Now that you mention it, DA cognition does make a lot of sense in light of my philosophical writings. That really narrows it down to ILI or EIE. I'm probably too pro Fe to be an ILI, so that makes EIE the most likely type. I'm an oddly introverted-looking extrovert, though, I must say, if I'm really an EIE.

More philosophy from me:

81. We found that there is no such thing as a pure reflection. The self, properly conceived, is always an impure reflection, which is to say a self different from itself. In what manner is the self different from itself? It isn't the case that the self is an object split in two. An object split in two can be put back together. The self rather is two in such a way that these two cannot ever be joined together. This consists in the fact that one portion of the self is appearance while the other half is what appears. The appearance is immanent--I have access to it--while what appears is transcendent--I do not have access to it. Now, what is transcendent, conceived from an omniscient point of view, simply doesn't exist. If something doesn't exist, it can't be brought into a union with what does exist except by being made to exist. But what exists is always the appearance or facet of something transcendent. Even in the case of a pure appearance, an appearance with nothing behind it, a tangible nothingness transcends it. Moreover, to gain access to what transcends the appearance is to lose access to the original appearance in its isolation. It would be a unification but also a replacement of one actuality by another where instead I want both actualities.

82. We determined that the universe, conceived from an omniscient point of view, is my reflection, that my reflection is a nothing along with the appearance of that nothing, and that my self would be the unification of these two existences. This unification is realized in my reflection, but my reflection is always partly outside of my grasp as a pure transcendent in the form of the nothingness attached to the appearing nothing. That is to say my full reflection, or my identity, is always partly concealed. This can't be overcome by looking for the rest of my identity because the rest of my identity, the part of it that is not nothing-appearing but rather nothing in the pure sense as a transcendence, is precisely concealment, blindness. If I see everything, as I do when looking at things from an omniscient viewpoint, I have to see blindness as much as anything else; it can't be gotten rid of, as it is a part of the full picture of reality.

83. Blindness, which is to say nothing, is always blindness to something. It is relative; it presumes something outside it. If I must include blindness in a full picture of reality, how, then, can I have a genuinely full picture of reality? The answer is that blindness must be conceived of as a purely local phenomenon. That is to say, in a universe where there is A and B, A can be blind to B or B can be blind to A but A and B must both be visible from the broader omniscient viewpoint. This means that, in the reflection, nothing and nothing's appearance are both, in fact, kinds of appearances. The distinction between them lies in the fact that nothing posits its appearance whereas its appearance is self-contained, not positing at all. In general, where I find an appearance, I never can derive an object from it alone. An appearance taken by itself doesn't imply anything beyond itself. But if I conceive of an object, I always necessarily consider it as possibly or actually appearing. Objects necessarily have appearances; appearances do not necessarily have objects.

84. We have considered that there are two types of appearances which form the divided whole that is reality. There is the type of appearance that posits an appearance other than itself--this I call nothing or the transcendent--and there is the type of appearance that doesn't extend beyond itself--this I call the immanent. If A posits B but B does not posit A, how is it that I arrive back at A from B? The answer lies in the fact that "self-contained" does not mean devoid of relative qualities; on the contrary, anything immanent always involves an inner transcendence. In other words, something inside the immanent is blind to something else inside the immanent. How do we know this? We know this because reality forms a whole, and this whole necessarily includes blindness. I can't ever encounter the immanent without it carrying a transcendence inside it, then. Why? Because if I did, where would transcendence be at that point? I have to carry it with me into the immanent, or else it disappears altogether.