A Primer On My Personality Research (2) - Exertion Theory (dual-types)
Humans adapt to their environment by modeling it in the brain, and if they are
smart, modeling the outcome of potential changes to it. Changes to the environment
create a new state for it, which in turn may be modeled for reasons of determining
what the outcome of the changed environmental situation will be. We can discern
two elements of information processing: the "metabolic" form of environmental
perception before and after change, and the "exerted" form of cause/effect
analysis.
We thus perceive a division of kinds of information in the brain, one belonging
to an "information" domain that models perceptions, and the other belonging to
an "energy" or "work" domain of learned possible approaches to change and their
outcomes. Because the modeling of conscious information is by its nature
psychological, we may extend this principle of divided information to include
the entire psyche and each of its aspects. We thus say that the division of
information into domains perceived and energetic is a general attribute of psyche.
The "Model-A" proposed by Aushura Augusta captures the perceptive side of
the psyche quite well. Inspired by C.G. Jung's theory of psychological types and
confident that a better understanding of the differences between people was
attainable, Augusta sought and found a theory of information perception that had
been put forward some decades earlier by Anton Kepinsky. Kepinsky, who had created
the theory in response to the problem of psychopathology, had limited himself,
like Jung, to the matters of problematic perception which his patients were faced
with. This point is important, that the forebearer of socionics were clinicians,
who were faced on a daily basis with the task of finding treatment for people who
had by their definition deep problems of perception. These clinicians believed
that the best way to treat their patients was to meet them on their own ground,
persuading them to view the world in a more adaptable light on terms they could
understand. This method, inherited from Freud and still dominant today,
necessitated effective models of perception, the development of which was
considered by clinicians a matter of professional concern. The belief dominant
then, and still now, was that if only one could treat the issues of erroneous
perception, then the behavioral issues would correct themselves. Therefore,
thought clinicians, the study of behavioral patterns itself was a waste of time
and energy when better breakthroughs in the understanding of perception, they
believed, lied just beyond the theoretical horizon. Furthermore, B.F. Skinner
had already demonstrated that behavior was to a degree conditioned on the basis
of perceived reward, and although the behaviorists were wholly unconcerned with
patterns of perception the clinicians thought the study of behavior best left to
Skinner and his acolytes, with little to no interplay between the two fields.
For all of these reasons Aushura Augusta found no dearth of information from which
to construct her desired model of relationships between healthy people, and for
that reason was inherently limited in the scope of her conclusions. Having
available only theories of perception from which to construct the basis for her
relational theory, she limited herself to the consideration of perception and
presumed, for good or ill, exertion modeling at any given point in her "ring"
model of progressive perception to be dependent on the same psychological
functions which dictated perception at the same point in the cycle. Had she
considered an alternate viewpoint (which may not have been available to her; more
on this later), she might have realized that people can have very different ideas
about what kinds of activity may be influenced by their choice of perceptions.
Therefore because we consider the domains of metabolism and exertion, perception
and energy distinct from each other, our considerations are removed from Augusta's
(erroneous) hypothesis that they were unseperate, and therefore from the
ideological stream of the theoretical institution she founded. (not withstanding
a direct challenge from within it, which has yet to materialize)
Having considered where our situation places us from a sociotheoretic context, let us
discuss what the existence of seperate metabolism and exertion types means to our
understanding of personality.
When the brain receives new information, it is stored as various forms of memory.
These memories comprise the basis for our recognition of persistences of
perception and therefore, our recognition of our own existence. In addition to
recognizing our own existence, we further recognize persistences of situation
and the existence of preferential responses to these situations. Situations
form the content of our perceptions, just as memories of appropriate response form
the content of our adaptation strategies. Together these memories form the
"observation of self-relationship to world" we call psyche.
Having previously divided the psyche into seperate domains information and
exertion, we can see that in the interest of survival it is beneficial for one
to remember -- when considering either the matters of perception relevant to
information metabolism or the matters of action relevant to exertion -- to recall
from the psyche those memories which seem relevant to the situation; specifically,
which perceptions of one's situation are most effective, and which actions will
best change or influence the situation at hand. The observation of these recalls,
when we can very easily observe in the behavior of ourselves and others, suggests
a relationship between the information domain and information metabolism, and the
energy domain and information exertion.
The question is, how to structure the relationship between metabolism and
exertion? Due to the accuracy of Augusta's model-A in modeling information
metabolism, we can include her theory of personality as one half of our scheme.
The question remaining to us then, is how to model the second half? What is
the second half, the exertion domain, like and how do we describe it. To
understand the exertion domain and its contents, let us examine the substance
and consequences of Augusta's theory in more detail.
Like Jung, Augusta suggests that people perceive the world by means of
functions of psychological processing. These functions have orientation --
outward or inward, extroverted or introverted -- and specific interests. Augusta,
however, went further by suggesting that although the functions existed in the
mind, they could only apprehend the information that met their criterion of
interest. This meant that each of the functions of the psyche corresponded to
specific kinds of information elements that existed independently of the mind,
in the physical world no less. Indeed, Augusta reasoned that there existed a
precise physical correlation between the psyche and the physical world of static
and kinetic energies; she even used these precepts to phrase her definitions
of the eight functions. This point is important: that there exist only eight
kinds of information available to our perceptions. If we cannot percieve a
form of information, then we cannot prove it exists experimentally and thus,
cannot be certain of its existence. Such information is necessarily non-objective
and useless to our considerations. Given that all of our perceptions are
accounted for by the functions of our metabolism types, actions, too, must be
considered in the lense of the eight elements. Therefore we divide the spectrum
of exerted actions, like our perceptions, into eight distinct categories, each
of which corresponds to a kind of information. Further, because we can only act
on the basis of information we are immediately aware of, it is necessary for the
actions we exert to be performed in the context of the metabolism function we
are using to perceive our environment at the moment of our intended exertion.
We further reckon that our exerted energies will influence the environment
itself, and thereby our perception of it. Given that we can only settle on one
perception before going through with an activity, we must have moved forward
from our previous position in Model-A to the next position in the chain. We
therefore conclude that exerted activities act as mediators of transition from
one function of perception to another. Because there are eight functions of
perception there exist eight transitions, and therefore eight mediations and
eight exerted functions to perform them. The question remaining to us is, what
is the order of the exerted functions, and how do we explain their relationship
to each other? To answer this question we must consider the original genesis
of Model-A itself, and of the Jungian typological ordering that preceded it.
The origin of modern typology schemes begins with Jung. In 1921 he published an
essay titled "Psychological Types", in which he discussed typology on the basis
of two principles, attitude and function. Attitudes, said Jung, could be either
introverted or extroverted depending on how they related to the concept of
psychological object. To Jung, the "object" was not a body in space; rather, it
was a circumstance or concept that demanded attention due to its relevance to
matters of immediate survival. Like Freud, Jung followed Darwin in believing that
those psychic aspects which were possessed by humans existed due to their relevance
to survival. Given that thought was itself a trait of humans, it could not be
excluded from the possession of its own role in the scheme of human survival.
Jung considered thought a form of energy, called libido, which was directed toward
the object, a conception of the relevance of psychic experience to objective
matters of survival. An extroverted person, observed Jung, survived by attempting
to assimilate themselves to this object, to relate to it and to bind with it.
By becoming a part of the object, reasoned the extrovert, one becomes attuned to
the methods of survival represented by the object and freed from all threat of
personal destruction; for if the object exists as a representation of the means
by which to survive, then for as long as means exist for survival the object
will remain intact and essentially immortal. Thus the extrovert has evolved to
perceive the object as a source of immortality that denies death.
The introvert takes a different view. Survival, says the introvert, seeks itself
at the expense of all else. The introvert views this prerogative as unacceptable:
spontaneous adaptation without order is to be abhorred because it creates a sense
of chaos that is torturous to the psyche. The introvert desires to seperate
themselves from the object, to stand apart from it and free from its influence in
the service of psyche. Whereas the extrovert attempts to feed the object by means
of their energy, and thereby attain immortality along with it, the introvert
seeks to weaken the object in favor of their own psychically motivated goals.
It is not the pursuit of survival, but the freedom of experience from the chains
of necessity that the introvert desires. Says Jung, the introvert attempts to
withdraw libido from the object, to put the object to work for themselves. The
introvert observes the lengths extroverts go to sustain the object, even to
their own deaths, and looks upon these terminations of personal experience -- of
psyche destroyed -- with apprehension and dismay: they see the object as the
enemy of psyche, just as the extrovert sees the psyche as the enemy of the
object. For this reason they regard the varying manifestations of extrovert
assimilation -- collective action, obedience to a leader, loyalty to a group,
etc. -- with skepticism and suspicion. The introvert distrusts the object and
accordingly seeks to withdraw interest from it at every opportunity.
Jung believed the attitudes found expression through functions of relationship
between elements of the attitudes themselves. Jung distinguished four functions
of each attitude, calling them thinking, feeling, intuition, and sensation.
To each of these functions Jung accorded a definition. Thinking was defined as
the relationship of an attitude to its contrast; feeling the relationship of an
attitude to itself. Sensation functioned as the perception of the contrasting
attitude, whereas intuition was the means of an attitude's self perception.
Given that each attitude was in possession of all four functions, there could
be distinguished eight functions in total.
Jung realized from his own experience that one could not perceive the world with
two or more functions simultaneously. Rather, one must choose which function
to use, a matter Jung believed determined by one's self confidence in the
function's use. Asking himself from whence this confidence came, Jung determined
confidence itself to be, like other aspects of his personal experience, an
evolutionary trait. Confidence, said Jung, could be defined as the perception of
personal aptitude to the demands of a situation. If a person were unconfident
about a situation, it was due to their self-perception of their functions as
being unequal to the situation's demands. Conversely, a person who felt confident
in themselves did so because they perceived themselves as being capable of the
task before them. Confidence, then, evolved as a natural self-signaling or
personal compass by which individuals could avoid potentially untenable
situations and seek out those situations best suited to themselves. However it
is not the situation that brings confidence, but the match of one's instincts
to the present situation. Instincts are in-born and cannot be
changed. It is necessary that the criterion for confidence be determined by
instinctual factors for this very reason, to have a pillar of constancy about
which one may self-orient. There is, then, no true distinction
between the suitability of one's instincts to a situation, and one's confidence
in it. Jung had other criterion for confidence, as well. One of these
was the concept of differentiation, described by him as the ability to identify
situation relevant phenomena. The higher a function's differentiation level, the
better its ability to extract information relevant to the present situation
from one's environs. There existed, therefore, a correlation between a function's
level of differentiation and its powers of adaptation. Because confidence is
dependent on one's ability to adapt, confidence in a function corresponds to
its level of differentiation. Therefore, said Jung, the attitude and function
in which one possessed the most confidence was the master of one's personal
behavior. If a person was most confident relating to the object, they were
extroverted; if most confident relating to the psyche, introverted. If most
confident in their ability to relate, rational; if most confident in their
ability to perceive, irrational. Indeed, the concepts of confidence and
adeptitude can themselves be contrasted, respectively, as introverted and
extroverted perceptions of the same idea.
Jung believed the dominant attitude itself in possession of confidence, which
it invested in its strongest function. This pairing mastered the personality.
Jung believed in the existence of four attitude-function pairings in a single
person, which he called "function-types". The function-types were ordered in
sequence of apprehension by the master pairing, which first sought to repress
the attitude opposite itself by setting the strongest function-type of the
opposing attitude in immediate succession to itself. For the master's influence
to be successfully received by the opposing attitude, it was necessary for the
opposing attitude to be represented in the personality by a function-type that
was capable of conducting the receival. Jung observed that the rational functions
always received information from the irrational functions, and the irrational
functions always from the rational. Therefore if the master function-type were
rational, then the succeeding, or auxiliary, function type was necessarily
irrational. Conversely, if the master function-type were irrational, the
auxiliary function-type would need to be rational, or else no communication
between the function-types could take place. In this way an introvert could
impress upon the extroverted world the existence of their subjective experience
in terms the extrovert could understand, and the extrovert their awareness of
the object in terms the introvert could acknowledge.
Jung called the primary function and its auxiliary the ego -- effectively uniting
them with Freud's concept of the same --, and the third and
fourth, which the primary had brought to heel, the unconscious. Jung limited the
quantity of functions in the personality to four to represent the archetype of
mandala, a four-sided figure believed to represent wholeness. (the Christian
cross, the alchemaic philosopher's stone or lapis, the "tenemos" sacred space,
etc.) He does not specify attitude orientation rules for the unconscious
functions, referring to them as functions only. Although Jung numbers his
functions, he does not suggest a specific order of progression for them. There
does exist, however, an implied order; for the primary unconscious function,
called by Jung the "inferior", and its auxiliary rise in retribution to the
conscious attitude. For them to rise in retribution to the ego, they must follow
it sequentially: first the ego, then the constellated unconscious. We can draw
a further implication, one of relation to the attitude of the inferior function
and its auxiliary, by noting, as Jung did, that the conscious attitude is
compensated for by the unconscious attitude. This is the extroverted attitude
in the case of an introvert-oriented ego, and an introverted attitude in the
case of an extrovert orientation. The existence of this dynamic implies that
the attitude of the inferior function-type is in opposition to that of the
primary, and likewise, the attitude of the inferior auxiliary opposite that of
the primary auxiliary/second function. We conclude that the unconscious always
appears following the ego's auxiliary, and always in exact opposition to the ego
in terms of both attitude and function.
In summary, Jung's typology consisted of four functions, each of which could
be oriented toward either evolutionary "objective" ends or toward "subjective"
experiential observations. The former is an extroverted attitude, the latter an
introverted one. To each person were allowed four function-attitude pairings,
(function-types) the strongest of which attempted to subvert the attitude
opposite itself by means of the next strongest. This prompted the emergence of
the unconscious as a retributionary force on the part of the attitude opposite
the strongest, carried out by the fourth and third strongest, respectively.
For example, an extroverted thinking function-type may have as its auxiliary
either introverted intuition or introverted sensing, the use of which will
constellate the retribution of the unconscious in the form of introverted
feeling and the introverted irrational function not paired with extroverted
thinking. The movement of consciousness from extroverted thinking to introverted
feeling's auxiilary (and back again to extroverted thinking) reveals the
"wholeness" archetype to be as the primary mover of not just the pursuit of
psychic wholeness, but of personality itself.
As regards Anton Kepenski's work we know little. Let us for the sake of
completeness relegate the influence of Kepenski on the development of Model-A
to the background for the remainder of this discussion, and turn our attention
to Augusta and Jung's influence on her.
Two legacies of Jung's work are immediately evident in Model-A, the base
function, which corresponds to Jung's primary function, and the creative
function, which corresponds to Jung's primary auxiliary or secondary function.
From there, the similarities grow murkier. Augusta maintained Jung's assertion
that the unconscious is manifested by the inferior function set, however she
takes a step further by labeling Jung's unconscious the "super-id" and Jung's
primary function set the "ego". From here she postulates that everyone
possesses every function, not just four, and assigns the half of the function
spectrum not already paired into the ego and super-id to Sigmund Freud's
concepts of the superego and id. The superego, says Augusta, mediates the
relationship between the ego and the super-id/inferior function set. Likewise,
the id mediates the transition from unconsciousness to consciousness. Obeying
Jung's rules of function pairing as a matter of cognitive necessity, Augusta
reverses the attitude of the ego to create the id, and the attitude of the
super-id to create the superego. Thus the functions are ordered in pairings
ego, superego, super-id, and id, by order of differentiation. In Model-A
differentiation levels are cyclical, rising and falling as the biochemical
underpinnings of the functions degrade and resurge. The ego is the most
differentiated and most confident pairing; it supresses the manifestation of
the opposite attitude by suppressing its energy. Following the ego is the
superego, which is dominated by the other function of the same attitude and
class as the ego. Its partner's relationship to the ego is similar, possessing
the alternative function of the same attitude and class to that of the
creative/secondary function. Although the superego represses the unconscious
super-id due to its attitude polarity, the ego's repression of the id is
stronger, thus allowing the super-id to follow after the superego. Like Jung's
unconscious function set, the super-id is in absolute opposition to the ego in
both attitude and function, providing the "gateway" to the unconscious. Augusta
reasons that the unconscious is not only compensatory but complementary to the
ego. The search for an ideal incarnation of this complementarity in another
person, says Augusta, is the driving force in individual life and by extension,
society itself. Augusta refers to this complementarity as dual-seeking, and
its collective pursuit the motive for social activity. She calls this motive
and the activity it creates "socionic" due to its semi-predictable, systematic
quality. The collective of all such personalities, she says, are the "socion".
The transition from unconsciousness back to consciousness is carried out by
the emergence of the repressed id. We know little of Augusta's understanding
of the id, save that she called its dominant function the accessor of "personal
knowledge" and its auxiliary the ". These descriptions are hardly sufficient for
a proper understanding of their role, and for this reason we will return to them
later in this discussion.
Looking at the relationship of the four function pairings each to its opposite,
it is easy to be stricken as regards the standards for understanding in our
times as regards the clarity of the relationships to logical apprehension. Is
it not to be expected that the confident ego would seek to repress the anxious,
impulsive id? Would it not be the discipline of the consensus-reliant superego
to disdain the mysticism of the unconscious super-id? We could just as easily
see the four pairings as characters in themselves: the heroic ego conquering
the diabolical id, the wise ruler standing in contrast to the inane court
jester. It is not by accident that these correspondences exist; however for
the time being let us turn our attention away from this matter to the
consideration of the functions .
Augusta draws a clear distinction between functions, which she defines as
placeholders for consideration of a kind of psychic content, and the content
itself, which she calls elements of information. The functions, Augusta makes
clear, are invarible and shared by everyone: they are roles assigned to the
information elements which are observed when the function is in use. The
information elements are the form the function takes, and are analogous to
Jung's function-type concept. However, Augusta takes Jung's concept one step
farther, analoging the psyche to the physical world. Corresponding to the
information elements, says Augusta, are information aspects: These aspects
are independent of the mind: they are, in fact, elements of physical reality.
Augusta postulates that the mind apprehends the physical world because it
possesses information element processing systems that can perceive the
aspects. There exists a corresponding information element to every function-type
in Jung's psychology, and a corresponding information aspect thereto. This
is the distinctive mark of Augusta's typology: the world is perceived due to
compatibilities of mind to the environment, without which there can be no
processing of information and therefore, no recognition of phenomena. The
world is neither seperate from the mind nor the mind seperate from the world:
the two are inseperable halves of an essential whole. Were either not to exist,
there would be no apprehension of existence and therefore, no existence at all.
This dualism, which bears unmistakable parallels to Albert Einstein's theory of
relativity (for reasons we will discuss later) -- that reality is dependent on
the observer -- is at once a statement of philosophical truth and psychic fact.
It is philosophical in that it demonstrates an inexorable link between
information and perception, and psychic in that it captures the relationship
between the object and the subject as an essential union vital to the correct
apprehension of reality, an instance of Jung's syzygy archetype, no less. There
exists only what we perceive, and no more. There is no supraordinate truth
inaccessible to mankind, only functions of varying degrees of awareness. The
greater our awareness of an information aspect, the more we can understand about
it. Because there exists in the socion a type suited to the correct
understanding of each aspect, it lies within the capacity of humanity to
apphrehend all that exists, now and forever. There are no limits, in other words.
It is this statement about the enduring power of human society to master the
world's information that reveals the true relevance and extent of Augusta's
theory. The information elements speak to potentials in the here and now and
into the indefinite future. The ring of Model-A turns forever, from
consciousness to unconsciousness and back again. Just as each person possesses
a type, so does each person possess strengths and weaknesses, the use of which
characterize their contributions and their vices. In each of us, Model-A plays
a vital, if not defining, role. It defines our talents as well as our
ineptitudes, our tolerances and our depreciations, our acceptances and our
dismissals. And yet we are defined, by Model-A, as not solitary characters, but
halves of a desperately sought whole to which we will spare no resource, no
effort to experience in its fullest degree.
Model-A's apprehension demands of us many questions. To accept Model-A, we must
accept its philosophy and observe its consequences to our apprehension of our
existence. The relativism of our modern age, who Einstein fathered, is
superseded by the dualism inherent in Model-A. We are similarly confronted with
the fact that Einstein himself possessed a type, the organization of which
played a key part in his discoveries. Without the structure represented by
Model-A, Einstein could not have created his discoveries. Without the cycle of
consciousness into unconsciousness, from the extroverted attitude of objective
apphrehension and assimilation to the introverted attitude of subjective
relativism, Einstein could never have concluded that the objective reality we
observe is dependent on our own subjective dispositions. Model-A reveals to
us that the reverse is equally true, that our subjective dispositions are
beholden to our environment. Within the lense of this dualism, philosophy's
ignorance of Model-A is immediately consequential. We are inclined to question
the assertions of the man who would impress his own private experience upon
others in opposition to their worldview. The revolutionary who says the world
is this way and not that way seems at once suspect and unreliable. Just as
Model-A builds upon the model offered by Jung, so do all advances in human
understanding appear as elaborated, ever more precise models of the phenomenon
we apprehend. It is neither proper nor truthful to purport that a
long-established precedent, such as the existence of time, is outright wrong.
The assertion of such amounts to the supression of time's perception as an
unconscious factor: time continues to exist, but the individual in question
chooses to repress the perception of it, or to dismiss its importance in favor
of other elements of their experience. As we shall see, Model-A does not
provide rationale for this person's denial alone; indeed, it anticipates its
very eventuality.
Model A reckons eight aspects of information. These aspects are classified
along three axes: objects vs. fields, statics vs. dynamics, and internal vs.
external. Augusta acknowledged the orientations described by Jung as "introvert"
and "extrovert". She observed that the extrovert was cheifly concerned with
the observation of objects that were of immediate consequence to their
environment. Augusta's definition of "object" is very broad: anything that is
considered in the singular is an object. By managing the objects around oneself
effectively, one effectively assimilates to the larger "psychological object"
the set of all objects comprise. The extrovert is ever witness to the objects
that surround them: each is considered independently, and never as a single
transience. If a set is apprehended at all, then it exists only as an "object"
in itself, and can be manipulated as such. Orientation to the object-aware
world draws one's attention to the objects themselves, their movement, their
properties, their relationships to each other and to themselves. Their
relationships Augusta termed their "dynamics" because relations are the motive
for change. Their movements and properties Augusta observed as their "statics"
because they are representative of time-transient factors that are intrinsic
to the objects themselves: although they can be augmented, they cannot be
changed without transforming the object considered. The matter of how these
transformations come about at all is a factor of relationship between the energy
and information domains, and is beyond the scope of Model-A. Although we will
discuss this relationship in detail later, for now let us refrain from the
consideration of phenomenon not defined by Model-A for purposes of clarity.
In addition to the object traits just discussed, objects also possess traits
of externality and internality. Their external traits are their means for
influencing other objects; their internal traits are representative of
behavioral influences within the objects themselves. Thus there are two
axes -- statics vs. dynamics and internalities vs. externalities -- by which
Augusta apprehends object traits, and to each of these she accords a
corresponding Jungian function. To their internal statics she corresponds
intuition; to their external statics she corresponds sensation; to their
external dynamics she corresponds thinking; and to their internal dynamics she
corresponds feeling. Each of these functions are oriented towards the object,
they are so extroverted. Therefore for the extroverted function set we have
extroverted thinking, extroverted feeling, extroverted intuition, and
extroverted sensation, corresponding to the information elements of the same.
Augusta postulates that the consideration of fields implies seperation from
the consideration of objects and the "psychological object", thus corresponding
the observation of fields to the intra-psychic or "introverted" attitude
described by Jung. This attitude is so described "subjective" because of the
contrast between the observed, which is in fact the ethereal, intransigent
nature of the field, and the observer, who is the equally intransigent witness
to the field's nature. Whereas the the extrovert lives in the real-world
physical realm of imminent survival concerns, the introvert lives in a
meta-physical reality of long-range observations and timeless truths. These
long-range observations correspond to the dynamics of observed fields, and
the timeless truths to their statics. For example, none save an introvert
could discern patterns in the processes of change, or the existence of physical
laws such as the persistent force of gravity. Each of these concepts are
traits not of individual objects but of the set of all objects of a given
kind, and as such may be considered relevant aspects of the "field" of
considered objects. Like the extrovert, the introvert is keen to the external
and internal factors of the fields they observe. If a factor of a field is
apprehended from without, it is an external factor that may be witnessed by
objects external to the field. If the factor is an internal feature of the
field, then it is exclusive to the objects that lie within it. The four
pairings of internal/external and static/dynamic field factors correspond to
Jung's four functional manifestations of the introverted attitude. To the
internal dynamics accords intuition; to the external dynamics accords
sensation; to the external statics accords thinking; and to the internal
statics corresponds feeling. This gives us introverted thinking, introverted
feeling, introverted sensation, and introverted intuition for the introverted
function set.
Let us now treat the eight elements in greater detail, starting with the
extroverted set. To remove ambiguity as to whether the eight elements or the
eight aspects are being considered, we will refer to them as the "eight
elemental aspects" to denote that what is being considered is the experience
of the aspects themselves by means of the elements.
We begin with extroverted intuition.
EXTROVERTED INTUITION
Jung describes extroverted intuition as the awareness of possibilities. These
possibilities, says Jung, are potential events that may happen at any moment.
Augusta postulates that this awareness has a physical aspect, equating
extroverted intuition as an information aspect with the internal statics of
objects, and as an information element with the perception of the same. Augusta
describes the internal statics of objects as their potential, equivalent to
the physical concept of potential energy owing to a state of position to act.
The question as to what potential is existant, then, is a matter of the
activity the apphrended object is capable of performing. The nature of this
activity, which we reckon as apphrehensible only by means of a corresponding
information element, is a question of the exerted element which serves
extroverted intuition. We will refrain from discussing exertion elements, except
in brief, during this portion of our discussion as Augusta does not postulate
their existence. Rather, we shall treat them to their own section later. For
now we content ourselves that extroverted intuition is the apphrehension of
potential for activity by an object.
Through the lense of extroverted intuition, one sees a world that is comprised
of potentials for activity possessed by various objects. Because this is the
entirety of extroverted intuition's experience -- the other elements either pay
an auxiliary role, as is the case for the other elements of the irrational
class, or no role at all, in the case of the rational class -- the world seems
populated entirely by objects and their potentials. In the context of such
a world, it is easy to discern similarities between objects that possess
potential behaviors. This is the comparative aspect of intuitive experience,
which we do not reckon as extroverted intuition because it is only indirectly
relevant to an object's potential for action: observation of potentials does
not equate to the perception of similarities between them. It may be that the
comparative aspect is a function in its own right that is reckoned neither by
information metabolism as Augusta defines it nor exertion as we define it here.
Perhaps it is a function of intellect itself, or a native (pure) property of
intuition. We do not discuss it further here, but only acknowledge its role
in the intuitive experience.
Note: this is another in my primer series, and is not yet complete. I'll be editing this post with further discussion as I structure my ideas.
Edit 5/18: described the rationale for exertion theory, and the basis for believing exertion can be described with socionics information elements.
Edit: 5/22: began describing the psychological object as postulated by Jung.
Edit: 5/30: completed discussion of Jung's typology. NOTE: I am unclear as to what Jung's understanding of psychic progression was (if any), although I do not say that in the text. It might be more appropriate to consider this description my attempt to bridge Jung to socionics, rather than what Jung really thought. But as I say in the comments below, I am still researching Jung's understanding of typology at this time.
Edit: 6/10: Removed the Jungian type derivation. Jung did not attempt to order the functions sequentially that I can deduce. (at the very least, he did not explicitly state the situation as such.) Rather, the "loss-cutter" differentiation process I had described here is the road to expressing Jung's typology as an incomplete expression of Model-A, and further the use of Jung's conscious-unconscious compensation dynamic as a proof of Model-A's urobolic/mandalic nature.
Edit: 6/11: Restored the Jungian type derivation with the most reasonably correct interpretation of his theory I can contrive. Note that this interpretation is in direct contrast with MBTI on the matter of the 3rd function, which is considered socionics 6th function as opposed to 4th. However, the truth may ultimately lie at the midsection of the two extremes. (we will discuss this later.)
Edit: 6/15: Discussed Jugn's influence on Augusta and Model-A, and explained that Model-A is a more complete description of the processes first apprehended by Jung, effectively recognizing Jung's typology as a subset of Model-A.
Edit: 6/19: Preliminary discussion of the eight information elements/aspects. ("elemental aspects")
Edit: 6/20: Described extroverted intuition as an IM element.
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Originally Posted by labcoat
, analyzing the structure of the 
instances before him. When a person talks to labcoat, they speak of possibilities (
). That is the experience of ENFp exertion. labcoat himself puts forward the structure of the world as he sees it at that moment. Given that structure, he produces 
subjective experience of living with this possibility. The experience of this possibility creates the need for a structured 
)
), being felt or remaining constant (
), being exchanged (
), being realized (
What do you think, labcoat? (I am using 
