Søren Kierkegaard

[strrrng]

IEI > EII. The way he wrote about sin and despair and encapsulated his conception of humanity in The Sickness Unto Death was more NiFe than FiNe, both because the subject matter is more stereotypically in the realm of Fi and because of his writing style. The discourse is more of an extended reflection on the undercurrents of said topics than a definitive taking of a stance, or any kind of "ethical" declaration. For example, talking about sin in terms of "not knowing, not wanting to know and wanting to know," in such a way that theoretical boundaries can be drawn on something he accepts as relatively nebulous, is a far cry from something like Dostoevsky intimating at a struggle to come to terms with what faith is supposed to be for the hero of a novel.

[Dauphin]

The fact that Jung misunderstood Kierkegaard is disappointing, but revealing about his character. Kierkegaard was much more human than Jung, that is, he didn't place himself outside humanity in his philosophical and psychological investigation like Jung seems to. Jung, despite writing about fantastic subjects, was much colder and more scientific in his perspective. He's closer to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, as both of them also took a godlike distant view of humanity. Kierkegaard can be considered to be the greater man and the greater thinker than the three aforementioned men precisely because he wrote as a mere man interrogating himself, without making claim to objectivity. Ludwig Wittgenstein was able to see this in his readings of Kierkegaard and actually considered himself to be a lesser man than him.

[AbsoluteIdealist]

IEI > EII. The way he wrote about sin and despair and encapsulated his conception of humanity in The Sickness Unto Death was more NiFe than FiNe, both because the subject matter is more stereotypically in the realm of Fi and because of his writing style. The discourse is more of an extended reflection on the undercurrents of said topics than a definitive taking of a stance, or any kind of "ethical" declaration. For example, talking about sin in terms of "not knowing, not wanting to know and wanting to know," in such a way that theoretical boundaries can be drawn on something he accepts as relatively nebulous, is a far cry from something like Dostoevsky intimating at a struggle to come to terms with what faith is supposed to be for the hero of a novel.

I would agree IEI > EII, but here is some thinking regarding why IEE may actually be more helpful for comprehensive understanding of Kierkegaard's contributions to philosophy in relation to socionics:

Bert Dreyfus has previously demonstrated that the characters throughout Dostoevsky's novels correspond precisely to Kierkegaard's dialectics of inward subjectivity in relation to the other. For example, Ivan of BK corresponds clearly to the ethical life stage where the unconditional commitment is conceived to be an absolute commitment to mind. Essential existential differences between religiousness A and B may be discerned in comparing Prince Myshkin (The Idiot) with Alyosha (BK). I would extend this logic also to novels such as Les Miserables, where Fantine may be conceptualized as being a knight of infinite resignation, Javert is clearly ethical once again, and Valjean is clearly a knight of faith in the sense of having an unconditional existential commitment to Cosette. This is the relation which relates itself by relating to another, transparently grounded in the Power (e.g. for religiousness B, Alyosha's identity is grounded by unconditional commitment to Father Zoshima, Valjean's by unconditional commitment to Cosette) which posited it.

You all probably are aware this notion of the self from Hegel is emphasizing the form of "how" an individual relates to himself and something other. One important part of his existentialism, the meaning of CUP's "truth is subjectivity," is the value of how to relate to self or other, and this eventually leads to Heidegger with the notions of the ethical virtuouso and authenticity.

Given that what is absolute truth for Kierkegaard is this relation and nothing other ("God is precisely how an individual relates to God."), might it make more complete sense to posit Kierkegaard as IEE (but not ESI)? I think this is very likely because is it not the case that Fi is precisely about discerning how to relate to self and others, so that e.g. ESI is very confident in relationships, and IEE is most talented with respect to relating to others.

Also, is it not the case that IEE is holographic-panoramic cognition, which is described as "either-or" thinking? Although the truth represented by Kierkegaard's work of the same name is that disjunctive logic contradicts itself even as Judge Wilhelm attempts to use it (or Javert or Ivan for that matter...), is it not true that Kierkegaard does retain formal disjunctive logic for existentialism because of the following reason - namely, Kierkegaard's two religious stages are just two alternative holographic-panoramic forms of conceiving a more complete relationship between an aesthetic lifestyle and and ethical commitment, so that these religious stages are sublations but not in the dialectical-algorithmic form of cognition? E.g. in the case of Abraham, the unconditional commitment to Isaac which is lived through the leap of faith or absolute certainty and confidence that God will provide Isaac despite seeing the knife hang over the beloved: there is, for Abraham, always infinite aesthetic possibility in spite of natural necessity for the finite individual of Isaac in the temporal world, balanced nonetheless by the ethical possibility for new necessary commitments to something finite in an infinite manner, making that temporal relation between the two eternal.

I suppose IEI is the other way of thinking about Kierkegaard's type that makes sense. More concretely, it is clear that Kierkegaard's dialectics of inwardness develop in a contingent vortical way of representing the self and other, inner and outer, etc as they should for an IEI. What makes me think perhaps IEI is merely this. Either type seems to make great sense. I generally prioritize the typings of strrrng and silke particularly highly, and they are both IEI's so they may relate strongly, identify to a great degree. I believe it has been observed that a type generally has dual forms of cognition, so that e.g. an IEI would have its dual form of cognition, the holographic cognitive form of IEE, in addition to the vortical cognition natural to it. This observation only increases the confidence that Kierkegaard was either an IEE or an IEI. I do see EII as a possibility, given the introversion, the clearly Delta values in opposition to the conception of God that appears to me more beta with absolute idealism, etc.

Kierkegaard's work, I think many would agree, must properly be comprehended in relation to hegelianism. There is a great book by Jon Stewart, "Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel reconsidered," which provides factual evidence to refute the presupposition Kierkegaard was directly refuting Hegel himself, but was more generally opposed to the hegelianism of Denmark at the time. In any case, Kierkegaard certainly seems to me to be opposed to Ti with his statement that truth is subjectivity for the following reasoning: Kierkegaard's entire existentialism is exploring possible ways of living in which the self is in harmony practically, existentially; for this reason, myself and my philosophy professor friends like to read Kierkegaard as directly complimentary to William James. Is pragmatism not emphasizing Te? I sincerely do not know as I have not spent any attention on socionics theory for years literally, so I have forgotten, but it seems plausible. Also, Hegel's thought is cited correctly I believe as qualified as the culmination of the dialectic form of cognition. He is cited as EIE or ILI; to me, is he not - consistent with his logic - a type of both-and, perhaps also IEI-ish as strnng seemed to include in his beta nf suggestion of his type?

[Thus side note: It seems most reasonable, is it not, to suggest as Gluenko himself has, that any individual does not have one certain type fixed for a lifetime, though they do have natural temperment determined by substantial differences. It does seem plausible that certain forms of personality are substantiated in essential differences at genetic conception. Nevertheless, is it not the point of Kierkegaard's entire project, as well as the metaphysics he was responding to, that personality in nature is not the truth of the individual. Instead, the self is the commitment which is formed through taking into account both nature and freedom, so that Kierkegaard's project has been interpreted correctly as a cultural argument (i.e. "dogmatic" per dreyfus) rather than a strictly absolutely logical one.]

Lastly, good work by the likes of Zizek as well as Dreyfus has thought of Kierkegaard's dialectics as a project of retroactively positing necessity in something contingent from an existential perspective. This also seems to be in line with the holographic-panoramic cognitive and perhaps the IEI's forms of thinking.

In any case, I will not shit you with the so called modesty of "this is all speculation etc etc" -- I certainly conclude it is better to conceive him as thinking of content with the form of cognition of IEE as opposed to IEI, though proper to my committed metaphysical views I like to think that this opposition nonetheless in essence is reconciled in a higher identity. I think he is likely incorrectly classed as simply IEI because he is perceived to be poetic in the sense that Nietszche is. Yes and no. Kierkegaard was the only existentialist who proposed a coherent logic of some sort, though it is certainly not logic in the classical sense. His logic is rather a procedural, external logic (Te by definition, you know?) where necessity is posited for some thing or commitment in the functioning world. This is part of the inspiration for Heidegger's pragmatic ready to hand.

But he is a clear introvert? Yes, but is it not the case that (e.g. Hegel if everyone insists he is EIE - personally think he's more ILI-like) subtype makes technically extroverted types into introverted types in effect, for all intents and purposes? I'd encourage anyone not to make the mistake Jung and CS lewis of interpreting Kierkegaard's writings as neurotic poetic ramblings. He crafted Either/Or very intentionally, with a clear logic (one which to me seems in the final analysis exceptionally holographic-panoramic.). See for example stephen dunning's book "kierkegaard's dialectics of inwardness" to become persuaded that Kierkegaard's entire writings may be conceived as systematic in a way analogous to the german idealists, with a purposeful development, though again, not in a dialectic algorithmic sense exactly because this logic is not classical formal logic.)

This typing would help to tell a narrative of Kierkegaard as in some respects a great "completion" or full picturing of the real determinations qualifying IEE-ESI philosophy started by Christianity and Dante, in a similar way to Liebnez (and spinoza?) starting and Kant "completing" the philosophy of LII (also holographical-panoramic), or Heraclitus starting and Hegel "completing" the philosophy of ILI-EIE (dialectical-algorithmic); or Aristotle, Descartes, (and Spinoza? any recommendations on his type are welcomed; his is an especially important metaphysics no?) starting and Logical Positivism "completing" the Causal-Determinist philosophy of LSI-ILE; or Darwin and Smith developing vortical-synergetic "completions" / "launchpads" of evolution and capitalism - no doubt these are both launchpads as well as completions in a sense absolute or total completions of the real determinations and reflections of preceding related works).

What do you guys think? Would love to develop this discussion further, thanks!

Ps, this is the user named limitless from several years ago haha, in case anyone remembers.

[strrrng]

I would agree IEI > EII, but here is some thinking regarding why IEE may actually be more helpful for comprehensive understanding of Kierkegaard's contributions to philosophy in relation to socionics:

Bert Dreyfus has previously demonstrated that the characters throughout Dostoevsky's novels correspond precisely to Kierkegaard's dialectics of inward subjectivity in relation to the other. For example, Ivan of BK corresponds clearly to the ethical life stage where the unconditional commitment is conceived to be an absolute commitment to mind. Essential existential differences between religiousness A and B may be discerned in comparing Prince Myshkin (The Idiot) with Alyosha (BK). I would extend this logic also to novels such as Les Miserables, where Fantine may be conceptualized as being a knight of infinite resignation, Javert is clearly ethical once again, and Valjean is clearly a knight of faith in the sense of having an unconditional existential commitment to Cosette. This is the relation which relates itself by relating to another, transparently grounded in the Power (e.g. for religiousness B, Alyosha's identity is grounded by unconditional commitment to Father Zoshima, Valjean's by unconditional commitment to Cosette) which posited it.

You all probably are aware this notion of the self from Hegel is emphasizing the form of "how" an individual relates to himself and something other. One important part of his existentialism, the meaning of CUP's "truth is subjectivity," is the value of how to relate to self or other, and this eventually leads to Heidegger with the notions of the ethical virtuouso and authenticity.

Interesting. I haven't read Les Miserables, but you seem to be getting at a kind of disjunction between the finer points of the system of someone like Hegel and how this actually affirms some of Kierkegaard's thoughts. To me he always seemed aware of a more balanced form of the other—his dialectics were more an expression of a necessary progression to affirm identity than an actual structure. I think he picked up on the fact that Hegel was right about the necessity of alterity in any spiritual process, whereas the parallel between his stages and Karamazov would anchor his intent in a way that would even things out.

This would shed light on the IEI typing, as IEIs and EIEs have a tendency to overshadow each other due to how diametrical DA and VS cognition are in the context of beta. I would expect a delta NF to either completely disregard the dialectical processes he drew from, or simply establish a precept and move on without much reference.

Given that what is absolute truth for Kierkegaard is this relation and nothing other ("God is precisely how an individual relates to God."), might it make more complete sense to posit Kierkegaard as IEE (but not ESI)? I think this is very likely because is it not the case that Fi is precisely about discerning how to relate to self and others, so that e.g. ESI is very confident in relationships, and IEE is most talented with respect to relating to others.

I don't think the kind of relating he was positing with that idea was the same kind you're referring to with IEE. Kierkegaard seemed to more or less be saying that there's something standalone about man's relationship to God—his whole point was that if it isn't posited as such, with all the attendant sacrifices that doing so entails, then it may as well just be a pseudo-utilitarian gesture. This kind of singular commitment to an ideal that can never be limited by external circumstances resonates more with IEI than delta NF for me.

Also, is it not the case that IEE is holographic-panoramic cognition, which is described as "either-or" thinking? Although the truth represented by Kierkegaard's work of the same name is that disjunctive logic contradicts itself even as Judge Wilhelm attempts to use it (or Javert or Ivan for that matter...), is it not true that Kierkegaard does retain formal disjunctive logic for existentialism because of the following reason - namely, Kierkegaard's two religious stages are just two alternative holographic-panoramic forms of conceiving a more complete relationship between an aesthetic lifestyle and and ethical commitment, so that these religious stages are sublations but not in the dialectical-algorithmic form of cognition? E.g. in the case of Abraham, the unconditional commitment to Isaac which is lived through the leap of faith or absolute certainty and confidence that God will provide Isaac despite seeing the knife hang over the beloved: there is, for Abraham, always infinite aesthetic possibility in spite of natural necessity for the finite individual of Isaac in the temporal world, balanced nonetheless by the ethical possibility for new necessary commitments to something finite in an infinite manner, making that temporal relation between the two eternal.

I completely agree with your assessment of the dialectic surrounding Abraham. But I don't think his stages are reflective of holographic. The "either/or" in that cognition is more about contextual variation, not simply that two aspects complement each other. And the way they complement each other is not really static-y, i.e. each one is completely self-contained in a process that allows for an emergent synthesis. It could go different ways, this is just how I interpreted it.

I suppose IEI is the other way of thinking about Kierkegaard's type that makes sense. More concretely, it is clear that Kierkegaard's dialectics of inwardness develop in a contingent vortical way of representing the self and other, inner and outer, etc as they should for an IEI. What makes me think perhaps IEI is merely this. Either type seems to make great sense. I generally prioritize the typings of strrrng and silke particularly highly, and they are both IEI's so they may relate strongly, identify to a great degree. I believe it has been observed that a type generally has dual forms of cognition, so that e.g. an IEI would have its dual form of cognition, the holographic cognitive form of IEE, in addition to the vortical cognition natural to it. This observation only increases the confidence that Kierkegaard was either an IEE or an IEI. I do see EII as a possibility, given the introversion, the clearly Delta values in opposition to the conception of God that appears to me more beta with absolute idealism, etc.

Thanks. And yeah, I do relate in a way. I wouldn't espouse the form of commitment he did, but he at least recognized that spirituality isn't just an exercise. I'm not saying deltas do, but the way they formulate existential ideas IMO is more about the symbols that house them, in a way that allows anyone to trace steps without getting too mired in inner convolutions.

Kierkegaard's work, I think many would agree, must properly be comprehended in relation to hegelianism. There is a great book by Jon Stewart, "Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel reconsidered," which provides factual evidence to refute the presupposition Kierkegaard was directly refuting Hegel himself, but was more generally opposed to the hegelianism of Denmark at the time. In any case, Kierkegaard certainly seems to me to be opposed to Ti with his statement that truth is subjectivity for the following reasoning: Kierkegaard's entire existentialism is exploring possible ways of living in which the self is in harmony practically, existentially; for this reason, myself and my philosophy professor friends like to read Kierkegaard as directly complimentary to William James. Is pragmatism not emphasizing Te? I sincerely do not know as I have not spent any attention on socionics theory for years literally, so I have forgotten, but it seems plausible. Also, Hegel's thought is cited correctly I believe as qualified as the culmination of the dialectic form of cognition. He is cited as EIE or ILI; to me, is he not - consistent with his logic - a type of both-and, perhaps also IEI-ish as strnng seemed to include in his beta nf suggestion of his type?

The truth is subjectivity could go either way. Betas do tend to be more absolute, but if I'm not mistaken, his efforts had to do with reconciling whatever truth there is with subjective experience. Not sure though. I've noticed in the past that a lot of gammas will get irritated with betas constantly positing self-referential concepts.

Lastly, good work by the likes of Zizek as well as Dreyfus has thought of Kierkegaard's dialectics as a project of retroactively positing necessity in something contingent from an existential perspective. This also seems to be in line with the holographic-panoramic cognitive and perhaps the IEI's forms of thinking.

Yeah, Zizek is big on retroactivity, though I haven't heard much of what he has to say about how it applies to Kierkegaard.

In any case, I will not shit you with the so called modesty of "this is all speculation etc etc" -- I certainly conclude it is better to conceive him as thinking of content with the form of cognition of IEE as opposed to IEI, though proper to my committed metaphysical views I like to think that this opposition nonetheless in essence is reconciled in a higher identity. I think he is likely incorrectly classed as simply IEI because he is perceived to be poetic in the sense that Nietszche is. Yes and no. Kierkegaard was the only existentialist who proposed a coherent logic of some sort, though it is certainly not logic in the classical sense. His logic is rather a procedural, external logic (Te by definition, you know?) where necessity is posited for some thing or commitment in the functioning world. This is part of the inspiration for Heidegger's pragmatic ready to hand.

Could you expand on the procedural aspect of his logic?

But he is a clear introvert? Yes, but is it not the case that (e.g. Hegel if everyone insists he is EIE - personally think he's more ILI-like) subtype makes technically extroverted types into introverted types in effect, for all intents and purposes? I'd encourage anyone not to make the mistake Jung and CS lewis of interpreting Kierkegaard's writings as neurotic poetic ramblings. He crafted Either/Or very intentionally, with a clear logic (one which to me seems in the final analysis exceptionally holographic-panoramic.). See for example stephen dunning's book "kierkegaard's dialectics of inwardness" to become persuaded that Kierkegaard's entire writings may be conceived as systematic in a way analogous to the german idealists, with a purposeful development, though again, not in a dialectic algorithmic sense exactly because this logic is not classical formal logic.)

How do you see Either/Or evincing that cognition?

This typing would help to tell a narrative of Kierkegaard as in some respects a great "completion" or full picturing of the real determinations qualifying IEE-ESI philosophy started by Christianity and Dante, in a similar way to Liebnez (and spinoza?) starting and Kant "completing" the philosophy of LII (also holographical-panoramic), or Heraclitus starting and Hegel "completing" the philosophy of ILI-EIE (dialectical-algorithmic); or Aristotle, Descartes, (and Spinoza? any recommendations on his type are welcomed; his is an especially important metaphysics no?) starting and Logical Positivism "completing" the Causal-Determinist philosophy of LSI-ILE; or Darwin and Smith developing vortical-synergetic "completions" / "launchpads" of evolution and capitalism - no doubt these are both launchpads as well as completions in a sense absolute or total completions of the real determinations and reflections of preceding related works).

It's interesting, I just wonder what to make of his influence on Camus.