Here is a short summary of the Wittgenstein-Russell relationship (not fictional, but still interesting):
In early May 1913 Russell began work on a long manuscript titled Theory of Knowledge. This was to be his first major philosophical work after Principia Mathematica. Despite a full load of lectures, students, meetings and visitors, by May 26 he had 240 pages and was optimistic about the book’s completion. Then on May 27 he had a visit from Wittgenstein.
Russell kept going, however, and by June 6 he had 350 pages – at which point he abandoned the manuscript. The immediate reasons for this had to do with problems with his account of molecular judgments. But it became clear to him as time passed that a more fundamental problem had been raised by Wittgenstein.Wittgenstein came to see me – we were both cross from the heat – I showed him a crucial part of what I have been writing. He said it was all wrong, not realizing the difficulties – that he had tried my view and knew it wouldn’t work. I couldn’t understand his objection – in fact he was very inarticulate – but I feel in my bones that he must be right, and that he has seen something I have missed. If I could see it too I shouldn’t mind, but as it is, it is worrying, and has rather destroyed the pleasure in my writing. (Russell 2002, 446)
Looking back on this incident in 1916 he wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell:All that has gone wrong with me lately comes from Wittgenstein’s attack on my work – I have only just realized this. It was very difficult to be honest about it, as it makes a large part of the book I meant to write impossible for years to come probably ... I must be much sunk – it is the first time in my life that I have failed in honesty over work. (Russell 2002, 448)
Do you remember that at the time when you were seeing Vittoz I wrote a lot of stuff about Theory of Knowledge, which Wittgenstein criticised with the greatest severity? His criticism, tho’ I don’t think you realised it at the time, was an event of first-rate importance in my life, and affected everything I have done since. I saw he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. (Russell 1998, 282)
It appeared to me from the last exchange that you still use type as a sentence. As you have been told that makes no sense. There are very healthy, successful, happy and remarkable representatives of every type. So whatever is your damage it is something other than type even when type is intertwined with most things.
wait, so which one is IEE and which one is LII?
Enneagram: 9w1 6w5 2w3 so/sx
The guy who wrote the Tractatus is an IEE.
Last edited by Whoobie77; 02-16-2014 at 11:24 PM.
Principia has come under a lot of fire because of its inconsistencies and paradoxes. Here are some excerpts from Wikipedia:
Contemporary mathematics, however, avoids paradoxes such as Russell's in less unwieldy ways, such as the system of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.Consistency and criticisms
According to Carnap's "Logicist Foundations of Mathematics", Russell wanted a theory that could plausibly be said to derive all of mathematics from purely logical axioms. However, Principia Mathematica required, in addition to the basic axioms of type theory, three further axioms that seemed to not be true as mere matters of logic, namely the axiom of infinity, the axiom of choice, and the axiom of reducibility. Since the first two were existential axioms, Russell phrased mathematical statements depending on them as conditionals. But reducibility was required to be sure that the formal statements even properly express statements of real analysis, so that statements depending on it could not be reformulated as conditionals. Frank P. Ramsey tried to argue that Russell's ramification of the theory of types was unnecessary, so that reducibility could be removed, but these arguments seemed inconclusive.
Beyond the status of the axioms as logical truths, the questions remained:
- whether a contradiction could be derived from the Principia's axioms (the question of inconsistency), and
- whether there exists a mathematical statement which could neither be proven nor disproven in the system (the question of completeness).
Propositional logic itself was known to be consistent, but the same had not been established for Principia's axioms of set theory. (See Hilbert's second problem.)
Gödel 1930, 1931
In 1930, Gödel's completeness theorem showed that first-order predicate logic itself was complete in a much weaker sense—that is, any sentence that is unprovable from a given set of axioms must actually be false in some model of the axioms. However, this is not the stronger sense of completeness desired for Principia Mathematica, since a given system of axioms (such as those of Principia Mathematica) may have many models, in some of which a given statement is true and in others of which that statement is false, so that the statement is left undecided by the axioms.
Gödel's incompleteness theorems cast unexpected light on these two related questions.
Gödel's first incompleteness theorem showed that Principia could not be both consistent and complete. According to the theorem, within every sufficiently powerful logical system (such as Principia), there exists a statement G that essentially reads, "The statement G cannot be proved." Such a statement is a sort of Catch-22: if G is provable, then it is false, and the system is therefore inconsistent; and if G is not provable, then it is true, and the system is therefore incomplete.
Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (1931) shows that no formal system extending basic arithmetic can be used to prove its own consistency. Thus, the statement "there are no contradictions in the Principia system" cannot be proven in the Principia system unless there are contradictions in the system (in which case it can be proven both true and false).
Wittgenstein 1919, 1939
By the second edition of PM, Russell had removed his axiom of reducibility to a new axiom (although he does not state it as such). Gödel 1944:126 describes it this way: "This change is connected with the new axiom that functions can occur in propositions only "through their values", i.e., extensionally . . . [this is] quite unobjectionable even from the constructive standpoint . . . provided that quantifiers are always restricted to definite orders". This change from a quasi-intensional stance to a fully extensional stance also restricts predicate logic to the second order, i.e. functions of functions: "We can decide that mathematics is to confine itself to functions of functions which obey the above assumption" (PM 2nd Edition p. 401, Appendix C).
This new proposal resulted in a dire outcome. An "extensional stance" and restriction to a second-order predicate logic means that a propositional function extended to all individuals such as "All 'x' are blue" now has to list all of the 'x' that satisfy (are true in) the proposition, listing them in a possibly infinite conjunction: e.g. x1 V x2 V . . . V xn V . . .. Ironically, this change came about as the result of criticism from Wittgenstein in his 1919 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. As described by Russell in the Preface to the 2nd edition of PM:
"There is another course, recommended by Wittgenstein† (†Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, *5.54ff) for philosophical reasons. This is to assume that functions of propositions are always truth-functions, and that a function can only occur in a proposition through its values. . . . [Working through the consequences] it appears that everything in Vol. I remains true . . . the theory of inductive cardinals and ordinals survives; but it seems that the theory of infinite Dedekindian and well-ordered series largely collapses, so that irrationals, and real numbers generally, can no longer be adequately dealt with. Also Cantor's proof that 2n > n breaks down unless n is finite." (PM 2nd edition reprinted 1962:xiv, also cf new Appendix C).In other words, the fact that an infinite list cannot realistically be specified means that the concept of "number" in the infinite sense (i.e. the continuum) cannot be described by the new theory proposed in PM Second Edition.
Wittgenstein in his Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939 criticised Principia on various grounds, such as:
- It purports to reveal the fundamental basis for arithmetic. However, it is our everyday arithmetical practices such as counting which are fundamental; for if a persistent discrepancy arose between counting and Principia, this would be treated as evidence of an error in Principia (e.g., that Principia did not characterise numbers or addition correctly), not as evidence of an error in everyday counting.
- The calculating methods in Principia can only be used in practice with very small numbers. To calculate using large numbers (e.g., billions), the formulae would become too long, and some short-cut method would have to be used, which would no doubt rely on everyday techniques such as counting (or else on non-fundamental and hence questionable methods such as induction). So again Principia depends on everyday techniques, not vice versa.
Wittgenstein did, however, concede that Principia may nonetheless make some aspects of everyday arithmetic clearer.
In his 1944 Russell's mathematical logic, Gödel offers a "critical but sympathetic discussion of the logicistic order of ideas":
"It is to be regretted that this first comprehensive and thorough-going presentation of a mathematical logic and the derivation of mathematics from it [is] so greatly lacking in formal precision in the foundations (contained in *1-*21 of Principia) that it represents in this respect a considerable step backwards as compared with Frege. What is missing, above all, is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. Syntactical considerations are omitted even in cases where they are necessary for the cogency of the proofs . . . The matter is especially doubtful for the rule of substitution and of replacing defined symbols by their definiens . . . it is chiefly the rule of substitution which would have to be proved" (Gödel 1944:124)
To take another example, just look at Why I Am Not a Christian. He's dismantling an set of ethical principles due to logical inconsistencies. None of the IEEs I have ever known would ever make value appraisals in this way.
Here's a brief quote: "As I said before, I do not think that the real reason why people accept religion has anything to do with argumentation. They accept religion on emotional grounds."
That's an IEE talking???
I mean, seriously, just look at enough photos of the man, you can see he holds himself like he's a rational, read about his sex life and you can see he's an Infantile (ie lives outside sexuality), etc.
We agree on his type, so why are you fighting me about it
Russell only saw explicit static properties of fields/conditions/sets; Wittgenstein saw both explicit and implicit static properties of fields/conditions/sets. Here's Russell on Wittgenstein:Wittgenstein did, however, concede that Principia may nonetheless make some aspects of everyday arithmetic clearer.
I couldn’t understand his objection – in fact he was very inarticulate – but I feel in my bones that he must be right, and that he has seen something I have missed. If I could see it too I shouldn’t mind, but as it is, it is worrying, and has rather destroyed the pleasure in my writing.
The circular reasoning is complete, but I am hesitant to be really final about that. I’m nowhere near the logician Russell was so it’s possible there’s something I’m not inferring properly.In the chapter “Can Religion Cure Our Troubles?”, he laments the idea that some offer proof of Christianity’s veracity in that “if people think this, they will act better than if they do not.” (pg. 196). Whether or not one might believe propositions like “belief system x causes behavior y“, categorically, it can be hard to verify or negate. Utilizing it as a measure of a belief system’s truthfulness is poor reasoning.When discussing Christianity, Russell was often inclined to use silly logic of the type you might expect from a Bernard Shaw or an H.L. Mencken.
His attack on the cosmological proof is a strawman argument
He misstates the cosmological argument as saying that everything has a cause: ego, God must also have a cause. But the cosmological argument doesn’t say that every thing has a cause; rather, it says that every event has a cause. Everything that comes into being or passes out of being has a cause. That's the premise.
The remainder of his denials consists in bare assertions without any argumentation to back them up. Conversely, he doesn’t bother to engage the detailed arguments offered by philosophers and scientists and theologians against the eternity of the world or the spontaneous origin of life on earth.
He then claims that to suppose otherwise betrays a poverty of imagination. But doesn’t that ignore a rather important distinction between reality and imagination? There are a number of versions of the cosmological argument. He engages none of them.
His attack on the nomological proof is fallacious. As he frames the issue, if God had a reason for legislating nature in one way rather than another, then that reason legislates God’s own action. But this formulation falters on an equivocation of terms. Whether we define a law of nature as a statistical mean or the inevitable effect of meeting certain necessary and sufficient physical conditions, that is not the same as a reason. A reason is a mental, and not an extramental entity, and so it doesn’t imply something outside and anterior to the agent—something which thereby constrains the agent. There is no dualism between a reason and a faculty for reason. Reasons inhere in the mind of a personal agent.
On the face of it, it is also a false analogy to equate physical causality with statistical probabilities—like a game of chance. The whole point is that certain natural phenomena are generally predicable in a way that a throw of the dice is not.
In spite of his competence in other areas, it is the present writer's opinion, after examining Russell's religious writings, that in the religious sphere he reveals an abysmal lack of competency and proficiency.I could keep going, but I think you get the point.Russell's conviction that all religious belief is a result of fear is a claim that displays what Randall and Buchler have well termed the "sociological fallacy." This fallacy occurs when people try to establish the origin of something, in this case religious belief, by considering it as it actually functions in society, and then on the basis of this sociological investigation use the common elements to evaluate that which has allegedly arisen out of the societal situation. But such an approach is using a descriptive statement as though it were a normative definition.
A person uses this element mainly as a kind of game, or to ridicule those who he thinks take it too seriously. They often intentionally go against its conventional usage simply to prove a point in favor of their creative function.
Wouldn't saying something like "I've solved all the problems of philosophy" go against conventional usage? Isn't it kind of "ridiculing" the idea of philosophy as a profession?
"Global structural logic...Their main goal that they are pursuing is the creation of a comprehensive, breathtaking, singular picture of the world."
"The irrational worldview is accepting of wild, untamed nature."
"The rational worldview is skeptical and often fearful of wild, untamed nature"
"[INTjs] stomach is usually placed ahead of the chest giving them their characteristic posture."
"Typical characteristics: rigid"
It was a paraphrase of the thought "He has the rigidity of Introverted Rational combined with some noted physical characteristics of LIIs". My bad.
As for Russell, weak Ti = other academics critiquing your work? lolz
You said "Ti in general" is interested in such a pursuit; Gulenko said "Ti in the Alpha quadra" is interested in such a pursuit.
Strength Valued UnvaluedFor comparison, here is IEI (your type, methinks):4 Ne Fe
3 Fi Ni
2 Te Se
1 Si Ti
4 Ni Fi
3 Fe Ne
2 Ti Si
1 Se Te
By the way, the bolded text betrays your aristocratic and Fe-valuing nature
For the most part, that is.
Objects/Units/Particles:Fields/Conditions/Systems:In the physical sciences, a particle is a small localized object to which can be ascribed several physical or chemical properties such as volume or mass. The term macroscopic particle usually refers to particles much larger than atoms and molecules. These are usually abstracted as point-like particles, even though they have volumes, shapes, structures, etc. Examples of macroscopic particles would include dust, sand, pieces of debris during a car accident, or even objects as big as the stars of a galaxy.
A field is a physical quantity that has a value for each point in space and time. Defining the field as "numbers in space" shouldn't detract from the idea that it has physical reality. “It occupies space. It contains energy. Its presence eliminates a true vacuum.” The field creates a "condition in space" such that when we put a particle in it, the particle "feels" a force."Fe" = "Explicit Field Dynamics""'these things are happening', 'we are making these changes', 'these developments are occurring', 'these changes have occurred', 'the conditions are changing in this way'""Ti" = "Implicit Field Statics"EDIT:"'because it's against the unspoken rules', 'this is the true state of affairs', 'because of an unseen truth', 'underlying structure', 'unseen property of these conditions'"
I forgot to mention: it's not about the fact that "other academics are critiquing his work", it's about "the nature of or reasons for their criticism".
"using a new way of doing or thinking about something"
I was using this definition, not the one relating to literal experiments.
"Use of the creative function — while frequent and effortless — seems to turn on and off. One moment the person may seem highly interested in this aspect, and the next — totally indifferent."
My actual response was based on this. I think Russell's spotty logic is dependent on his Ti "flipping on and off", so to speak. He's much more concerned in Why I Am Not a Christian with providing the unique perspective of being a non-theist (Ne), than of making sure everything is neatly logically consistent. I get the sense this is probably true about some of his political works as well, but, as I said, I don't care much for Russell so my knowledge of him is limited at best.
Since Russell as ILE is convention, Bloem better have great arguments to justify a retyping. In addition to what Whoobie77 posted about 2nd function, I'll remind you of how CD cognition can lose contact with reality. If Bloem can overcome both these things, then convincing ppl of a different type for Russell may be possible.