Quote Originally Posted by k0rpsy View Post
Perfect..
Oh I hate this, I like getting involved but I know I'm going to get lost in concepts that I struggle to grasp.

Quote Originally Posted by k0rpsy View Post
A citation would be helpful. In the meantime there's this, which I'm guessing is in the same spirit:..
Yes it is.


Quote Originally Posted by k0rpsy View Post
So, predicated on the assumption that a self and one or more non-selves exists, the existential and categorical selves can be broadly described as identificatory attachments to mental constructs arising from persistent belief in phenomenal object-subject relations..
Well I hope I have understood you, so I'd like to paraphrase? You are working from the assumption that there is one actual "core" self, then the existential and catagorical selves can be described as these reflective mental constructs, seperate from a true experiential self?

If this is the case, I would view the self in terms of the whole organism, this extends beyond a narrow definition of the immediate expereintial self, but would include all cognitive and sensory processes, including abstract catagorisations and associations and a constructed identities as well as immediate perceptual experience.





Quote Originally Posted by k0rpsy View Post
I'd argue the truth of this statement by leaning on Uncle Herc once again, who said "You cannot step into the same river twice, young homie, for the waters are ever flowing on." So if one were to point to oneself to convey "This is me", that action would spur an accretion of perceptions begetting memories and thoughts, and the self who indicated itself would have changed before the gesture was completed.

Secondly, if we accept that we cannot perceive, rationalize, or communicate perfectly, and if we accept that the existential self arises from the mind as a result of phenomenal events, then we can see that this existential self is but a nonequivalent representation of the objective self. And so we cannot point to this simulacrum of the self and rightfully say that it is what we are.
Yes this is interesting, I have for some considered the idea of a static centred self as illusory. In fact it could be argued that a static self is a convenient social construction. It reminds me of this... (wait til about 1 minute)