“What Is in Our Interest”: India and the Ukraine War - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Most importantly, however, it remains unclear whether India’s current efforts at befriending Russia by refusing to condemn its invasion of Ukraine will actually arrest the continuing drift toward stronger Sino-Russian ties, even if the efforts further weaken what are already feeble Russian incentives to deepen ties with Pakistan. Above all, there is no assurance that India’s current strategy of mollifying Russia by eschewing public criticism of the Kremlin’s war, if successful in the near term, would pay off in the end—especially if Moscow is enervated as a result of cumulative Western sanctions and as a consequence is unable to support India in the manner that New Delhi hopes for. This outcome would be particularly problematic if the “no limits” Sino-Russian ties gave Beijing undue influence over Russia’s future cooperation with India or if Russia proves unable to support India’s military forces and their future modernization because of its own deteriorating industrial base at a time when India could also lose Ukraine as a critical supplier of components for the weapons that are now in the Indian military inventory.









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