Demonstrative and Mobilizing functions are Accepting NOT Producing.

[Soupman]

i think polr is when you subconsciously make something your life's mission and that's where you're seeing the Te

to me its got this deeply recessed quality under-riding a bunch of Fe noise, athough you may ultimately be right and I have it switched

I feel like he's essentially verbalizing what amount to feeling judgements and its hook is the "lyrical" quality to them--its the inviting appearance of substance, but there never is any. I feel like ILI would be throwing out plausible hypothesis, but these aren't actually plausible, they're more like thinly veiled conspiracy theories. its these synthetic descriptions arising out of feeling premises aimed at the logical theories themselves have an implicit aim, but none of it is logical its quixotic to the max, the kind of Te that is Te polr and is in keeping with how I think beta closes itself out.. by this I mean this is what it takes to unwind an endless bureaucracy and not go insane. balzac just submits, which I think is the basis for their admiration of maxim, in a brutal depraved kind of way, in other words, balzac recognizes the futility, or if not futility prohibitive effort at the onset to try and fight maxim, and secretely envies him for that fact, and can do that because the logic dominates the ethic, if it weren't so he would simply fight it for the abomination it is

I just don't think balzac stands for this particular brand of weirdness, this seems more like normative Ti. and this is where the plausibiltiy thing comes in, I think he'd have a real shot if the Ti were 4d because it would stand a chance of developing things on the level of logic, but there's no logical novelty or development here--there's no real contribution or even an attempt at contribution, he's not going to the logic he's talking about the logic, its not like developing a further theory that criticizes it in order to replace it, its more like the science-populizer kind of talk--the ethical supplement to the real logical workers, this time on the offense in a more negative capacity. its rote recitations of existing logical concepts applied to bizarre feeling based premises as far as I can tell. they may not even be that bizzarre, its like if you take the premise that socionics causes more harm than good and have observed as much in your own life, it seems like people might try to be a reverse-evangelist to the people and try to redirect them onto science. I think balzac is characterized by a high degree of fatalism too, like I have a friend that I can see pieces of Singu in, but they would never devote this kind of effort to the task because they could see how it ends up front, I think ethical intuitions work differently but thats a whole other thing. suffice to say balzac is more fatalistic so-why-bother, IEI is fatalistic but totally ok with that fact for some crazy reason, probably because they're tripping the whole time anyway

niehls bohr didn't just shit talk einstein, etc. maybe that's the manifestation of "unhealth" but I don't feel like that's it at all, this feels more like a misplaced attempt at involution for some ethical purpose

You maybe right but I'm weary of typing people who don't understand/disagree with me as IEI (or another type), because 6 years ago Roan "Aestrivex" LaPlante called me an IEI after I kept voicing my disagreements with him about socionics and quadra values. It's a pretty significant and toxic memory.

[Singu]

@Soupman Ok... and how do you think you can "test" something that was inductively "derived"... as that is just a summary of an observation? You can't test summaries. Summaries are not theories.

This isn't a fundamental disagreement due to differences in thinking etc, it's just a common misconception. I used to think that "science" had to do with "empiricism" and all that crap, but I looked into it and it turns out that that wasn't the case. Empiricism is a rather old and outdated philosophy, and science has largely moved onto rationalism, critical rationalism and falsificationism.

Just look up the "problem of induction". Google it. If you don't understand this problem first, then you're not going to get it. You're just going to be stuck in a lower dimension of thinking and running around in circle, trying to "justify" empiricism.

[Singu]

Constructivism is an epistemological philosophy created by the psychologist Piaget, mostly to be applied to education, sociology and psychology. It has nothing to do with scientific epistemology.

[Singu]

lol @ Bertrand pretty much saying the same thing that I'm saying, just months ago:

the standard is "wow we predicted planets existing before we could observe them--not x planet will be at y location down the exact coordinates"-- it is enough that the planet be predicted to be there, that allows the theory sufficient acceptance to be later refined. it is precisely through this imaginative process that new knowledge is created, the idea that you can only proceed linearly from observation in developing theory cuts an entire half off of the development of human knowledge. it would essentially limit all potential knowledge to the currently accepted paradigm, which is stupid

- http://www.the16types.info/vbulletin...-reading/page8

Yes, this is the rationalist method, which I would pretty much agree with.

I guess he'd just been doing some cut-and-paste job of Kuhn or something, so he didn't even digest what he was apparently saying. But of course what I'm saying is Popperian, not Kuhnian. Kuhnian "paradigm shift" is nonsense, and that's not how science actually progresses. No comment for this is necessarily Bertrand, as it would be yet another clusterfuck.

[niffer]

[Singu]

What I'm saying is nothing more than Popperian. Popper was the fiercest critic of inductivism:

Conjectures and Refutations, Karl Popper

5. Back to the Presocratics

...

There is a widespread belief, somewhat remotely due, I think, to the influence of Francis Bacon, that one should study the problems of the theory of knowledge in connection with our knowledge of an orange rather than our knowledge of the cosmos. I dissent from this belief, and it is one of the main purposes of my paper to convey to you some of my reasons for dissenting.

At any rate it is good to remember from time to time that our Western science—and there seems to be no other—did not start with collecting observations of oranges, but with bold theories about the world.

III

Traditional empiricist epistemology and the traditional historiography of science are both deeply influenced by the Baconian myth that all science starts from observation and then slowly and cautiously proceeds to theories. That the facts are very different can be learned from studying the early Presocratics. Here we find bold and fascinating ideas, some of which are strange and even staggering anticipations of modern results, while many others are wide of the mark, from our modern point of view; but most of them, and the best of them, have nothing to do with observation. Take for example some of the theories about the shape and position of the earth. Thales said, we are told, ‘that the earth is supported by water on which it rides like a ship, and when we say that there is an earthquake, then the earth is being shaken by the movement of the water’. No doubt Thales had observed earthquakes as well as the rolling of a ship before he arrived at his theory. But the point of his theory was to explain the support or suspension of the earth, and also earthquakes, by the conjecture that the earth floats on water; and for this conjecture (which so strangely anticipates the modern theory of continental drift) he could have had no basis in his observations.

We must not forget that the function of the Baconian myth is to explain why scientific statements are true, by pointing out that observation is the ‘true source’ of our scientific knowledge. Once we realize that all scientific statements are hypotheses, or guesses, or conjectures, and that the vast majority of these conjectures (including Bacon’s own) have turned out to be false, the Baconian myth becomes irrelevant. For it is pointless to argue that the conjectures of science—those which have proved to be false as well as those which are still accepted—all start from observation.

However this may be, Thales’ beautiful theory of the support or suspension of the earth and of earthquakes, though in no sense based upon observation, is at least inspired by an empirical or observational analogy. But even this is no longer true of the theory proposed by Thales’ great pupil, Anaximander. Anaximander’s theory of the suspension of the earth is still highly intuitive, but it no longer uses observational analogies. In fact it may be described as counter-observational. According to Anaximander’s theory, ‘The earth … is held up by nothing, but remains stationary owing to the fact that it is equally distant from all other things. Its shape is … like that of a drum. … We walk on one of its flat surfaces, while the other is on the opposite side.’ The drum, of course, is an observational analogy. But the idea of the earth’s free suspension in space, and the explanation of its stability, have no analogy whatever in the whole field of observable facts.

In my opinion this idea of Anaximander’s is one of the boldest, most revolutionary, and most portentous ideas in the whole history of human thought. It made possible the theories of Aristarchus and of Copernicus. But the step taken by Anaximander was even more difficult and audacious than the one taken by Aristarchus and Copernicus. To envisage the earth as freely poised in mid-space, and to say ‘that it remains motionless because of its equidistance or equilibrium’ (as Aristotle paraphrases Anaximander), is to anticipate to some extent even Newton’s idea of immaterial and invisible gravitational forces.

IV

How did Anaximander arrive at this remarkable theory? Certainly not by observation but by reasoning. His theory is an attempt to solve one of the problems to which his teacher and kinsman Thales, the founder of the Milesian or Ionian School, had offered a solution before him. I therefore conjecture that Anaximander arrived at his theory by criticizing Thales’ theory. This conjecture can be supported, I believe, by a consideration of the structure of Anaximander’s theory.

...

[domr]

I get it now. Accepting/Producing is a band-aid fix to explain duality:

Your dual's leading is accepting & creative is producing. If suggestive is accepting and mobilizing is producing then it perfectly mirrors your dual's ego block functions = perfect match.

The problem is this total breaks other relationships such as quasi-identical. Your leading is accepting & creative is producing. If your demonstrative is accepting and ignoring is producing then this mirrors your quasi-identicals ego block functions = perfect conflict.