Or IM element definition, or information aspect definition. Whatever. Definitions can be logically evaluated if they're inferred from axioms or if they're part of a system which makes claims that support or contradict them, inferred definitions can be evaluated based on both, non-inferential "just stated" ones only the latter. Is it still possible to logically argue for or against function definitions outside of that ? The claims made in typology regarding definitions do not solely pertain to reality itself but to how patterns/phenomena present in it can be categorized and labeled. What I mean by the labeling/categorizing thing is how, for example, a Typology system says 'Si is X', implying 'X exists' but not merely stopping at an establishment of it's existence and going on to give it a certain label. What I am concerned with is the labeling aspect (and yeah, defining can be and mostly is clarification of the meaning of a given label rather than creating it, doesn't affect what my main point here). This allows for most if not all definitions to be considered and judged as true or false, but only in so far as they remain contained within greater systems, for any method that would be required for doing such is dependent on further claims that system would have to make outside of the definitions themselves. A definition in a vacuum does not lend itself to such.