"Weber (1903-1917) described the construction of an ideal type in the following manner:
'An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present, and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified thought-construct. (p. 90)'
"We focus on reality from the point of view that is dictated by our values. From this point of view, we notice certain features of reality and ignore those features that would become visible only from other points of view. We thus select only certain features of reality relevant to the point of view we have adopted; we then postulate connections among these selected features. We thus go beyond the data in order to conceive of relationships that underlie them.
"Ideal types, moreover, are idealized descriptions of the concrete features of things that are given from this particular point of view. The concrete features of things frequently prove to be difficult to distinguish from one another; their identities may remain fuzzy, fluid, indefinite, and vague. With ideal types, we draw precise and clear conceptual boundaries around these features of things. We conceptually set aside the real indistinctness and ambiguity, and we imagine a 'pure' case in which the relevant features are distinct and unambiguous. Furthermore, in actual cases the features may vary so widely that each individual seems unique and incomparable to others. The ideal type, however, specifies manifold features, all of which are not found in each actual case. The features delineated by the ideal type are, as Weber expressed it, 'more of less present' and 'occasionally absent' in individual cases.
"The result is a general category that in all likelihood does not exactly depict any actually existing instance of it. Rather, the category describes a general class that has been deliberately 'perfected' and 'purified' for intellectual purposes. The scientific mind requires clear, distinct, and precisely defined concepts in order to comprehend reality. And the perfection and purity of the ideal type make it a clear, distinct and intelligible concept. The realities themselves are never so clear, distinct, and intelligible; that is why they would remain forever unintelligible if exact concepts were not constructed and applied to them."
"Ideal types, as a system of interconnected concepts, can then serve as a kind of 'theory' for the study of any particular phenomenon. We call this 'a kind of "theory"' because it is not a theory in the usual sense of providing a conceptual representation of reality that will be either true or false. Ideal types, as we have said, are not true or false; they are only helpful or unhelpful in the further investigation of reality. Yet in further investigation of reality, it would seem to be more helpful to employ a fully defined system of interrelated concepts than to use merely one or two sparsely defined notions" (424-25).