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Thread: Model D

  1. #401
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    https://www.researchgate.net/publica...s_in_Reasoning

    "A general two-stage theory of human inference is proposed. A distinction is drawn between heuristic processes which select items of task information as ‘relevant’, and analytic processes which operate on the selected items to generate inferences or judgements. These two stages are illustrated in a selective review of work on both deductive and statistical reasoning. Factors identified as contributing to heuristic selection include perceptual salience, linguistic suppositions and semantic associations. Analytic processes are considered to be context dependent: people reason from experience, not from inference rules. The paper includes discussion of the theory in comparison with other contemporary theories of human inference, and in relation to the current debate about human rationality."

    It is possible that "the scientist" is a heuristic type/subtype and "the philosopher" is an analytic type/subtype.



    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

    "In contrast, Karl Popper's critical rationalism claimed that inductive justifications are never used in science and proposed instead that science is based on the procedure of conjecturing hypotheses, deductively calculating consequences, and then empirically attempting to falsify them."

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    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/

    "Popper’s account appears to be incomplete in an important way. There are always many hypotheses which have not yet been refuted by the evidence, and these may contradict one another. According to the strictly deductive framework, since none are yet falsified, they are all on an equal footing. Yet, scientists will typically want to say that one is better supported by the evidence than the others. We seem to need more than just deductive reasoning to support practical decision-making (Salmon 1981). Popper did indeed appeal to a notion of one hypothesis being better or worse “corroborated” by the evidence. But arguably, this took him away from a strictly deductive view of science. It appears doubtful then that pure deductivism can give an adequate account of scientific method."

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    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

    "In contrast, Karl Popper's critical rationalism claimed that inductive justifications are never used in science and proposed instead that science is based on the procedure of conjecturing hypotheses, deductively calculating consequences, and then empirically attempting to falsify them."
    I think "conjecturing hypotheses" is inductive reasoning.

    inductive deductive 1.jpg

    inductive deductive 3.jpg

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    "Popper’s account appears to be incomplete in an important way. There are always many hypotheses which have not yet been refuted by the evidence, and these may contradict one another. According to the strictly deductive framework, since none are yet falsified, they are all on an equal footing. Yet, scientists will typically want to say that one is better supported by the evidence than the others. We seem to need more than just deductive reasoning to support practical decision-making (Salmon 1981). Popper did indeed appeal to a notion of one hypothesis being better or worse “corroborated” by the evidence. But arguably, this took him away from a strictly deductive view of science. It appears doubtful then that pure deductivism can give an adequate account of scientific method."
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

    In 1963, Karl Popper wrote, "Induction, i.e. inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure." Popper's 1972 book Objective Knowledge—whose first chapter is devoted to the problem of induction—opens, "I think I have solved a major philosophical problem: the problem of induction". In Popper's schema, enumerative induction is "a kind of optical illusion" cast by the steps of conjecture and refutation during a problem shift. An imaginative leap, the tentative solution is improvised, lacking inductive rules to guide it. The resulting, unrestricted generalization is deductive, an entailed consequence of all explanatory considerations. Controversy continued, however, with Popper's putative solution not generally accepted.

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    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincaré_conjecture

    Conjectures are inductive processes, but deductive logic is much more important in mathematics and philosophy.

    The process of solving mathematical problems/theorems includes analogy and categorization (i.e. shared structure), which do not try to achieve general conclusions.

    ------

    mathematics and philosophy: deductive reasoning is hard, inductive reasoning is easy

    science: inductive reasoning is hard, deductive reasoning is easy
    Last edited by Petter; 04-21-2021 at 06:35 AM.

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    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincaré_conjecture

    Conjectures are inductive processes, but deductive logic is much more important in mathematics and philosophy.

    The process of solving mathematical problems/theorems includes analogy and categorization (i.e. shared structure), which do not try to achieve general conclusions.

    ------

    mathematics and philosophy: deductive reasoning is hard, inductive reasoning is easy

    science: inductive reasoning is hard, deductive reasoning is easy
    Finding patterns (analogy etc) is hard in both mathematics/philosophy and science.

    Deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning are (relatively) easy in both mathematics/philosophy and science.

    The patterns are fuzzy/incomplete in science so heuristic methods are needed.
    Last edited by Petter; 04-21-2021 at 07:43 AM.

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    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYfpSAxGakI (The Dehn Invariant - Numberphile)

    Daniel Litt's type is "the ​mathematician".
    introvert, not a planner, primary PFA/PFS, leading Se, the right hemisphere, analytic



    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8VdPW8tCWY (Closer To Truth ... Seth Lloyd - What is Information?)

    introvert, not a planner, primary PFA/PFS, leading Se, the right hemisphere, heuristic

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    These are possible subtypes:

    These are possible dichotomies:

    1. comparison vs. creativity (less likely)

    2. analysis vs. synthesis

    3. deductive reasoning vs. inductive reasoning/abductive reasoning
    4. "analytic" vs. heuristic

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    5. top-down vs. bottom-up


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top-do...and_psychology

    Cognitively speaking, certain cognitive processes, such as fast reactions or quick visual identification, are considered bottom-up processes because they rely primarily on sensory information, whereas processes such as motor control and directed attention are considered top-down because they are goal directed. Neurologically speaking, some areas of the brain, such as area V1 mostly have bottom-up connections. Other areas, such as the fusiform gyrus have inputs from higher brain areas and are considered to have top-down influence.

    The study of visual attention provides an example. If your attention is drawn to a flower in a field, it may be because the color or shape of the flower are visually salient. The information that caused you to attend to the flower came to you in a bottom-up fashion—your attention was not contingent upon knowledge of the flower; the outside stimulus was sufficient on its own. Contrast this situation with one in which you are looking for a flower. You have a representation of what you are looking for. When you see the object you are looking for, it is salient. This is an example of the use of top-down information.

    In cognitive terms, two thinking approaches are distinguished. "Top-down" (or "big chunk") is stereotypically the visionary, or the person who sees the larger picture and overview. Such people focus on the big picture and from that derive the details to support it. "Bottom-up" (or "small chunk") cognition is akin to focusing on the detail primarily, rather than the landscape. The expression "seeing the wood for the trees" references the two styles of cognition.

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    planner (i.e. organizer) = analyzer ?

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    Si = top-down and Se = bottom-up ?

    ... or planner = top-down ?

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    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top-do...ttom-up_design

    "A top-down approach (also known as stepwise design and stepwise refinement and in some cases used as a synonym of decomposition) is essentially the breaking down of a system to gain insight into its compositional sub-systems in a reverse engineering fashion."

    This is (obviously) an analysis.

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    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creativity#Neuroscience

    The neuroscience of creativity looks at the operation of the brain during creative behaviour. It has been addressed in the article "Creative Innovation: Possible Brain Mechanisms." The authors write that "creative innovation might require coactivation and communication between regions of the brain that ordinarily are not strongly connected." Highly creative people who excel at creative innovation tend to differ from others in three ways:

    * they have a high level of specialized knowledge,

    * they are capable of divergent thinking mediated by the frontal lobe.

    * and they are able to modulate neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine in their frontal lobe.

    Thus, the frontal lobe appears to be the part of the cortex that is most important for creativity.

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    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/#1.1

    This conception may be called the decompositional conception of analysis. But it is not the only conception, and indeed is arguably neither the dominant conception in the pre-modern period nor the conception that is characteristic of at least one major strand in ‘analytic’ philosophy. In ancient Greek thought, ‘analysis’ referred primarily to the process of working back to first principles by means of which something could then be demonstrated. This conception may be called the regressive conception of analysis.

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    Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy ... by Sandra Lapointe, Christopher Pincock

    "academic philosophy is analytic and critical rather than speculative" (speculative = synthetic or contextual)

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    Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy ... by Sandra Lapointe, Christopher Pincock

    "academic philosophy is analytic and critical rather than speculative" (speculative = synthetic or contextual)
    Most metaphysicians are/were probably heuristic types.

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    https://acoarecovery.wordpress.com/2...in-activity-3/

    https://maaarine.tumblr.com/post/147863880963

    expert --> "Zen-like pattern"

    cross-contextual thinking --> "Christmas tree pattern"

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    https://acoarecovery.wordpress.com/2...in-activity-3/

    https://maaarine.tumblr.com/post/147863880963

    expert --> "Zen-like pattern"

    cross-contextual thinking --> "Christmas tree pattern"
    I think there are two different kinds of synthesis/creativity.

    1. Two related objects are connected.

    2. Two unrelated objects are connected. (e.g. a sock <--> a coffee filter)

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    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creativity

    Creativity is a phenomenon whereby something somehow new and somehow valuable is formed.

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    Hi, so i've looked at this thread a couple times trying to figure out what you've been doing here, and it looks really interesting. The problem though is that I don't really know where to start reading/how your model works. Could you recommend which replies I should read, or just a rundown of how it works?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Baqer View Post
    Hi, so i've looked at this thread a couple times trying to figure out what you've been doing here, and it looks really interesting. The problem though is that I don't really know where to start reading/how your model works. Could you recommend which replies I should read, or just a rundown of how it works?
    I am trying to define new dichotomies and types, so there is no model at the moment. You can start reading at post #296.
    Last edited by Petter; 05-04-2021 at 07:45 PM.

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    I think there are two different kinds of synthesis/creativity.

    1. Two related objects are connected.

    2. Two unrelated objects are connected. (e.g. a sock <--> a coffee filter)
    ... or there are (1) causally related objects and (2) structurally related objects

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    2. Two unrelated objects are connected. (e.g. a sock <--> a coffee filter)
    This is analogy or "semi-creativity".

    "With someone else, talk about everything you could do with the object that you have not done before."

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    ... or there are (1) causally related objects and (2) structurally related objects
    1. object A --> <-- object B

    2. geon A --> <-- geon B

    If this new object or pattern is useful, then it is a creative process.

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    Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy ... by Sandra Lapointe, Christopher Pincock

    "academic philosophy is analytic and critical rather than speculative" (speculative = synthetic or contextual)
    https://www.researchgate.net/publica...c_Philosophers'

    The rise of ‘analytic philosophy’: When and how did people begin calling themselves ‘analytic philosophers’?

    Greg Frost-Arnold

    6.2. Earlier contrast classes

    Some of the most common contemporaneous contrast classes for people doing what we today would call ‘analytic philosophy’ from the 1930’s through the 1960’s are (i) speculative, (ii) traditional, and (iii) metaphysical philosophy. There may be others (including ‘Idealist’ and ‘synthetic’); let us briefly consider these three.

    (i) Speculative: Ammerman writes, in the Preface to his anthology, “[w]e will contrast the analytic with the speculative philosopher, who, if he studies language at all, does so only in order to facilitate the achievement of his main goal: speculation about the metaphysical foundations of the universe” (1965, 2). The UNESCO report, mentioned above in §5.3, states “[W]e are admittedly, in Britain, living in a period when the dominant temper of academic philosophy is analytic and critical rather than speculative” (1953, 119). There are many further examples (Wisdom 1931, 14, Wisdom 1934, 1, Nagel 1936-I, 9, Stebbing 1932-3 and Broad 1923, 2026). Several of these authors stress that analytic philosophy does not discover any new information about the world, but instead aims to better understand the information we already have, via analysis.

    (ii) Traditional: Near the end of the Vienna Circle’s Scientific World-Conception manifesto, the authors write “we now see clearly what is the essence of the new scientific world-conception in contrast with traditional philosophy” (1929/1973, §4). Black, in a symposium on the method of analysis, says that some advocates of this method “subject most traditional conceptions of the nature of Philosophy to adverse criticism” (1934, 53). Nagel also draws this contrast in his pair of Journal of Philosophy articles (1936-I, 9, 11).

    (iii) Metaphysical: The anti-metaphysical animus of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein, and their allies is well known, and is a defining theme throughout their work, especially from the 1930s onward. Returning to the Ammerman quote in (i) just above, we see that the speculations at issue concern ‘the metaphysical foundations of the universe.’ And Nagel’s pair of articles combines (ii) and (iii), depicting Moore as combating “metaphysics of traditional philosophy” (1936-I, 11; cf. 16). That said, although many prototypical analytic philosophers rejected what they call ‘traditional metaphysics’ or ‘idealist metaphysics,’ some Cambridge analysts thought a reformed metaphysics was possible. This is Russell’s position (e.g. 1918/2010, 110); Stebbing (1932-33) provides a detailed attempt to characterize and defend metaphysics as a proper part of the method of analysis.

    Can we explain the shift in contrast classes, from ‘speculative /metaphysical/ traditional’ to ‘continental’? Here is one exploratory hypothesis. In the early part of the 20th Century, the British analysts’ (non-linguistic) piecemeal, analytic endeavors were quite different from traditional or idealist speculative metaphysical systems. Then, in what I called ‘Phase two’ above, these analysts agreed with the logical empiricists that philosophy should be pursued linguistically. Then, at some point in the later 1960s or 70s, the analytic philosophers realized that the people they were aligning themselves against were also very interested in language (Glock 2008, 132), and often at least as hostile to traditional, systematic metaphysics as the analytic philosophers. Thus a new label needed to be fashioned, which could still serve to distinguish the two (by now) sociologically distinct groups. The term ‘continental’ fit this bill.

    Here is a further hypothesis: the shift in contrast class from ‘speculative/metaphysical’ to ‘continental’ helped allow the resurrection of metaphysics within analytic philosophy, and skepticism towards the linguistic turn. Once analytic philosophy’s other espoused staunchly anti-metaphysical stances, and became more interested in the workings of language, analytic philosophers could once again take up the mantle of metaphysics. Of course, there are many other likely causes of the revival of metaphysics in analytic philosophy: e.g. Quine’s claim at the end of “Two Dogmas” that rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction blurs the line between metaphysics and science, Strawson’s Individuals, and Kripke’s making modality appear intellectually respectable.

    7. Conclusion

    I have argued that, in line with previous scholarship, the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in our sense first appears in the 1930s, but doesn’t being to gain wide currency until around 1950. I then discussed various rationales people during that time period gave for grouping these (in many ways) disparate philosophers under a single heading. But the later rationale grounding the grouping, namely that philosophical inquiries are at bottom linguistic, contradicts certain earlier actors’ explicit descriptions of their activities. So, unsurprisingly, some historical actors resisted this grouping—and this may in part explain why the term ‘analytic philosophy’ did not begin to spread widely until the 1950s. Finally, the contrast class for ‘analytic’ has not always been ‘continental’: that is a relatively recent development—in part because the previous ways the analytic community distinguished itself from outsiders ceased to hold of the analytic and non-analytic philosophers.

  27. #427
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    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLPvxP8OiEc (Unregistered Podcast ... Analytical Philosophy vs Continental Philosophy)

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jason_Brennan

    Jason Brennan is most likely a heuristic/speculative type.

  28. #428
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    there are (1) causally related objects and (2) structurally related objects
    1. object A --> <-- object B

    2. geon A --> <-- geon B

    If this new object or pattern is useful, then it is a creative process.
    ... or object vs. geon is the difference, so both Si (objects) and Se (geons) deal with causal relationships and structural relationships.

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    ... or object vs. geon is the difference, so both Si (objects) and Se (geons) deal with causal relationships and structural relationships.
    "Dogged, Excluding, Inquisitive-then-satisfied, From the many to the one, Filling in the blanks" are caused by BA10 (not "Ni" or Si).

  30. #430
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    "Dogged, Excluding, Inquisitive-then-satisfied, From the many to the one, Filling in the blanks" are caused by BA10 (not "Ni" or Si).
    ... and primary PFA/PFS

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    the left hemisphere: analytic philosophy <--- computer science (NLP etc) <--- discrete mathematics (TCS etc)

    the right hemisphere: continuous mathematics ---> theoretical physics ---> speculative philosophy

  32. #432
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    introvert, a planner, primary PFA/PFS (and working memory)


    analytic philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein

    computer science: Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg

    discrete mathematics: Andrew Wiles

    continuous mathematics: Roger Penrose, Robbert Dijkgraaf

    theoretical physics: Sean M. Carroll, Carlo Rovelli

    speculative philosophy: Jason Brennan (see post #427)

  33. #433
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    https://www.insider.com/celebrities-...k-alike-2017-1

    structurally related objects (Si) ... similar facial features

  34. #434
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    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brodmann_area_10

    "Although this region is extensive in humans, its function is poorly understood. Koechlin & Hyafil have proposed that processing of 'cognitive branching' is the core function of the frontopolar cortex. Cognitive branching enables a previously running task to be maintained in a pending state for subsequent retrieval and execution upon completion of the ongoing one. Many of our complex behaviors and mental activities require simultaneous engagement of multiple tasks, and they suggest the anterior prefrontal cortex may perform a domain-general function in these scheduling operations. "
    a planner --> dynamic (i.e. change, activity or progress ... which is directly related to mathematical analysis)

    not a planner --> static

  35. #435
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    mechanics --> dynamic

    mechanical engineering --> static

    chemistry --> static

  36. #436
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    A)

    a planner --> dynamic

    not a planner --> static

    B)

    a planner --> causal reasoning

    not a planner --> structure

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