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Last edited by mfckr; 12-29-2014 at 01:18 AM.
Model A makes the same hypothesis; the only difference is that it pries the individual tendencies apart and denominates it down into further components. So, it's a lot less hassle to say that Ti can deal with morality, when in stupidionics it's analogous to saying Role Fi deals with morality but it is filtered thru Base Ti with influences from both Vulnerable Fe and Ignoring Te. *chokes self*Originally Posted by COOL AND MANLY
is there an end to this test? which one do you want? all of them?
I got 92 on the first one
I'm now on "You're Being Tortured In The Morning: Scenario 1"
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Last edited by mfckr; 12-29-2014 at 01:18 AM.
Yet, I do not agree that moral stances can be derived via Ti. Is this your opinion? I'm not interested in going further if you can't justify it.
Regardless, is morality the only thing we can analyze to type this guy? No, so make an argument for something else.
You tell me. I have no idea why you asked me to take it. The result of that test is meaningless to me.
Meh. To adopt his viewpoint would mean you could as easily extend it beyond animal life even, to plant life, and you're also including in animal life bugs, snails, ants, worms etc etc. meaning that people to have consistency would need to be as aware of the life of an earthworm on the sidewalk as they are of the human being walking next to them. Calling an exterminator for your house would be equivalent to genocide. Pulling carrots from your garden would be the same as roasting your child for dinner. There are different criteria for how different species are treated because they are different in obvious, measurable, tangible ways. They aren't arbitrary distinctions with fuzzy boundaries the way race is.
I imagine he asked you to take it because Ti has a great deal to do with consistency, and that includes consistency in moral judgements. I scored 100%, not because I'm particularly moral, but because my answer for one question was consistent with the answer for another. I didn't have conflicting judgements based on emotional reactions. A consistent ethical framework is far more Ti than Fi. However, I personally think that Singer's trying to stretch things to be the same which are not comparable, and doing so out of an emotional reaction, trying to make his emotions fit something that seems consistent and logical but isn't sound reasoning.
That is an interesting point. Though, apparently most people get around 80% on the test, so I don't think that is relevant. Besides, his wording seems to indicate something else. I think I know what, and I want to say something, but I will wait for his response before jumping to conclusions.
He does come acrossPoLR and
creative so I'll say either EII or LII. I'm not sure whether he's a logical type or an ethical type and I'd have to read more of his writings to make that judgement. I find his idea to kill handicapped newborns extreme, but in the other hand I can see why he would think that.
I found this excerpt interesting though:
"Singer's work has attracted criticism from other philosophers. Bernard Williams, who was a critic of utilitarianism, said of Singer that he "is always so keen to mortify himself and tell everyone how to live". Williams criticised Singer's ethic by saying that he's "always so damn logical" and thus "leaves out an entire dimension of value". Williams claimed that Singer's utilitarianism is impractical as it's impossible to "make these calculations and comparisons in real life"."
“We cannot change the cards we are dealt, just how we play the hand.” Randy Pausch
Ne-IEE
6w7 sp/sx
6w7-9w1-4w5
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Last edited by mfckr; 12-29-2014 at 01:19 AM.
From a simple biological perspective, species is a distinct classification with clear boundaries. Race is not. This is regardless of a person's viewpoint of how humans as a species fit into the rest of the world. My argument is that comparing one species to another is not analogous to comparing one race to another. Singer claiming that it is the same is incorrect, and is merely another way to invoke an emotional appeal.
That's correct.
Species: Homo Sapiens Sapiens and one can think of races as one thinks of breeds of dogs for example, that is, races/breeds are identified based on their appearance and behavior. If you use that criteria, then humans do come in breeds and as if it is not actively practised on this forum...
Ti world it seems - Ti forum I mean.
Last edited by Absurd; 02-15-2013 at 07:40 PM.
What I'm about to say is more tangential, but it's worth pointing out that species classification often isn't as clear-cut and categorical as you might think, and actually tends to be a rather significant dilemma for biologists to sort out (see Species Problem). There's very good reasons per why this is a dilemma too, when for instance one considers how ostensible boundaries between species can be readily blurred by the existence of hybrids, some of which are quite abundant.
The problem isn't limited to non-human species either. What's presently regarded as the human species is a likely confluence of many different hominid species whose evolutionary trajectories branched off and were later reabsorbed over the course of time into the cumulative makeup of 'our' surviving gene pool:
Racial differences arguably constitute mere early stages of the speciation process.This is regardless of a person's viewpoint of how humans as a species fit into the rest of the world. My argument is that comparing one species to another is not analogous to comparing one race to another.
Tangent re: race vs. species aside, I'm assuming that Singer was rhetorically criticizing ethical practices, not biological standards.Singer claiming that it is the same is incorrect, and is merely another way to invoke an emotional appeal.
Further, I'm not sure you've adequately qualified why biological standards—even if we accept species divides as being strictly categorical—necessarily imply ethics of anthropocentric-favoritism.
Last edited by mfckr; 02-15-2013 at 08:56 PM.
I'm familiar with the nitty-gritty of defining species, and disagreements re. the classification in specific detail as well as the issue of hybrids. I've also spent many hours in such tedious tasks as counting teeth in rodent skulls to identify one nearly identical species from another, so I have some frustrating hands-on experience as well, but it's still a simple broad classification with the key issue of reproductive viability at the heart of it. In basic terms, nobody is going to confuse a mouse for an elephant, or a human from a dog and while a person can be several races mixed together, there exists no naturally conceived and reproductively viable animal that is several species mixed together. Two species - yes, as though most mules are infertile, sometimes one isn't, and I'm not sure on such things as ligers etc., but certainly not multiple species mixing easily and producing viable offspring who can reproduce with members of any one of the parent species. In other words, species is still, no matter how carefully defined or how far the edges are pressed still a very different concept from race. A race could perhaps under an extreme bottleneck and isolation become a new species, but that group is far more likely to die out due to likelihood of deleterious mutations being passed on in greater numbers within the much smaller population required for speciation to take place. Inbreeding sucks ass for producing a healthy population, while diversity greatly increases odds of survival.
Anyway, yeah, he wasn't going off of biological standards as you said, and was instead making an ethical judgment. That judgment is not based on anything other than his feeling that “To give preference to the life of a being simply because that being is a member of our species would put us in the same position as racists who give preference to those who are members of their race.” Which is very far from being accurate under whatever terms you choose to look at it.
I've always found these kind of reasonings mere rationalization for justifying an underlying empathy-based ethics. Subjective ethics in a bundle of objectivity.
All live beings react to the environment (they're alive). Plants definitely do. They do not "feel" because they've no nervous system. So what? Neurons are just another kind of cells, which are specialized in processing information. Pain/pleasure is just some kind of information in some kind of specialized groups of neurons (amygdala, etc). But neurons do not have "soul" neither any other kind of property that makes them inherently more worthy than any other cell. They're just more useful.
That rationale for justyfing the inherent superiority of animals above plants is as arbitrary as it is the older one for justyfing the superiority of humans above animals. For some people, empathizing with other humans is something more natural than doing it with animals (other animals). From a pure biological perspective, this is the only one that makes some sense. Some people empathize so much with animals (because they can feel pain) that they choose to treat them as equals. That's OK I guess, but it's still subjective, and I dislike when they present it as the logically correct option when in fact it's still subjective and arbitrary. You feel then I empathize with you then I see you as an equal. Is it right to kill a human being born without amygdala but with the same inteligence, according to this? (hypothetical scenario).
Because the point is, that good and evil are concepts that exist only in the minds that thinks about them. We can only "prove" (estimate), from a pure logical perspective, if something will produce some kind of result (correct/incorrect), but there's no way of proving if something is inherently good or bad. These concepts are human constructs, they do not exist in nature. The frontier between what it's acceptable and what is not is always arbitrary. The question is very important, but it does nothing to do with what is real or not.
I find much more abominable felling a tree which was alive before humans knew how to write and read than killing rabbits that run rampant in Australia (or used to do). But that's my subjective opinion, of course.
Just my two cents.
I thought it was obvious why—the reason I had you take the test was so you could demonstrate to yourself that you're fully capable of rendering morality judgments, and can apparently do so proficiently (at least according to the evaluative standards of this test).
There was a prior thread where people posted their results; funnily enough, many of the Fi egos scored ~75%.
Like squark explained, Ti (and Tx in general) can be attitudinally predisposed to assess for logical consistency, such that it's fully possible to construct moral frameworks in this way. Whereas Fi tends to be more consistent according to its own internalized feeling-values, which may or may not correspond to external standards of logical consistency.
I expected as much. I already said I'm not arguing against that, I have no idea why you keep pulling me back to this point.
What I don't understand is this: "Pay attention to what he's basing his arguments on and how they're constructed. Ask yourself whether this basis comprises logical judgments or value judgments."
You are implying, and have stated that "Singer's moral stances are derived via Ti epistemic attitudes." Where is this coming from? Jung? Socionics? It's baseless as far as I know. If LIIs moral stances are derived via Ti epistemic attitudes, then what good is their Fi? Do they even have it, use it, or whatever? Is this true for LSIs as well? I'm curious. If it's your opinion then just say so, I would understand.
Yeah, and glam got 92%. So what do I make of it?There was a prior thread where people posted their results; funnily enough, many of the Fi egos scored ~75%.
Like squark explained, Ti (and Tx in general) can be attitudinally predisposed to assess for logical consistency, such that it's fully possible to construct moral frameworks in this way. Whereas Fi tends to be more consistent according to its own internalized feeling-values, which may or may not correspond to external standards of logical consistency.
I can't believe you are using this test to make a point - mind you, one which I don't dispute nonetheless.
I got 100% on that test. First one I mean, the consistency one.
Having said that I don't really know what is the point here at all.
Oh, thanks
Heh.
Didn't know it was so simple...
Oh, cool. What do you do?
Yes, race as a construct is epistemically murkier and obviously more difficult to delineate compared to species. But these class differences b/t race vs. species represent one of degree rather than kind. Given that after many successive generations under the net influence of genetic drift, gene flow, bottlenecking, natural selection, epigenetic interactions, etc etc, any initial bifurcations would become more racially distinctive over time, with some gradually diverging further apart into the eventual emergence of new species. Unless you happen to know of some other viable mechanism in the natural world for inducing speciation that I don't.In basic terms, nobody is going to confuse a mouse for an elephant, or a human from a dog and while a person can be several races mixed together, there exists no naturally conceived and reproductively viable animal that is several species mixed together. Two species - yes, as though most mules are infertile, sometimes one isn't, and I'm not sure on such things as ligers etc., but certainly not multiple species mixing easily and producing viable offspring who can reproduce with members of any one of the parent species. In other words, species is still, no matter how carefully defined or how far the edges are pressed still a very different concept from race. A race could perhaps under an extreme bottleneck and isolation become a new species, but that group is far more likely to die out due to likelihood of deleterious mutations being passed on in greater numbers within the much smaller population required for speciation to take place. Inbreeding sucks ass for producing a healthy population, while diversity greatly increases odds of survival.
I don't know whether that's his actual feeling, or if he's just making a lame contrived rhetorical appeal to feeling—my guess is the latter.Anyway, yeah, he wasn't going off of biological standards as you said, and was instead making an ethical judgment. That judgment is not based on anything other than his feeling that “To give preference to the life of a being simply because that being is a member of our species would put us in the same position as racists who give preference to those who are members of their race.” Which is very far from being accurate under whatever terms you choose to look at it.
In any event, what I'm really curious about is why an arbitrary classificatory schema or logical framework could or 'should' be considered a better rubric for making sound ethical judgments. Esp. considering that said frameworks likely belie an underpinning of personal feelings and value judgments which aren't the least bit logical.
I'm glad you're not arguing it now, because it looked like you were crying and throwing a tantrum in your 1st few thread posts that Ti couldn't deal with morality questions.
Obviously everyone in life possesses some kind of moral outlook which tends to influence their actions—whether said outlook is explicitly known to them or not. Some people are more natively altruistic, egotistic, utilitarian, or blends thereof, etc. Some choose to carefully rationalize their motives to be consistent with some sort of a priori normative framework, while others don't give a shit and prefer to simply act on impulse in whatever ways their whims lead them in the moment, and so forth.What I don't understand is this: "Pay attention to what he's basing his arguments on and how they're constructed. Ask yourself whether this basis comprises logical judgments or value judgments."
You are implying, and have stated that "Singer's moral stances are derived via Ti epistemic attitudes." Where is this coming from? Jung? Socionics? It's baseless as far as I know. If LIIs moral stances are derived via Ti epistemic attitudes, then what good is their Fi? Do they even have it, use it, or whatever? Is this true for LSIs as well? I'm curious. If it's your opinion then just say so, I would understand.
So what I'm essentially asking you, is to think for yourself about what the man's predominant mental disposition seems to be. Is he approaching moral questions/issues more so from a logical or valuational perspective? Is he more whimsical or deliberate? Blah blah.
I dunno. Come up with your own ideas.Yeah, and glam got 92%. So what do I make of it?
I attained the desired effect of getting you to stop saying that Ti can't do morality.I can't believe you are using this test to make a point - mind you, one which I don't dispute nonetheless.
"Ethics" is a shittier term than "Feeling" for the ethical/feeling functions.
Anyone who is devoid of ethics is probably a socio-path. The Thinking-Feeling dichotomy does not parallel a sociopathic gradient. Thinking types spend far more time and effort philosophizing about ethics than feeling types do. Feeling types have less of an urge to argue ethical principles academically. They practice ethics and their philosophizing tends towards the anecdotal and intuitive. This is the tendency I've found, there are certainly exceptions.
The end is nigh
Well, I don't really have much to disagree with you about here.
The only contention I might make, is that I'm not sure Singer is trying to justify empathy-based ethics per se. Considering that his core ethical pretext of "suffering is bad, therefore it ought to be minimized" is a standardly Utilitarian outlook, and that he only subsequently invokes the notion of empathy insofar as it serves to inversely justify this Utilitarian ideal, i.e. "see, you can empathize that the experience of suffering is bad, therefore you should ethically agree that suffering ought to be minimized for all life."—in other words, he's saying something doubly goofy involving both imaginary projections of pseudo-empathy and imaginary projections about a supposed 'Greater Good'.
The interpretation of that test. Taking this approach and having tests similar to that but different in only one aspect, that is, pinpointing the difference between Si, Se, Fe, Ha, Na, and Ne would be greatly appreciated. Multiple tests that is.
Okay, I'm kidding and I think it was some kind of misunderstanding.
Thanks(?) for vid, no time to watch it now though, I mean, it drags like hell. I'll leave philosophy talk to alphas, gammas and betas. Talk...
Hahaha.
Anyway, he's some Ti/Fe, I think.
Last edited by Absurd; 02-16-2013 at 07:46 AM.
First of all, don't get ahead of yourself. I make a point to not attack all your arguments because most of them are irrelevant to the discussion, but it doesn't mean I agree with them. Now, I don't know if this is your argument for typing this man LII, or you just found it convenient for whatever you are arguing for and used it, but it's quite disappointing. There is no logic in being consistent for the sake of it.
Implying that consistency anywhere is an indication of Ti is quite the argument to make. Surely you can back that up? Because I don't buy it. It's funny because you use the same idea to define IJs, statics, Ti egos, and at some point even LSEs. You're the epitome of incosistency and dynamic world view, right?
Indeed. Having feelings (like empathy) does not make a thinker less logic, neither using logic a feeler less ethical. It's the way they see the problem what makes them logic or ethical. Well, statistically, there are always exceptions to rules.
If we want to play the card of considering correlations between these concepts and reality (biological nature), I would say ethical types could have more "direct" communication between emotional centers of the brain and the frontal lobe or any other key region in making decisions. I see logical functions as objective conceptualizators, and ethical ones as subjective conceptualizators. I'm not implying with this that logic conceptualizators are inherently more right (or logic users less emotional), only that they have some kind of negative synergy with emotions, whereas ethical ones have positive synergy with them:
Empathizing-systemizing theory.
Last edited by MensSuperMateriam; 02-16-2013 at 09:47 AM.
If you agree with with the static/dynamic nature of functions, this would make sense. Ti users (only ego or should we extend to all valuers?) would statistically look for consistency more than others. It's not that consistency is part of the nature of the function, but a consequence of it. Being a static function it looks for things that don't change, and being objective, that could be applied regardless circumstances.
Ti is an constructor (or seeker) for Universals. Kant is a good example and archetype of this behavior.
I don't. Not to this extent.
Furthermore, if all static functions are to have some consistency in them. How is Stinger's statements an indication of Ti and not Fi? Regardless of his type, who is to say he is not speaking directly of Fi?
And what makes Ti "look for consistency more than others"? "Being objective", says who? Socionics maintains that Ne and Se are more objective than Ti. If you want a function that is both static and objective, then that is where you should be looking.
Another empty statement. No offense, but what are you basing this on?
Asking questions is playing dumb? I wasn't interested in a reply in any case, it's a rhetorical question.
You addressed nothing. I can only guess that you meant as a base function Ti in LIIs would have an effect on everything they do. Close enough? Do you want me to refute that? I can, but it's boring, I have no interest in going to that direction. I already know where you are coming from.
Fi is ideed static. I was not arguing about Singer's type (I have no clear opinion about this), only about functions.
None taken. Discrepancies usually do not offend me (as long as they're expressed respectfully). Objectivity has different meanings in Socionics. If fact, if I remember properly, there are three kinds of objectivity: extrovert over introvert, judgement over perception, external over internal (L over E and S over N). According to this, the most objective function would be Te.
Ti is more objective than Fi in the sense that logic functions see the world as it is, whereas ethical functions sees the word in a more personalized style, as I see it, so to speak. Obviously every person has particular opinions which could be radically different to the opinions of users with the same functions. It's a matter of style. Logic looks to the external world regardless the user; ethics look to the world through the user. I'm not sure if I'm explaining this properly.
Ti<->Universals, this is a consequence of the nature of the function. I mean, Ti does nor equal to them, but Ti users tend to do this more than the rest. I explained in the former post the reasoning for this: Ti is static + Ti is objective -> Ti seeks for Universals. You can disagree, of course, but I made my point.
I forgot: P functions are not conceptualizators (these are J functions), they're off the table about what we're speaking.
I think static/dynamic is a valid aspect of functions. It makes biological sense if managed properly (never in an absolutist way), but that's another issue. Of course all of this is speculation, but as it its the existence of your own type, right?
Last edited by MensSuperMateriam; 02-16-2013 at 11:10 AM.
the net sum of functions evens out to the same thing if you take into account only 2, 4 or 8 fxns. since model A traverses thru each function exhaustively, it gets away with assigning 2D traits to each individual IE and having that IE play a specific function in the psyche, so you have Fi playing the part of evaluating ethics and Ti evaluating logical axioms, etc. and each type can embody these traits to a certain limited capacity. the 4-function model is fundamentally different from this but the net sum is the same, i.e. the types remain the same, even if the function definitions vary and functions play a different part in the psyche since you don't traverse thru them exhaustively but selectively. there have been several threads on this, feel free to look them up. or don't. do whatever you want.
either you aren't intelligent enough to accommodate this perspective, or you are too intellectually arrogant to concede. in the case of the former, refamiliarize yourself with Model A and come back when you have something worthwhile to add to this thread. in the case of the latter, fuck off.
Dat suggestive face. Um, no comment.I forgot: P functions are not conceptualizators (these are J functions), they're off the table about what we're speaking.
I think static/dynamic is a valid aspect of functions. It makes biological sense if managed properly (never in an absolutist way), but that's another issue. Of course all of this is speculation, but as it its the existence of your own type, right?
Bold: How so? Lets review the three kinds of objectivity: extrovert over introvert, judgement over perception, external over internal. Ti has two of these, so does Se. So I ask you again, what makes Ti more objective? Keep in mind Se is a static element as well.
*applaud*
Let me know when you make a real point. Accusing me of something without evidence is hardly worth a reply.
Thank you for nothing.
Shut the fuck up or say something substantial. You are just viciously nit-picking everyone else with the assumption that your typing of Singer is somehow self-evident. It's not.
The end is nigh
He's just a drama queen, he can't help it.
Yeah, lets just pretend that my concerns are not valid. I'm just nit-picking for the sake of it. Idiot.
>implying I typed Singer or attempted to
nope
I think you actually implied his type first page.
I'm pretty sure I didn't. I said it's likely that he is a feeler, just a guess. That as far as I went with his typing.
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