Originally Posted by
Bertrand
i think he's implying but leaving out that there's a distinction between conflict on the level of understanding and physical or actual conflict, one does not inevitably cause the other, in other words, one can get a handle on miscommunications. but it does sort of beg the question, because it further implies that there's conflict arising out of something other than miscommunication, and you might say that if we all had perfect mutual understanding there would be no conflict, but what he's saying is that even with perfect understanding there would nevertheless be conflict, otherwise the two simply are identical (conflict = conflict) simply distributed differently in time. this is an interesting implication because I can see it possibly being both ways, but I think we will never really know what is actually the case because we will likely never perfect communication and understanding well enough to find out whether or not that resolves all actual conflict. in other words, this is precisely what philosophers debate, whether all evil is fundamentally a form of ignorance or whether it exists in a positive capacity despite knowing better. i.e.: is their evil that knows itself to be evil, or is all evil a product of well intentioned misunderstandings and miscommunications. I think this is itself a psychological perspective, meaning what you think is where you personally are conservative, some people don't risk or manipulate some information and others do. in other words, if you're conservative on ethics the position is essentially "always do the right thing" and spend all energy on figuring out the logical situation and the "real" facts, this would be like sensing/logic types.
another way to look at is physical conflict is itself not an ethical thing, rather its simply a form of ethically neutral communication in of itself, thus conflict on the level of understanding and physical conflict are distinguishable simply by their mode of instantiation namely physical v abstract. in that sense they are distinguishable because despite the fact they one may lead to the other via escalation, it does not imply anything "went wrong" or that there was any kind of moral stake at all in play, thus there is no reason to think that distinguishing them presents a moral problem by reverse implication that doing so negates the proposition that evil is a product of misunderstanding. its not a product of misunderstanding because violence as a product of misunderstanding is not in fact evil, its just an extended form of communication difficulties resolving themselves. this is probably the more Fi polr position
anyway there's a lot going on here