Iran starts its first nuclear reactor today

[Capitalist Pig]

Ok, I'm legitimately curious: Why is everyone convinced that Persians will unite an Arabian Middle East?

I'm simply thinking that having a nuclear accident in 2010 requires extreme negligence in hiring and training practices and a complete lack of self-preservation within the state's borders.

Who said it will happen in 2010? Accidents do happen from time to time. You'd think the same about having an oil accident, or a spaceship blowing up, or a conspiracy to hijack a bunch of airliners and crash them into skyscrapers. All examples of things that have happened in the past decade alone.

[717495]

It's all so simple.

[Socionics Is A Cult]

I doubt there'll be an "accident". Russian health and safety wouldn't allow it.

[Begoner]

Iran certainly will not unify the Middle East -- its population is mostly Shi'ite and non-Arabic while most Middle Eastern countries have a mostly Sunni Arabic population. Ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences are important everywhere in the world (Belgium is a good example of an industrialized country which lacks cohesion because of the differences between French speakers and Dutch speakers), but especially so in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Iran is seen by many to be a bulwark against American (and, to a lesser extent, Israeli) imperialism. A recent poll asked Egyptians whether they thought Iran was developing nuclear weapons or nuclear power for civilian use. Among those who thought the latter, 97% thought Iran should be allowed to continue along their current trajectory; even among those who thought the former, a shocking 81% felt that Iran had a right to its nuclear program.

However, the US seems to be taking a comparatively soft line on Iran presently. If the Israelis had their way, they would bomb Iran, thereby consolidating Ahmadinejad's power, galvanizing Iran's public, and virtually guaranteeing that Iran would manufacture a nuclear weapon. As things stand, however, the American-sponsored reform movement in Iran is a powerful destabilizing force that is preventing the regime from taking too hard-line a stance. Thus, it is possible that if the US does not take an overly bellicose approach, Iran will join Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, et al. in having a puppet government subservient to the US.

[Jimbean]

Iran certainly will not unify the Middle East -- its population is mostly Shi'ite and non-Arabic while most Middle Eastern countries have a mostly Sunni Arabic population. Ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences are important everywhere in the world (Belgium is a good example of an industrialized country which lacks cohesion because of the differences between French speakers and Dutch speakers), but especially so in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Iran is seen by many to be a bulwark against American (and, to a lesser extent, Israeli) imperialism. A recent poll asked Egyptians whether they thought Iran was developing nuclear weapons or nuclear power for civilian use. Among those who thought the latter, 97% thought Iran should be allowed to continue along their current trajectory; even among those who thought the former, a shocking 81% felt that Iran had a right to its nuclear program.

However, the US seems to be taking a comparatively soft line on Iran presently. If the Israelis had their way, they would bomb Iran, thereby consolidating Ahmadinejad's power, galvanizing Iran's public, and virtually guaranteeing that Iran would manufacture a nuclear weapon. As things stand, however, the American-sponsored reform movement in Iran is a powerful destabilizing force that is preventing the regime from taking too hard-line a stance. Thus, it is possible that if the US does not take an overly bellicose approach, Iran will join Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, et al. in having a puppet government subservient to the US.

From what I understand, I agree with everything you just said except the last sentence. What makes you think that Iran will be on truly good terms with the US?

[Begoner]

From what I understand, I agree with everything you just said except the last sentence. What makes you think that Iran will be on truly good terms with the US?

I don't think the Iranian population will be on good terms with the US, but the ruling elite might be; essentially, we could see a reprise of the 1953 coup that ousted Mosaddegh from power and replaced him with the Shah. Of course, there are two important differences: the Iranian public is currently more pro-American than it was in 1953 (especially Iranian youth) while the army is more anti-American. However, these two factors do not cancel each other out; while the former makes a coup slightly easier, the latter makes it significantly harder. Nonetheless, there are many Iranian politicians who would stand to benefit from American intervention -- namely, Ahmadinejad's opponents, the opponents of the clerical system, etc.; moreover, Mosaddegh was far more popular in 1953 than Ahmadinejad is now. If the US would can economically isolate Iran, putting additional stress on its already shaky economy, it can create the necessary turmoil to destabilize the current regime and attempt a coup (cf. Chile, 1973).

There are certain factors that render a coup more difficult to effect than it was in 1953 or 1973 (for one, the greater decentralization of the Iranian military), but if the US plays its cards right, it may usher a more amenable government into power.

Alternatively, if the US is willing to adopt a strategy that has a greater chance of success but is more time-consuming, it can wait until the reform movement seizes power. Then, it can provide economic support to Iran to allow the movement to consolidate its power until it is able to win the allegiance of the military, at which point democratic governance will be discontinued. The downside to this approach is that it is uncertain whether the reform movement will be able to ascend to power. Perhaps a good example of a failure of both approaches would be Cuba; initially, the US attempted to stage a coup in Cuba, but was thwarted in its attempt. Later, the US tried to destabilize the Cuban regime through sanctions; however, given its past behavior in Cuba, it was unable to obtain any significant amount of leverage with the people or government of Cuba. As such, Castro's regime has managed to maintain its grip on power for several decades, while the US can only wait for the wounds of the past to heal and a reform movement to gain momentum.

[Jimbean]

I don't think the Iranian population will be on good terms with the US, but the ruling elite might be; essentially, we could see a reprise of the 1953 coup that ousted Mosaddegh from power and replaced him with the Shah. Of course, there are two important differences: the Iranian public is currently more pro-American than it was in 1953 (especially Iranian youth) while the army is more anti-American. However, these two factors do not cancel each other out; while the former makes a coup slightly easier, the latter makes it significantly harder. Nonetheless, there are many Iranian politicians who would stand to benefit from American intervention -- namely, Ahmadinejad's opponents, the opponents of the clerical system, etc.; moreover, Mosaddegh was far more popular in 1953 than Ahmadinejad is now. If the US would can economically isolate Iran, putting additional stress on its already shaky economy, it can create the necessary turmoil to destabilize the current regime and attempt a coup (cf. Chile, 1973).

There are certain factors that render a coup more difficult to effect than it was in 1953 or 1973 (for one, the greater decentralization of the Iranian military), but if the US plays its cards right, it may usher a more amenable government into power.

Alternatively, if the US is willing to adopt a strategy that has a greater chance of success but is more time-consuming, it can wait until the reform movement seizes power. Then, it can provide economic support to Iran to allow the movement to consolidate its power until it is able to win the allegiance of the military, at which point democratic governance will be discontinued. The downside to this approach is that it is uncertain whether the reform movement will be able to ascend to power. Perhaps a good example of a failure of both approaches would be Cuba; initially, the US attempted to stage a coup in Cuba, but was thwarted in its attempt. Later, the US tried to destabilize the Cuban regime through sanctions; however, given its past behavior in Cuba, it was unable to obtain any significant amount of leverage with the people or government of Cuba. As such, Castro's regime has managed to maintain its grip on power for several decades, while the US can only wait for the wounds of the past to heal and a reform movement to gain momentum.

What you are saying is quite possible. What really seems to be important is on the US side of things. Based on many different facets of information, I would think that if the US wanted to strike Iran, they would do it before upcoming election. I think after that, it is going to be too late because of the condition of the economy by that time.

[Creepy-male]

It was bound to happen eventually, the US can't be always paranoid about nuclear technology.... fuck the US instead should just develop better technology, instead of trying to politically control the arms race out of paranoia... you know how badass our technology would be if we just minded our own business and dedicated effort into our own technologic advancement.

Of course this is all complex because there is no one man that makes these decisions, it is subject to social currents, arms makers, politicians, businesses, science/academia, militaries spread across the global climate. But still rapid interventionalism can come to a point where it creates the problem in and of itself.

[Jimbean]

It was bound to happen eventually, the US can't be always paranoid about nuclear technology.... fuck the US instead should just develop better technology, instead of trying to politically control the arms race out of paranoia... you know how badass our technology would be if we just minded our own business and dedicated effort into our own technologic advancement.

Of course this is all complex because there is no one man that makes these decisions, it is subject to social currents, arms makers, politicians, businesses, science/academia, militaries spread across the global climate. But still rapid interventionalism can come to a point where it creates the problem in and of itself.

The whole name of the game is not being better than Iran. Iran currently does not fit into the western elite's global political plan; so they want to take them down or at least replace them.