt to rationalize religion, something that Kierkegaard vehemently opposed.

I used to think INFJ before too. Based o nthe same arguments as you (in general).

[Beautiful sky]

Please type...Please read the intro first

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard

[munenori2]

From the secondary sources of which I'm familiar, EII was my first thought. Certainly NF.

[EyeSeeCold]

"What I really need is to get clear about what I must do, not what I must know, except insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to find a purpose, to see what it really is that God wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die."

It does seem Delta-ish and maybe specifically INFj. At least / I think. I don't know too much about him or his works to really have strong judgment.

Regardless, it is a great quote, in my opinion.

[Beautiful sky]

It does seem Delta-ish and maybe specifically INFj. At least / I think. I don't know too much about him or his works to really have strong judgment.

Regardless, it is a great quote, in my opinion.

Remember Ti are obsessed with "the truth"

[Singu]

It does seem Delta-ish and maybe specifically INFj. At least / I think. I don't know too much about him or his works to really have strong judgment.

Regardless, it is a great quote, in my opinion.

Finding a purpose and blah blah blah sounds more Ni.

[EyeSeeCold]

Remember Ti are obsessed with "the truth"

True, but all truths are not the same.

Finding a purpose and blah blah blah sounds more Ni.

A purpose is /.

Meaning is /.

[The Idiot]

Typed as INFP( FiNe) in MBTI, in socionics some type him as INFp but others type him as INFj so I was just curious about how others see him ( typed IEI and EII in an old thread).

[Tallmo]

My gut feeling is LII but it might be wrong. Video???

[xerx]

It's pretty unlikely that he had weak Ni:

And when the hourglass has run out, the hourglass of temporality, when the noise of secular life has grown silent and its restless or ineffectual activism has come to an end, when everything around you is still, as it is in eternity, then eternity asks you and every individual in these millions and millions about only one thing: whether you have lived in despair or not.

[Exodus]

It's pretty unlikely that he had weak Ni:

And when the hourglass has run out, the hourglass of temporality, when the noise of secular life has grown silent and its restless or ineffectual activism has come to an end, when everything around you is still, as it is in eternity, then eternity asks you and every individual in these millions and millions about only one thing: whether you have lived in despair or not.

That's quite dramatic...the epitome of NiFe. Where are people getting FiNe?

[Olimpia]

He seems to be EII to me.

[Glare]

Strong Ni and Fi, I think IEI 4w5 > EII.

[para]

EII with strong Ni. Fi ego seems apparent, IMO.

[Avalonia]

My typing of him is IEI, I intend on writing an analysis on him sometime, at least after I've written about more Delta types.

[meadowmaster]

If you are going by quadra to type him Beta really can't be considered a good option. Unlike Nietzsche who spends a great deal of his time speaking to the importance of changing morals over time, or alpha philosophers like Kant who privilege a style of utilitarian Ethics, Kierkegaard ultimately recommends an individual move away from a concretized system of morals to enter into something of a private relationship with God. This private relationship with God emphasizes the highest endowment of meaning possible and characterizes the individual's movement throughout reality irrevocably once this state is reached. Because of the focus on the emotionality of this relationship, the individual will find themselves gaining all connections to others they have lost in an even strong form than before. I think because the nature of connection is what is ultimately strived for by Kierkegaard and the ability of this to endow meaning he is most likely an lead, and undoubtedly an EII. Most likely EII-Fi subtype. I could see him being Ni most likely in Jung, however. If not EII, ILI-Ni is probably the best type. He seems to truly have a great disregard for Fe/Ti as his Knight of Faith must transcend the ethics they have been brought up with in one full swoop in order to enter into more of an Fi relationship with God. What's more is he seems to privilege the idea of the Knight of Faith being a rather simple individual otherwise who blends in with others, perhaps being something of a simple tax-collector. What is prioritized is his undercover emotional devotion to faith and God, however. This is not to be displayed, or to be used to catalyze social change or renovate ethics. Instead, the individual harmoniously lives in the world while being an undercover devotee to something higher and else. This is a sort of vibe I get from many EIIs quite honestly...they are complacent and kind but underneath their emotions and devotion run strong for something else they feel is divorced from reality and requires no need to explain because it is concretely their valuation and connection to things (thinking like Sufjan Stevens, Charlotte Gainsbourg).

[Bertrand]

I just want to point out Kant is the opposite of utilitarian he is deontological. But I agree with Kierkegaard being EII, he definitely seems Ne over Se

if he's EIE it would only be in the way Hegel is EIE which is to say he is attempting to sway the course of history

[meadowmaster]

Hmm...that's a very Kantian way of looking at it which is respectful. But ultimately while his kingdom of ends is theoretically based upon his theory of mind, it advocates for incredibly utilitarian principles. That was the sort of Kantian side that really annoyed Nietzsche...he felt he found a convoluted theory of mind to simply advocate for a utilitarian ethics. I don't fully agree with that because I think the KVR stands on its own as an important expression for Kant, but he must have had a drive towards a sort of utilitarianism underneath his theory.

[meadowmaster]

Other quick note: There are definitely similarities between Kierkegaard and Spinoza (maybe even more so than Nietzsche and Kierkegaard who are commonly compared) who I also see as being a very clear Fi/Te philosopher. I think Spinoza would likely be ILI-Ni with a strong ethical side as opposed to EII however.

[Bertrand]

you can subsume anything into utilitarianism except for pure evil, but it doesn't mean Kant considered himself a utilitarian or that the academy defines him as such. ultimately if you use such a broad definition of utilitarian we are all utilitarians, which is true, but it just kicks it back to Kant to describe the best method of being utilitarian, which the "utilitarians" tend to disagree with, which leaves us where we started

I think Nietzsche's point was not that Kant was a utilitarian so much as that nature itself imbues humans with the unavoidable quality of either improving mankind or dying out (that which does not kill me makes me stronger). in other words, even the villians, and the saints, and the average, all bring something to the table that has cause for existing because anything completely worthless is selected out over time. in this sense everyone has utility, and Kant too, even as he did a lot of things Nietzsche would call "anti life", the same with Christianity (which was really his beef with Kant, that he was a Christian--and the problem with Christianity is it tends to make a virtue out of subverting this fact of nature, which would be the only form of "true death" were it to succeed). the deal with Nietzsche is he held everything in a dialectic tension such that he can call Kant a utilitarian out of one side of his mouth, anti-life out of the other, and still fully comprehend his base deontological stance. that's what made Nietzsche so sophisticated but at the same time widely misunderstood (to this day), because people read him too straightforwardly. the bottom line is he saw in Kant the desire for the "betterment of humanity" thus a "utilitarian" urge, but he also condemned him for sanctioning a mode of thought (Christianity) that he saw as a credible threat to the future wellbeing of all humanity, inasmuch as it spiritualized weakness, and humanity only exists inasmuch as "the strong survive" so by enshrining this denail it functioned as a kind of "rot" at the center of western culture that would ultimately lead to its downfall

Jung was actually quite aware of all this, which is why the Jungian take on this Christian dynamic is actually redemptive of the tradition, because in some sense Nietzsche was not wrong. God bless the German idealist tradition

[meadowmaster]

Yeah I definitely don't think the many considered himself utilitarian. His project was clearly to enumerate what he saw as the capabilities of the mind and then draw conclusions about what would be best for people to do from this...but personally I see those conclusions as conforming fairly well with a notion of what is best for the greatest number of people.

I don't think the definition is too broad. This is someone who stated the following:

“act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”

to me that seems squarely utilitarian.

[Bertrand]

you have to understand that Kant viewed all humans as "mini independent legislators" meaning via their behavior they acted out rules. He said for that behavior to be "moral" it had to be such that, as legislature, the acts they committed had to be of that kind that the rule or principle they were based on could be abstracted out and applied to everyone. Otherwise it was not a rule worth adopting, if for no other reason than it was by definition impossible for everyone to adopt all at the same time and there not be a contradiction, i.e.: it would be irrational.

utilitarians place no such qualification on behavior in order to consider it "moral" rather they look to the consequences of the act. the act is good inasmuch as the consequences are good. there is no such rational consistency demanded between time and space and the underlying rule. in other words, Kant would say if you act as if "lying is bad" lying is either bad all the time for everyone or it is not strictly speaking bad (there is no absolute prohibition on it). whereas utilitarians would say sometimes lying is good sometimes its bad, depends on the results of the lie. I analogize the difference between Kant and utilitarianism as the difference between LII and ILI

Kant actually does tend to think lying is bad and that if you have Nazis at your door the best way to deal with that situation is not to lie, but that if people were good Kantians it would preclude an ideology like national socialism from taking root in the first place. he wants to know the absolute value of moral claims not their exigent value in order to derive a foundation for a transcendent morality not just a context bound series of reactions. what ILI disagrees with is if such a thing is even in principle possible. Kant would say something like unless we can drill down to absolute values there is only relativism that is time (4d) space (2/3d) and culturally bound (5d)

[para]

I've changed my mind: he's probably IEI.

[strrrng]

IEI > EII. The way he wrote about sin and despair and encapsulated his conception of humanity in The Sickness Unto Death was more NiFe than FiNe, both because the subject matter is more stereotypically in the realm of Fi and because of his writing style. The discourse is more of an extended reflection on the undercurrents of said topics than a definitive taking of a stance, or any kind of "ethical" declaration. For example, talking about sin in terms of "not knowing, not wanting to know and wanting to know," in such a way that theoretical boundaries can be drawn on something he accepts as relatively nebulous, is a far cry from something like Dostoevsky intimating at a struggle to come to terms with what faith is supposed to be for the hero of a novel.

[AbsoluteIdealist]

IEI > EII. The way he wrote about sin and despair and encapsulated his conception of humanity in The Sickness Unto Death was more NiFe than FiNe, both because the subject matter is more stereotypically in the realm of Fi and because of his writing style. The discourse is more of an extended reflection on the undercurrents of said topics than a definitive taking of a stance, or any kind of "ethical" declaration. For example, talking about sin in terms of "not knowing, not wanting to know and wanting to know," in such a way that theoretical boundaries can be drawn on something he accepts as relatively nebulous, is a far cry from something like Dostoevsky intimating at a struggle to come to terms with what faith is supposed to be for the hero of a novel.

I would agree IEI > EII, but here is some thinking regarding why IEE may actually be more helpful for comprehensive understanding of Kierkegaard's contributions to philosophy in relation to socionics:

Bert Dreyfus has previously demonstrated that the characters throughout Dostoevsky's novels correspond precisely to Kierkegaard's dialectics of inward subjectivity in relation to the other. For example, Ivan of BK corresponds clearly to the ethical life stage where the unconditional commitment is conceived to be an absolute commitment to mind. Essential existential differences between religiousness A and B may be discerned in comparing Prince Myshkin (The Idiot) with Alyosha (BK). I would extend this logic also to novels such as Les Miserables, where Fantine may be conceptualized as being a knight of infinite resignation, Javert is clearly ethical once again, and Valjean is clearly a knight of faith in the sense of having an unconditional existential commitment to Cosette. This is the relation which relates itself by relating to another, transparently grounded in the Power (e.g. for religiousness B, Alyosha's identity is grounded by unconditional commitment to Father Zoshima, Valjean's by unconditional commitment to Cosette) which posited it.

You all probably are aware this notion of the self from Hegel is emphasizing the form of "how" an individual relates to himself and something other. One important part of his existentialism, the meaning of CUP's "truth is subjectivity," is the value of how to relate to self or other, and this eventually leads to Heidegger with the notions of the ethical virtuouso and authenticity.

Given that what is absolute truth for Kierkegaard is this relation and nothing other ("God is precisely how an individual relates to God."), might it make more complete sense to posit Kierkegaard as IEE (but not ESI)? I think this is very likely because is it not the case that Fi is precisely about discerning how to relate to self and others, so that e.g. ESI is very confident in relationships, and IEE is most talented with respect to relating to others.

Also, is it not the case that IEE is holographic-panoramic cognition, which is described as "either-or" thinking? Although the truth represented by Kierkegaard's work of the same name is that disjunctive logic contradicts itself even as Judge Wilhelm attempts to use it (or Javert or Ivan for that matter...), is it not true that Kierkegaard does retain formal disjunctive logic for existentialism because of the following reason - namely, Kierkegaard's two religious stages are just two alternative holographic-panoramic forms of conceiving a more complete relationship between an aesthetic lifestyle and and ethical commitment, so that these religious stages are sublations but not in the dialectical-algorithmic form of cognition? E.g. in the case of Abraham, the unconditional commitment to Isaac which is lived through the leap of faith or absolute certainty and confidence that God will provide Isaac despite seeing the knife hang over the beloved: there is, for Abraham, always infinite aesthetic possibility in spite of natural necessity for the finite individual of Isaac in the temporal world, balanced nonetheless by the ethical possibility for new necessary commitments to something finite in an infinite manner, making that temporal relation between the two eternal.

I suppose IEI is the other way of thinking about Kierkegaard's type that makes sense. More concretely, it is clear that Kierkegaard's dialectics of inwardness develop in a contingent vortical way of representing the self and other, inner and outer, etc as they should for an IEI. What makes me think perhaps IEI is merely this. Either type seems to make great sense. I generally prioritize the typings of strrrng and silke particularly highly, and they are both IEI's so they may relate strongly, identify to a great degree. I believe it has been observed that a type generally has dual forms of cognition, so that e.g. an IEI would have its dual form of cognition, the holographic cognitive form of IEE, in addition to the vortical cognition natural to it. This observation only increases the confidence that Kierkegaard was either an IEE or an IEI. I do see EII as a possibility, given the introversion, the clearly Delta values in opposition to the conception of God that appears to me more beta with absolute idealism, etc.

Kierkegaard's work, I think many would agree, must properly be comprehended in relation to hegelianism. There is a great book by Jon Stewart, "Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel reconsidered," which provides factual evidence to refute the presupposition Kierkegaard was directly refuting Hegel himself, but was more generally opposed to the hegelianism of Denmark at the time. In any case, Kierkegaard certainly seems to me to be opposed to Ti with his statement that truth is subjectivity for the following reasoning: Kierkegaard's entire existentialism is exploring possible ways of living in which the self is in harmony practically, existentially; for this reason, myself and my philosophy professor friends like to read Kierkegaard as directly complimentary to William James. Is pragmatism not emphasizing Te? I sincerely do not know as I have not spent any attention on socionics theory for years literally, so I have forgotten, but it seems plausible. Also, Hegel's thought is cited correctly I believe as qualified as the culmination of the dialectic form of cognition. He is cited as EIE or ILI; to me, is he not - consistent with his logic - a type of both-and, perhaps also IEI-ish as strnng seemed to include in his beta nf suggestion of his type?

[Thus side note: It seems most reasonable, is it not, to suggest as Gluenko himself has, that any individual does not have one certain type fixed for a lifetime, though they do have natural temperment determined by substantial differences. It does seem plausible that certain forms of personality are substantiated in essential differences at genetic conception. Nevertheless, is it not the point of Kierkegaard's entire project, as well as the metaphysics he was responding to, that personality in nature is not the truth of the individual. Instead, the self is the commitment which is formed through taking into account both nature and freedom, so that Kierkegaard's project has been interpreted correctly as a cultural argument (i.e. "dogmatic" per dreyfus) rather than a strictly absolutely logical one.]

Lastly, good work by the likes of Zizek as well as Dreyfus has thought of Kierkegaard's dialectics as a project of retroactively positing necessity in something contingent from an existential perspective. This also seems to be in line with the holographic-panoramic cognitive and perhaps the IEI's forms of thinking.

In any case, I will not shit you with the so called modesty of "this is all speculation etc etc" -- I certainly conclude it is better to conceive him as thinking of content with the form of cognition of IEE as opposed to IEI, though proper to my committed metaphysical views I like to think that this opposition nonetheless in essence is reconciled in a higher identity. I think he is likely incorrectly classed as simply IEI because he is perceived to be poetic in the sense that Nietszche is. Yes and no. Kierkegaard was the only existentialist who proposed a coherent logic of some sort, though it is certainly not logic in the classical sense. His logic is rather a procedural, external logic (Te by definition, you know?) where necessity is posited for some thing or commitment in the functioning world. This is part of the inspiration for Heidegger's pragmatic ready to hand.

But he is a clear introvert? Yes, but is it not the case that (e.g. Hegel if everyone insists he is EIE - personally think he's more ILI-like) subtype makes technically extroverted types into introverted types in effect, for all intents and purposes? I'd encourage anyone not to make the mistake Jung and CS lewis of interpreting Kierkegaard's writings as neurotic poetic ramblings. He crafted Either/Or very intentionally, with a clear logic (one which to me seems in the final analysis exceptionally holographic-panoramic.). See for example stephen dunning's book "kierkegaard's dialectics of inwardness" to become persuaded that Kierkegaard's entire writings may be conceived as systematic in a way analogous to the german idealists, with a purposeful development, though again, not in a dialectic algorithmic sense exactly because this logic is not classical formal logic.)

This typing would help to tell a narrative of Kierkegaard as in some respects a great "completion" or full picturing of the real determinations qualifying IEE-ESI philosophy started by Christianity and Dante, in a similar way to Liebnez (and spinoza?) starting and Kant "completing" the philosophy of LII (also holographical-panoramic), or Heraclitus starting and Hegel "completing" the philosophy of ILI-EIE (dialectical-algorithmic); or Aristotle, Descartes, (and Spinoza? any recommendations on his type are welcomed; his is an especially important metaphysics no?) starting and Logical Positivism "completing" the Causal-Determinist philosophy of LSI-ILE; or Darwin and Smith developing vortical-synergetic "completions" / "launchpads" of evolution and capitalism - no doubt these are both launchpads as well as completions in a sense absolute or total completions of the real determinations and reflections of preceding related works).

What do you guys think? Would love to develop this discussion further, thanks!

Ps, this is the user named limitless from several years ago haha, in case anyone remembers.

[Dauphin]

The fact that Jung misunderstood Kierkegaard is disappointing, but revealing about his character. Kierkegaard was much more human than Jung, that is, he didn't place himself outside humanity in his philosophical and psychological investigation like Jung seems to. Jung, despite writing about fantastic subjects, was much colder and more scientific in his perspective. He's closer to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, as both of them also took a godlike distant view of humanity. Kierkegaard can be considered to be the greater man and the greater thinker than the three aforementioned men precisely because he wrote as a mere man interrogating himself, without making claim to objectivity. Ludwig Wittgenstein was able to see this in his readings of Kierkegaard and actually considered himself to be a lesser man than him.

[strrrng]

I would agree IEI > EII, but here is some thinking regarding why IEE may actually be more helpful for comprehensive understanding of Kierkegaard's contributions to philosophy in relation to socionics:

Bert Dreyfus has previously demonstrated that the characters throughout Dostoevsky's novels correspond precisely to Kierkegaard's dialectics of inward subjectivity in relation to the other. For example, Ivan of BK corresponds clearly to the ethical life stage where the unconditional commitment is conceived to be an absolute commitment to mind. Essential existential differences between religiousness A and B may be discerned in comparing Prince Myshkin (The Idiot) with Alyosha (BK). I would extend this logic also to novels such as Les Miserables, where Fantine may be conceptualized as being a knight of infinite resignation, Javert is clearly ethical once again, and Valjean is clearly a knight of faith in the sense of having an unconditional existential commitment to Cosette. This is the relation which relates itself by relating to another, transparently grounded in the Power (e.g. for religiousness B, Alyosha's identity is grounded by unconditional commitment to Father Zoshima, Valjean's by unconditional commitment to Cosette) which posited it.

You all probably are aware this notion of the self from Hegel is emphasizing the form of "how" an individual relates to himself and something other. One important part of his existentialism, the meaning of CUP's "truth is subjectivity," is the value of how to relate to self or other, and this eventually leads to Heidegger with the notions of the ethical virtuouso and authenticity.

Interesting. I haven't read Les Miserables, but you seem to be getting at a kind of disjunction between the finer points of the system of someone like Hegel and how this actually affirms some of Kierkegaard's thoughts. To me he always seemed aware of a more balanced form of the other—his dialectics were more an expression of a necessary progression to affirm identity than an actual structure. I think he picked up on the fact that Hegel was right about the necessity of alterity in any spiritual process, whereas the parallel between his stages and Karamazov would anchor his intent in a way that would even things out.

This would shed light on the IEI typing, as IEIs and EIEs have a tendency to overshadow each other due to how diametrical DA and VS cognition are in the context of beta. I would expect a delta NF to either completely disregard the dialectical processes he drew from, or simply establish a precept and move on without much reference.

Given that what is absolute truth for Kierkegaard is this relation and nothing other ("God is precisely how an individual relates to God."), might it make more complete sense to posit Kierkegaard as IEE (but not ESI)? I think this is very likely because is it not the case that Fi is precisely about discerning how to relate to self and others, so that e.g. ESI is very confident in relationships, and IEE is most talented with respect to relating to others.

I don't think the kind of relating he was positing with that idea was the same kind you're referring to with IEE. Kierkegaard seemed to more or less be saying that there's something standalone about man's relationship to God—his whole point was that if it isn't posited as such, with all the attendant sacrifices that doing so entails, then it may as well just be a pseudo-utilitarian gesture. This kind of singular commitment to an ideal that can never be limited by external circumstances resonates more with IEI than delta NF for me.

Also, is it not the case that IEE is holographic-panoramic cognition, which is described as "either-or" thinking? Although the truth represented by Kierkegaard's work of the same name is that disjunctive logic contradicts itself even as Judge Wilhelm attempts to use it (or Javert or Ivan for that matter...), is it not true that Kierkegaard does retain formal disjunctive logic for existentialism because of the following reason - namely, Kierkegaard's two religious stages are just two alternative holographic-panoramic forms of conceiving a more complete relationship between an aesthetic lifestyle and and ethical commitment, so that these religious stages are sublations but not in the dialectical-algorithmic form of cognition? E.g. in the case of Abraham, the unconditional commitment to Isaac which is lived through the leap of faith or absolute certainty and confidence that God will provide Isaac despite seeing the knife hang over the beloved: there is, for Abraham, always infinite aesthetic possibility in spite of natural necessity for the finite individual of Isaac in the temporal world, balanced nonetheless by the ethical possibility for new necessary commitments to something finite in an infinite manner, making that temporal relation between the two eternal.

I completely agree with your assessment of the dialectic surrounding Abraham. But I don't think his stages are reflective of holographic. The "either/or" in that cognition is more about contextual variation, not simply that two aspects complement each other. And the way they complement each other is not really static-y, i.e. each one is completely self-contained in a process that allows for an emergent synthesis. It could go different ways, this is just how I interpreted it.

I suppose IEI is the other way of thinking about Kierkegaard's type that makes sense. More concretely, it is clear that Kierkegaard's dialectics of inwardness develop in a contingent vortical way of representing the self and other, inner and outer, etc as they should for an IEI. What makes me think perhaps IEI is merely this. Either type seems to make great sense. I generally prioritize the typings of strrrng and silke particularly highly, and they are both IEI's so they may relate strongly, identify to a great degree. I believe it has been observed that a type generally has dual forms of cognition, so that e.g. an IEI would have its dual form of cognition, the holographic cognitive form of IEE, in addition to the vortical cognition natural to it. This observation only increases the confidence that Kierkegaard was either an IEE or an IEI. I do see EII as a possibility, given the introversion, the clearly Delta values in opposition to the conception of God that appears to me more beta with absolute idealism, etc.

Thanks. And yeah, I do relate in a way. I wouldn't espouse the form of commitment he did, but he at least recognized that spirituality isn't just an exercise. I'm not saying deltas do, but the way they formulate existential ideas IMO is more about the symbols that house them, in a way that allows anyone to trace steps without getting too mired in inner convolutions.

Kierkegaard's work, I think many would agree, must properly be comprehended in relation to hegelianism. There is a great book by Jon Stewart, "Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel reconsidered," which provides factual evidence to refute the presupposition Kierkegaard was directly refuting Hegel himself, but was more generally opposed to the hegelianism of Denmark at the time. In any case, Kierkegaard certainly seems to me to be opposed to Ti with his statement that truth is subjectivity for the following reasoning: Kierkegaard's entire existentialism is exploring possible ways of living in which the self is in harmony practically, existentially; for this reason, myself and my philosophy professor friends like to read Kierkegaard as directly complimentary to William James. Is pragmatism not emphasizing Te? I sincerely do not know as I have not spent any attention on socionics theory for years literally, so I have forgotten, but it seems plausible. Also, Hegel's thought is cited correctly I believe as qualified as the culmination of the dialectic form of cognition. He is cited as EIE or ILI; to me, is he not - consistent with his logic - a type of both-and, perhaps also IEI-ish as strnng seemed to include in his beta nf suggestion of his type?

The truth is subjectivity could go either way. Betas do tend to be more absolute, but if I'm not mistaken, his efforts had to do with reconciling whatever truth there is with subjective experience. Not sure though. I've noticed in the past that a lot of gammas will get irritated with betas constantly positing self-referential concepts.

Lastly, good work by the likes of Zizek as well as Dreyfus has thought of Kierkegaard's dialectics as a project of retroactively positing necessity in something contingent from an existential perspective. This also seems to be in line with the holographic-panoramic cognitive and perhaps the IEI's forms of thinking.

Yeah, Zizek is big on retroactivity, though I haven't heard much of what he has to say about how it applies to Kierkegaard.

In any case, I will not shit you with the so called modesty of "this is all speculation etc etc" -- I certainly conclude it is better to conceive him as thinking of content with the form of cognition of IEE as opposed to IEI, though proper to my committed metaphysical views I like to think that this opposition nonetheless in essence is reconciled in a higher identity. I think he is likely incorrectly classed as simply IEI because he is perceived to be poetic in the sense that Nietszche is. Yes and no. Kierkegaard was the only existentialist who proposed a coherent logic of some sort, though it is certainly not logic in the classical sense. His logic is rather a procedural, external logic (Te by definition, you know?) where necessity is posited for some thing or commitment in the functioning world. This is part of the inspiration for Heidegger's pragmatic ready to hand.

Could you expand on the procedural aspect of his logic?

But he is a clear introvert? Yes, but is it not the case that (e.g. Hegel if everyone insists he is EIE - personally think he's more ILI-like) subtype makes technically extroverted types into introverted types in effect, for all intents and purposes? I'd encourage anyone not to make the mistake Jung and CS lewis of interpreting Kierkegaard's writings as neurotic poetic ramblings. He crafted Either/Or very intentionally, with a clear logic (one which to me seems in the final analysis exceptionally holographic-panoramic.). See for example stephen dunning's book "kierkegaard's dialectics of inwardness" to become persuaded that Kierkegaard's entire writings may be conceived as systematic in a way analogous to the german idealists, with a purposeful development, though again, not in a dialectic algorithmic sense exactly because this logic is not classical formal logic.)

How do you see Either/Or evincing that cognition?

This typing would help to tell a narrative of Kierkegaard as in some respects a great "completion" or full picturing of the real determinations qualifying IEE-ESI philosophy started by Christianity and Dante, in a similar way to Liebnez (and spinoza?) starting and Kant "completing" the philosophy of LII (also holographical-panoramic), or Heraclitus starting and Hegel "completing" the philosophy of ILI-EIE (dialectical-algorithmic); or Aristotle, Descartes, (and Spinoza? any recommendations on his type are welcomed; his is an especially important metaphysics no?) starting and Logical Positivism "completing" the Causal-Determinist philosophy of LSI-ILE; or Darwin and Smith developing vortical-synergetic "completions" / "launchpads" of evolution and capitalism - no doubt these are both launchpads as well as completions in a sense absolute or total completions of the real determinations and reflections of preceding related works).

It's interesting, I just wonder what to make of his influence on Camus.