Stable universals vs changing

[Jonathan]

I've noticed that different interpretations of the IM elements often boil down to this difference:

1) Stable universals are static. For example, the technique of language, universals of feeling/value concepts.

2) Changing things are dynamic. For example, dialectical logic, cause-and-effect, if-then-therefore, changing emotional states: "I was too ecstatic, so events let me down, and then I was depressed, but I got so pessimistic that I was pleasantly surprised by what happened..."

vs. the other point of view:

1) stable universals are object. For example, techniques being viewed as "disconnected facts," the shared objective basis on which everything rests; universals of feeling/value concepts being in some sense "objective" and "shared" among all people.

2) Changing things are field. For example, dialectical logic, cause-and-effect, changing emotional states, etc., would be introverted because they're making connections between things....changes -> therefore connections -> therefore field -> therefore introverted IM element.

It seems to me that this difference of opinion is at the core to why what one person thinks is Xi, someone else invariable thinks is Xe.

This may also explain why so many famous people are typed in opposite quadras by various well-known socionists.

[Krig the Viking]

I fit pretty closely into the first point of view. The second point of view seems obviously incorrect, though it wouldn't surprise me if it accurate describes how some people see it.

[rat1]

object field is more fundamental.. but the whole changing vs staying the same descriptor you're using is pretty vague and really kinda sucks. I think it makes the two dichotomies look more intertwined then they actually are.

[krieger]

the second definition is pretty much already incorporated in the fact that Dynamic P is always Field... Field in Ji means something rather different from Field in Pi. i find the word "Field" to apply to Pi much better than to Ji, because J refers to distinctions rather than to entities.

the issue is that object/field is much less of a quantitative, technical marker in socionics than Static/Dynamic. object/field at best raises a subtle, qualitative connotation that is much better denoted with the words objective/subjective. but these words themselves have issues of interpretational variability, so one needs to address the combinations of object/field with static/dynamic individually:

Pi: ontological subjectivity; the perspective-dependent description of an entity; how the thing appears to you; phenomenology
Je: epistemic objectivity; heuristic-independent knowledge; distinctions that can be made on the basis of sense experience alone without the need for complex inferences and compositions
Pe: ontological objectivity; the thing-in-itself represented so as to eliminate the influence of perspective as fully as possible
Ji: epistemic subjectivity; heuristic-dependent knowledge; distinctions made on the basis of inferences and compositions based on training from prior personal experience

alternatively:
Je: epistemically unproblematic knowledge
Ji: epistemically challenging knowledge

to understand why Pi and Je go together, closely examine the empiricist definition of objectivity: objectivity consists in premising knowledge on sense experience. sense experience happens from a perspective. hence, epistemic objectivity is ontologically subjective. the challenge of human thinking is to arrive at ontologically objective descriptions despite this constrained starting point.

Static constructs are premised on Dynamic fundaments, but the point of the Statics is to, at one point, lend the basis for a "prediction" on the Dynamic plane again. so while Dynamics are the unequivocal starting point, the progression is potentially from Dynamic to Static back to Dynamic, back to Static, etc, etc.

all categories play a role in the workings of all types' cognition... another thing that needs to be incorporated is the fact that Accepting/Creating distributes the Focal/Diffuse quality over the functions. for example, in IxTp, Je is in the ego block, but Ji is Focal. this manifests in a tantalizing consideration for a final truth that is upheld as a kind of asymptotic ideal and never reached (or even addressed) in practice.

[Jonathan]

the second definition is pretty much already incorporated in the fact that Dynamic P is always Field... Field in Ji means something rather different from Field in Pi. i find the word "Field" to apply to Pi much better than to Ji, because J refers to distinctions rather than to entities.

the issue is that object/field is much less of a quantitative, technical marker in socionics than Static/Dynamic. object/field at best raises a subtle, qualitative connotation that is much better denoted with the words objective/subjective. but these words themselves have issues of interpretational variability, so one needs to address the combinations of object/field with static/dynamic individually:

Pi: ontological subjectivity; the perspective-dependent description of an entity; how the thing appears to you; phenomenology
Je: epistemic objectivity; heuristic-independent knowledge; distinctions that can be made on the basis of sense experience alone without the need for complex inferences and compositions
Pe: ontological objectivity; the thing-in-itself represented so as to eliminate the influence of perspective as fully as possible
Ji: epistemic subjectivity; heuristic-dependent knowledge; distinctions made on the basis of inferences and compositions based on training from prior personal experience

alternatively:
Je: epistemically unproblematic knowledge
Ji: epistemically challenging knowledge

to understand why Pi and Je go together, closely examine the empiricist definition of objectivity: objectivity consists in premising knowledge on sense experience. sense experience happens from a perspective. hence, epistemic objectivity is ontologically subjective. the challenge of human thinking is to arrive at ontologically objective descriptions despite this constrained starting point.

Static constructs are premised on Dynamic fundaments, but the point of the Statics is to, at one point, lend the basis for a "prediction" on the Dynamic plane again. so while Dynamics are the unequivocal starting point, the progression is potentially from Dynamic to Static back to Dynamic, back to Static, etc, etc.

all categories play a role in the workings of all types' cognition... another thing that needs to be incorporated is the fact that Accepting/Creating distributes the Focal/Diffuse quality over the functions. for example, in IxTp, Je is in the ego block, but Ji is Focal. this manifests in a tantalizing consideration for a final truth that is upheld as a kind of asymptotic ideal and never reached (or even addressed) in practice.

Interesting ideas. I have trouble though associating Je with "sense experience." It would seem to me that judgments made on the basis of sense of experience would be judgments paired with a sensing function (Delta/Alpha Je, Beta/Gamma Ji).

If I try to translate what you're saying in simple language, it sounds out like this:
Pi + Je = biased observations with simplistic judgments
Pe + Ji = relatively unbiased observations with more sophisticated judgments.
...which obviously makes Pe + Ji sound better all around.

Maybe I'm completely misinterpreting what you're saying.

But if I change Je as relying to "sense experience" to Je relying on "subjective experience" (i.e., Pi, which could be sensing or intuitive)...then it seems better to me.

As to Je being simpler than Ji, well of course since Je is more direct, it will seem perhaps more constrained from a Ji perspective...or perhaps its very strength is to simplify. Nevertheless, it doesn't seem to me right that all Je is simpler than all Ji in an absolute sense.

[krieger]

If I try to translate what you're saying in simple language, it sounds out like this:
Pi + Je = biased observations with simplistic judgments
Pe + Ji = relatively unbiased observations with more sophisticated judgments.

this attribution is entirely your own work.

But if I change Je as relying to "sense experience" to Je relying on "subjective experience" (i.e., Pi, which could be sensing or intuitive)...then it seems better to me.

well, no. Te being the empiricist function is central to my thesis. empiricism is the most straightforward definition of epistemic objectivity that i've come across. though i would concede that the most unproblematic manifestation of empiricism is probably that where Te is combined with Si. i have come across cases where gamma NTs outright rejected empiricism (Austrian economics comes to mind), so the link with Si could be important. but Se is not empiricist. at all.

i see Jung's association of Se with "sensing" as one of his major errors. Se isn't something directly picked up through the senses so much as it is a highly specified and concrete mental construct.

As to Je being simpler than Ji, well of course since Je is more direct, it will seem perhaps more constrained from a Ji perspective...or perhaps its very strength is to simplify.

Ji can actually simplify things a lot, because it reduces complex reasoning chains to their conclusion. but in so doing, the statement is provided as if appended with "take my word on it". Je on the other hand can sort of simply situations in a passive sense, i.e. the complexity of everything you could derive from a unit of Je is in a sense contained with in it. So you can illustrate a complex epistemic issue to a person by providing them the piece of information that makes him/her capable of deriving what s/he needs to know.

[Jonathan]

Te being the empiricist function is central to my thesis. empiricism is the most straightforward definition of epistemic objectivity that i've come across.

Interesting idea, although I tend to be a little skeptical of equating IM elements or types with philosophical movements (though I may not be understanding you correctly). It's one thing to say empiricism is a predominantly Te philosophy. One could even construct a self-consistent "application" of typology in which Te is empiricism, and the other IM elements are other areas of philosophy, which is apparently what you have done. There's nothing wrong with this; I've constructed similar "reducts" of typology, though I consider it helpful to understand that that's what I'm doing...applying typology to one area, rather than saying that my interpretation equals the whole of essence of Jung/socionic typology.

Specifically, empiricism, as I understand it, is a philosophical school that believes that all knowledge derives from the senses. While at first glance, it seems reasonable (since it's hard to even imagine intelligent existence of any sort without any inputs whatsoever), it's still a derived result, so I don't think anyone on the basis of being Te could arrive at that conclusion without at least first thinking quite a bit about it.

I'm not familiar with the various arguments for/against empiricism, but presumably the relevant questions are 1) Is there some sense in which mathematical or logical true is separate from what is known via the sense? 2) Are the claims of a mystic that he/she was communicated to in a non-sensory possible? 3) Could there be some sort of "instinctual" tendency that may count as a form of knowledge and would be inborn?

Ironically, if on the basis of Te, one could know the answers to those questions, that would be an argument against empiricism. In other words, if empiricism is true, and if merely being born a Te type causes one to know that it's true, then empiricism is false. Conversely, if a Te type merely thinks that's true but doesn't know it, then empiricism is also false (if thinking that something is true and not knowing means that one doesn't know it because it isn't true). (I suppose one could squeak by that and say that a Te type may believe it to be true without proving it, and it could still be true because the Te person's Te-ness did not make one know it even though it made one believe it and it's true, though believing something to be true that really is true is awfully close to knowledge.)

But surely at least some of the people in the long list of philosophers considered to be empiricists are Alpha types (?).

[Cat King Cole]

I understand labcoat as making references to metaphysics, not different schools of thought. "epistemic objectivity" is just a very specific way of saying "I believe knowledge comes from real things with studyable traits".

Similarly, "ontological subjectivity" means "I believe what exists"

ontology = "What exists, and what is it like?"
epistemology = "How can one know things?"

Since a functioning person must both be aware of reality and have a way of extracting knowledge from it, having a P and a J function in your ego follows naturally.

Irrational elements define one's ontological approach--"What exists, and what is it like?"
Rational elements define one's epistemological approach--"How can one know things?"

Introtim elements are subjective:
Pi: "Things only exist as defined by my relationship with them; their properties are defined by how it influences me".
Ji: "One can only arrive at knowledge by following personal reasoning, be it discursive (T) or intuitive (F)."

Extratim elements are objective:
Pe: "The world is filled with objects that can be reduced to traits and analyzed."
Je: "I can obtain knowledge by studying objects and building predictable patterns in my head, be they arrived at through discourse or intuition."

I have a faint sense that I'm mixing a lot of meaninglessness in here, so you'll have to forgive my inexperience with metaphysics.

I'd also add that Internal/External is the same as discursive/intuitive. N and F make connections through intuitive reason, where T and S make connections through discursive reason.

--

I can illustrate it with an ESE...

The ESE believes that reality is wholly subjective, but builds knowledge by studying objects. They're basically blind to anything that they haven't concretely experienced (ontological subjectivism through ). However, the ESE builds knowledge by studying people, being an epistemological objectivist. "This signals implies this", "I can do that to effect the change I want". Ethics, being reasoned intuitively, can't really explain why it knows these things--it "just does"; while Sensation is pretty plainly obvious. You can't argue with an atom.

Also remember that your dominant function is always on. So, if you want to compare an ESE and an SEI, the SEI is living in a world of ontological subjectivity, the ESE is living in a world of epistemological objectivity.

And bam, we have Rationality/Irrationality as an input/output dichotomy, which is the most universal application of it, imo, and removes a lot of the taint that comes from the nurture aspects of it like "orderliness" (which is strictly purely orderliness-of-information-processing and not orderliness-of-character).

[Jonathan]

I understand labcoat as making references to metaphysics, not different schools of thought. "epistemic objectivity" is just a very specific way of saying "I believe knowledge comes from real things with studyable traits".

Similarly, "ontological subjectivity" means "I believe what exists"

ontology = "What exists, and what is it like?"
epistemology = "How can one know things?"

...
I'd also add that Internal/External is the same as discursive/intuitive. N and F make connections through intuitive reason, where T and S make connections through discursive reason.

Thanks for the clarification of Labcoat's ideas. Overall it makes sense as a translation of the more usual definitions. You seem to be on the same wavelength....Is this a theory that has been discussed before?

Still, I have problems with F being about knowledge. Traditionally, judging functions are about decision making...E.g., how do I come up with some criterion for deciding on this or that. I suppose that can be translated to knowledge in some way (knowledge that one should decide on...), but only indirectly.

As to intuitive vs. discursive reason...I'm not sure what you mean. Can you explain?

[FDG]

Well labcoat is right, others opposing his POV are wrong (in this thread).

[Cat King Cole]

Thanks for the clarification of Labcoat's ideas. Overall it makes sense as a translation of the more usual definitions. You seem to be on the same wavelength....Is this a theory that has been discussed before?

I'm not sure if I am clarifying his ideas, I'm just working with the words he's used. I've also never talked about it with him before, or even thought about it; I just spend too much time on Wikipedia's philosophy articles

Still, I have problems with F being about knowledge. Traditionally, judging functions are about decision making...E.g., how do I come up with some criterion for deciding on this or that. I suppose that can be translated to knowledge in some way (knowledge that one should decide on...), but only indirectly.

"How do I come up with some criterion" = "How do I know something" though, right? Or do you mean something else?

Also, imo, Rational functions deal with reactions to knowledge. This is why Rational types have such immediate and strong reactions to words, facts, arguments, changing emotions, and all that Logical and Ethical stuff.

Irrational functions OTOH react to "reality", either their personal subjective reality as with IPs (cue imaginative couch potato doms and go-with-the-flow epicurean doms) or whatever it is in the world outside they've been sizing up.

Rick phrased it, basically, as "civilisation" versus "wild nature".

It's also a pre-existing concept in the notions of "apollonian" and "dionysian" elements in the world, interestingly.

As to intuitive vs. discursive reason...I'm not sure what you mean. Can you explain?

Reasoning can either be logical and step-by-step where your reasoning is clear at each step (discursive), or it can be intuitive where you leap about from point to point. That's nothing new though.

[tcaudilllg]

I think strict epistemology is a T EM trait. "Less assertion, more evidence." T EM types tend to insist on having a comprehensive truth table pointing to "truth beyond a reasonable doubt"... they are very skeptical of probability as a means to truth. Some of the more extreme ones can never be completely satisfied, because the symmetry of a proposition alone has no meaning for them.

[tcaudilllg]

I think words like "object" and "field" have no authentic bearing on information metabolism. "External statics of objects" seems to point towards a strictly libertarian ethos, which quite frankly not all SLEs have. Nor are all LIIs traditionalists. I think the socionists have screwed up their system by de-emphasizing the political, and the aspects of human nature that are only evident in its context.

[krieger]

Interesting idea, although I tend to be a little skeptical of equating IM elements or types with philosophical movements (though I may not be understanding you correctly). It's one thing to say empiricism is a predominantly Te philosophy. One could even construct a self-consistent "application" of typology in which Te is empiricism, and the other IM elements are other areas of philosophy, which is apparently what you have done. There's nothing wrong with this; I've constructed similar "reducts" of typology, though I consider it helpful to understand that that's what I'm doing...applying typology to one area, rather than saying that my interpretation equals the whole of essence of Jung/socionic typology.

it would be rather strange to me if in studying a phenomenon so closely related to the philosophy of thought we would never end up finding correlations between the two fields.

Specifically, empiricism, as I understand it, is a philosophical school that believes that all knowledge derives from the senses. While at first glance, it seems reasonable (since it's hard to even imagine intelligent existence of any sort without any inputs whatsoever), it's still a derived result, so I don't think anyone on the basis of being Te could arrive at that conclusion without at least first thinking quite a bit about it.

I'm not familiar with the various arguments for/against empiricism, but presumably the relevant questions are 1) Is there some sense in which mathematical or logical true is separate from what is known via the sense? 2) Are the claims of a mystic that he/she was communicated to in a non-sensory possible? 3) Could there be some sort of "instinctual" tendency that may count as a form of knowledge and would be inborn?

Ironically, if on the basis of Te, one could know the answers to those questions, that would be an argument against empiricism. In other words, if empiricism is true, and if merely being born a Te type causes one to know that it's true, then empiricism is false. Conversely, if a Te type merely thinks that's true but doesn't know it, then empiricism is also false (if thinking that something is true and not knowing means that one doesn't know it because it isn't true). (I suppose one could squeak by that and say that a Te type may believe it to be true without proving it, and it could still be true because the Te person's Te-ness did not make one know it even though it made one believe it and it's true, though believing something to be true that really is true is awfully close to knowledge.)

there are varying degrees of extremism at which the principle can be applied. i'm talking about a mild version where only an emphasis is placed on the demand for directly perceptible evidence. i don't see refutations of it's extremistic variety to be very useful to this discussion.

I understand labcoat as making references to metaphysics, not different schools of thought. "epistemic objectivity" is just a very specific way of saying "I believe knowledge comes from real things with studyable traits".

"real things" has more of an association with Pe. "studyable traits" gets pretty close to what i'm getting at. the issue is exactly that the two are hard to combine, because to jump from what we can study to what is real, we need to apply some sort of synthesis or abstraction.

Similarly, "ontological subjectivity" means "I believe what exists"

again i would connote this more with Pe. Pi is attentive to how things appear in a perspective-dependent way and holds skepticism to more perception-independent accounts of "what is real". however, this is also influenced by the Pi function being external (Si) among the person's valued functions, and possibly also by it's being Focal (in irrationals). in most type, the attitude is pretty ambivalent.

Irrational elements define one's ontological approach--"What exists, and what is it like?"
Rational elements define one's epistemological approach--"How can one know things?"

yes, but these things are constantly overlapping and not always capable of being isolated from one another. i do think you properly transcribe the terms.

Introtim elements are subjective:
Pi: "Things only exist as defined by my relationship with them; their properties are defined by how it influences me".
Ji: "One can only arrive at knowledge by following personal reasoning, be it discursive (T) or intuitive (F)."

Extratim elements are objective:
Pe: "The world is filled with objects that can be reduced to traits and analyzed."
Je: "I can obtain knowledge by studying objects and building predictable patterns in my head, be they arrived at through discourse or intuition."

I have a faint sense that I'm mixing a lot of meaninglessness in here, so you'll have to forgive my inexperience with metaphysics.

i'm not a big fan of the introtim/extrotim aspect of functions, because i suspect it doesn't have a technical definition of this kind. it's a qualitative connotation at best. attempts at finding the technical definition just have you end up with it's qualititative "feel" instead. i think this is what causes your self-professed sense of confusion.

I can illustrate it with an ESE...

The ESE believes that reality is wholly subjective, but builds knowledge by studying objects. They're basically blind to anything that they haven't concretely experienced (ontological subjectivism through ). However, the ESE builds knowledge by studying people, being an epistemological objectivist. "This signals implies this", "I can do that to effect the change I want". Ethics, being reasoned intuitively, can't really explain why it knows these things--it "just does"; while Sensation is pretty plainly obvious. You can't argue with an atom.

Also remember that your dominant function is always on. So, if you want to compare an ESE and an SEI, the SEI is living in a world of ontological subjectivity, the ESE is living in a world of epistemological objectivity.

And bam, we have Rationality/Irrationality as an input/output dichotomy, which is the most universal application of it, imo, and removes a lot of the taint that comes from the nurture aspects of it like "orderliness" (which is strictly purely orderliness-of-information-processing and not orderliness-of-character).

ethical functions are attentive to qualitative distinctions, so talking about epistemics and objectivity can be a little awkward in contexts like these.

[Jonathan]

Reasoning can either be logical and step-by-step where your reasoning is clear at each step (discursive), or it can be intuitive where you leap about from point to point. That's nothing new though.

I see. One of the definitions of "discursive" is leaping from point to point, but another one is proceeding by logic as opposed to intuition. But since the terms "logic" and "intuition" are already used in Socionics to mean something else, it gets confusing. But that's okay...different terminologies work for different people.

[Jonathan]

it would be rather strange to me if in studying a phenomenon so closely related to the philosophy of thought we would never end up finding correlations between the two fields.

Yeah, certainly. You found an application of socionics to philosophy of thought, which you seem to have thought about a lot, and it merits being explored. I was just pointing out that it's an application, (or correlation, as you put it).

[Aiss]

Reasoning can either be logical and step-by-step where your reasoning is clear at each step (discursive), or it can be intuitive where you leap about from point to point. That's nothing new though.

I see. One of the definitions of "discursive" is leaping from point to point, but another one is proceeding by logic as opposed to intuition. But since the terms "logic" and "intuition" are already used in Socionics to mean something else, it gets confusing. But that's okay...different terminologies work for different people.

And there I hoped we finally had terms that properly conveyed the qualitative difference between external and internal elements. :/ Any idea of better words for what CKC describes?

[Jonathan]

And there I hoped we finally had terms that properly conveyed the qualitative difference between external and internal elements. :/ Any idea of better words for what CKC describes?

I've tended think that "explicit" vs. "implicit" would be better word choices than "external" and "internal." But no single word is a magic bullet here. Augusta's premise is that there's something that N+F / S+T have in common such that N is to S as F is to T. But similarly, with the "abstract" vs. "involved" dichotomy, there's something that N+T / S+F have in common such that N is to S as T is to F. The danger is that when people take external/internal as the foundation, with various interpretations on what those terms mean, they often tend to build a very different model from what the IM elements meant originally.

[The Ineffable]

1) stable universals are object. For example, techniques being viewed as "disconnected facts," the shared objective basis on which everything rests; universals of feeling/value concepts being in some sense "objective" and "shared" among all people.

2) Changing things are field. For example, dialectical logic, cause-and-effect, changing emotional states, etc., would be introverted because they're making connections between things....changes -> therefore connections -> therefore field -> therefore introverted IM element.

I reached the level of distinguishing object from the Bodies of Socionics. Objects can be identified, ergo, by the nature of this concept, they have to be Static. So objects are Bodies + Static (Pe) - and from now, when I will associate this notion with the IEs, on I will use it exclusively with this meaning. Je, while Bodies as well, is things that can be only accounted for but not identified but through (other) objects. Using the simplest case, an action, a change, the predicate reveals something identifiable only by the changes that happen to the objects. You can't for instance identify walking by enumerating its properties because it has none; it can be told when it happens only by telling the changes in the properties of its affected object(s) - different position, different shape. Sure it is there and therefore Bodies (empirical, a posteriori, before our concept of it) but it can't be analyzed.

Time is used to identiy Dynamic occurances, but it is actually not Dynamic itself, time is a Static representation (Fields) of an oject, it presents a property which can take a value [1]. Humans perceive it spatially - for example "before" means back (this too ) in time but also spatially in front of someone. It is important to remember this, this and similar clarifications help in understanding the unarticulated (intuitive [2]) nature of the Dynamic information, in contrast with the analytic, explanative Static information.

 

Though like I said before, all of the following are unarticulated (they just "follow" something external to themselves) one way or another: Bodies, Dyamic, External, Irrational/Perceiving, Merry, Judicious, Logic (yes, its necessity external to its self-sufficient Rationality), Intuition, Democratic, Aristocratic (these last two for different reasons), and so on. BTW, there is no contradiction between Pe's being strongly intuitive though unlike the Dynamic IEs they identify, because in fact they are not used to identify themselves alone, but they are just used within a Static block along with Ji [3]. And yes, Ethics is less intuitive than Logic, it's conciseness is higher than of Logic - doubt on its judgment is unapplicable and no validation from outside is required, they simply establish what is the case, instead of being confirmed what is the case.

---

[1] - that is, Fields->Bodies, the revers of Bodies->Fields, which would be the case when a stimulus is represented a posteriori as a "property" of something - you perceive its value first which you afterwards (a posteriori) abstractize as a property.
[2] - the literal sens of the notion, not as in Socionics "Intuition".
[3] - precisely like taking the impression of an outsole: although the impression is just the shape you will be left with, the impression of that precise object is when you actually perform that operation on it, if you don't do it you don't have its shape. On the other hand, there is no term for the shape that exists in the object because there is none until imprinted in something. Now the concept of "shape" is the same thing, it is Static and Fields and it refers to an actual object by Pe (which itself is not shape, though) but it is not the object, it's only its representation. We use "shape" and "identity" to refer to actual object, but Pe are in fact the "shaping" and the "identification" (of course, can't talk about Bodies without actual experience) even when reproduced mentally in retrospective.

[Psyhence]

And there I hoped we finally had terms that properly conveyed the qualitative difference between external and internal elements. :/ Any idea of better words for what CKC describes?

Evident vs inherent.

Evident objects or interactions in Te, Ti, Se, Si

Inherent objects and interactions in Fe, Fi, Ne, Ni

In Te the process is evident
In Ti the correlations are evident
Se notices the qualities of objects that are evident
For Si the relationship results in evident innervations

Fe notices processes that are inherent to objects
Fi discrete relationships are inherent to the interaction.
Ne focuses on the properties of objects that are inherent
For Ni an interaction creates inherent changes

[Gilly]

Evident vs inherent.

Evident objects or interactions in Te, Ti, Se, Si

Inherent objects and interactions in Fe, Fi, Ne, Ni

In Te the process is evident
In Ti the correlations are evident
Se notices the qualities of objects that are evident
For Si the relationship results in evident innervations

Fe notices processes that are inherent to objects
Fi discrete relationships are inherent to the interaction.
Ne focuses on the properties of objects that are inherent
For Ni an interaction creates inherent changes

This is all really good, one of the better qualitative descriptions of functions I've ever seen.

[Destroypuppy]

Can anyone explain this in a more explicit way? I really want to understand this.

[griggerplease]

... hmm...

[Beautiful sky]

I dislike being Ij temperament sometimes

[RedBeard]

As a newbie I'm taken aback by the presence of an entire philosophical apparatus surrounding and upholding socionics theory. Jung's 8 function model was tailored for the introverted orientation; the only way to substantially expound on it was to come full circle into a system that also described the object in as vivid detail as the subject. It seems like more parts are necessary to negate any confusion between the object and the subject, especially if we're to fully accept the existence of processes, fields, and how one event leads to another.