What is my Type?

[Logos]

I cannot say for sure, I was only trying to evaluate the possibility of an empirical correlation between the two for subsequent speculation and verification and more speculation. If anything, I would think that is more conducive to continental philosophy, because the emotions are where subconscious meaning (which is absolute) is most likely to take precedence over reasoned truth (which depends on slight modifications in the construction of the argument, unless Phaedrus can prove otherwise).

But then Phaedrus and others would quickly point out that -valuers are -valuers since they are attracting elements.

[Nexus]

But then Phaedrus and others would quickly point out that -valuers are -valuers since they are attracting elements.

Could you elaborate? I'm still very new to socionics so I don't catch on the way you do.

[kensi]

You are probably right about that. Do you have any opinions on the matter? There are probably some socionic analogs to philosophy, but I just doubt the extremeties to which Phaedrus takes the argument such that it is impossible for -valuers to be objective or of the analytic school and -valuers to be subjective or of the continental school.

Is that what he said?

How do you or he explain this Ti/ Te assessment functionally ....to give reasonable support from the intervening functions or IM processes?

I always though that T altogether is responsible for an objective inclination regardless of its existance in ModelA.

[kensi]

But then Phaedrus and others would quickly point out that -valuers are -valuers since they are attracting elements.

Yes, Ti is forever linked to Fe as a preferential sequence. This is where MBTI is easier to understand than Socx.

[Logos]

Could you elaborate? I'm still very new to socionics so I don't catch on the way you do.

The quadras that have ego (Alpha, Beta) are also the same ones which have those with ego (Alpha, Beta). In Socionics duality, attracts and vice versa. So when one talks of these elements in philosophy, the dual elements will often be linked in some manner whether they are ends or means in the philosophy. So with this post I either gave you a grossly basic idea or I completely belittled your understanding of Socionics, so I apologize on both accounts.

[Nexus]

The quadras that have ego (Alpha, Beta) are also the same ones which have those with ego (Alpha, Beta). In Socionics duality, attracts and vice versa. So when one talks of these elements in philosophy, the dual elements will often be linked in some manner whether they are ends or means in the philosophy. So with this post I either gave you a grossly basic idea or I completely belittled your understanding of Socionics, so I apologize on both accounts.

Actually that still makes a lot of sense. Would you agree that analytic philosophy is conducive to and ?

This would correspond perfectly to labcoat's own interpretations:

Sure.

Negative dynamic/positive static blocks in model A aka. Process:
ISTj, INFj, ESFp, ENTp, ESTj, ENFj, ISFp, INTp

Positive dynamic/negative static blocks in model A aka. Result:
ISFj, INTj, ESTp, ENFp, ESFj, ENTj, ISTp, INFp

Gulenko refers to the Process group as "deductive" thinkers and to the Result group as "inductive" thinkers, so you may in fact find a correlation with your earlier results here. It's certainly worth investigating.

[kensi]

Would you agree that analytic philosophy is conducive to and ?

In general.....No...

however with dominant Ni...absolutely.

[Phaedrus]

Phaedrus,

What is your interpretation in the link that exists between one's intellectual functio(#1) and one's personal knowledge function(#7)?....they are both considered strong...this has some effect on typing....

Do you have anything to add to this?

If we assume that they are both strong, we should be very skeptical of people's ability to type a person based on what function(s) they believe that they are seeing in someone's post(s). I never base my typings on only the functional aspect(s) of a person, because that is a very unreliable typing method. If I wouldn't have had access to Huitzilopochtli's (IntjWurm's, shadowpuppet's) test results and other things he has said about himself (including his videos), I wouldn't pay much attention to his writing style. But his writing style, and the fact that I don't like to express my own thoughts in a similar way (it is always rather hard for me to follow the reasonings of INTjs because they focus so much on ), fits the INTj hypothesis rather nicely.

[Phaedrus]

If there is not a criteria for truth then false propositions must also be true.

Very interesting that you say that -- for several reasons:

1. My INTj father has said something very similar to what you say here, and he is also a mathematician.

2. Both you and my father misunderstand Gödel's two incompleteness theorems. It is an inevitable logical consequence of Gödel's proof (also pointed out by for example Karl Popper in his Appendix to The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2) that there can't be any general criteria for truth. The only explanation I can think of for the fact that you misunderstand Gödel's proof on that point is that you somehow manage to confuse truth with provability, that is you don't understand the logical distinction between truth and knowledge.

To confuse the two concepts truth and knowledge seems to be a trademark of INTjs, but it is still remarkable that you can make that mistake, considering the fact that Gödel's theorems are based on that very distinction. Gödel himself is extremely clear on that. It is absolutely necessary to make a clear distinction between truth and knowledge in order to understand what he has proven.

It does not follow (from the premise that there are no criteria for truth) that false propositions must also be true. What is implied is that there are true propositions that we don't know to be true. The set of proven (known) propositions is a subset of the larger set of true propositions.

3. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this is that Kurt Gödel might have been an INTj himself. In fact, there are strong indications of that. And yet I understand the consequences of Gödel's theorems better than INTjs tend to do, despite the fact that I am neither a mathematician nor an INTj. Whether this tells us something important or not is somewhat unclear at the moment, but perhaps we should keep in mind that Gödel was a logician rather than a mathematician, and that INTps tend to have a natural talent for conceptual logic.

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem is not applicable to what I said because I am talking about coherentist systems which are necessarily incomplete, and not foundational ones which are as complete as the natural accumulation of language allows and are the unnatural mess that the Logical Positivists (like Bertrand Russell) were trying to consolidate - this is why they were susceptible to and suffered from Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem.

What you don't seem to understand is that Gödel's incompleteness theorems are applicable to all complex systems -- including the coherentist systems you are talking about. You say that they are necessarily incomplete, which means that they contain true propositions that you will never know to be true. There will always be propositions whose truth or falsity you cannot prove. But lack of provability is not the same thing as lack of truth.

Why is Quine mistaken?

That is a potentially big topic. Maybe I will have reason to come back to that, but I don't have time to answer it right now.

What would be a more INTp philosophical orientation?

A lot can be said about that, and I might come back to it later too. I can say a few things though.

One way of dividing philosophers that has been suggested by various thinkers is the divide between Platonists and Aristotelians. Coleridge once said that as a philosopher you are either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, and according to this very rough divide INTjs are Platonists, and INTps are Aristotelians.

The divide between Platonists and Aristotelians has a lot in common with Reinin's dividide between Subjectivists and Objectivists, but they are not exactly identical. Here are some of my own notes and collected quotes on the subject:

"Where Plato is rationalistic, dogmatic, and contemptuous of the world of the senses, Aristotle is empirical, cautious, and anxious to consult all relevant facts and opinions before making up his mind. This seems to have been a temperamental difference between the two philosophers, but it is an important one." (D. J. O'Connor, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, p. 47)

"Associated with this difference in intellectual attitude is a difference of approach and emphasis. Roughly speaking, Plato tried to deduce the nature of the universe from what he thought to be the nature of human knowledge. Aristotle started with the facts of nature as he saw them, and reduced them to a system. He then found a place for human knowledge, as one natural phenomenon among others, in his system. This contrast is oversimplified, but it brings out an important difference between them." (p. 47)

"Plato supposed that soul and body were essentially different and that the individual human being was an immaterial immortal soul in a temporary association with a corruptible material body. This view has been reinforced by various religious and philosophical doctrines from Plato's day to the present and is still very influential in popular religous thinking. For Aristotle, on the contrary, a human being, like any other individual substance, was a genuine unit. Soul and body were distinguishable, but not separable, parts of the individual. Man was regarded by Aristotle as a part of nature." (p. 52)

As pointed out by Bertrand Russell in his History of Western Philosophy, some philosophers have been more influenced by mathematics and some others more influenced by the empirical sciences. Plato and Kant belong to the former group, whereas Democritus, Aristotle, Locke, Hume and other modern empiricists belong to the latter. The analytical tradition can be traced back to Aristotle.

According to William James there are two fundamentally different types of philosophers: rationalists and empiricists. Rationalists are idealists, optimists, monists, tender-minded dogmatics. Empiricists are materialists, pluralists, pessimists, tough-minded skeptics.

In James' divide INTjs are rationalists, and INTps are empiricists. And the Platonist approach is of course , whereas the Aristotelian approach is .

[FDG]

According to William James there are two fundamentally different types of philosophers: rationalists and empiricists. Rationalists are idealists, optimists, monists, tender-minded dogmatics. Empiricists are materialists, pluralists, pessimists, tough-minded skeptics.

Thank god I'm not a philosopher!

[Phaedrus]

Here is an old post of mine that is relevant to this discussion:


Two types of philosophy – INTj and INTp

Most contemporary philosophers would probably agree that the "continental" tradition in philosophy emanates from Immanuel Kant, and that the "analytical" tradition in philosophy emanates from David Hume. Let's have a look at some clear differences between those two traditions.

In the analytical tradtion empiricism plays an important role. The proponents of this kind of philosophy usually thinks that philosophy should attempt to be scientific, and one thinks that it is important to develop reliable methods by which truth can be attained. In the attempt to make philosophy more scientific it is not uncommon to use mathematics and formal logic to express and/or analyze specific language expressions and ideas. This tradition is also characterized by an argumentative, polemical debate climate, where knowledge and understanding is reached by adherence to a collective, critical process.

In the continental tradition the philosophers are more "self-contained". They proclaim their subjective views more independently of each other. The works in the continental tradition ares more similar to works of literature with its focus on rhetorics. The continental tradition focuses on the limitations of human knowledge, its essentially subjective nature. A typical trait of the continental tradition is the attempt to put a raster – a model – on reality. Everything is seen from a specific theoretical framework, for example marxism, phenomenology, structuralism, various postmodernist models etc.

The style of writing is different if we compare these two traditions. The analytical tradition is characterized by its striving for clarity and simplicity, the continental for its obscurity and complex language constructions.

The analytical philosophers are more interested in questions of Truth. What is truth? What is the correct way of living our lives? What is meant by the concept meaning? They try to construct something – theories, solutions to philosophical problems, theses etc.

In contrast, the continental approach is sometimes to try to show that the philosophical questions themselves are misguided and don't need to be answered. With could say that continental philosophers are focused on Meaning. What does it mean to exist as human beings in the world? What does it mean to us? They are often sceptical of the attempts of the philosophers in the analytical tradition to construct an overall view of reality, and try instead to deconstruct and criticize the pretentious claims of the Enlightenment.

The analytical philosophers way of seeing things is "timeless". The "eternal" philosophical questions are analyzed over and over again in an attempt to solve them, that is, find the true answers to them.

The continental philosophers have a more historicist perspective. They don't believe in absolute truths. Instead they tend to think of truth in relation to a historical framework – they tend to be relativists and/ or historicists of some sort. They tend to see ideas, others and their own, as part of a historical process.

Now, what is all this about? Compare what Jonathan writes about Te versus Ti in Alpha NTs and Gamma NTs. It is exactly the same thing that I have been talking about here and in the old thread "Socrates".

If you look at the historical typings by Socionists of Gamma NTs vs. Alpha NTs, and the way Socionist talk about Te vs. Ti, it appears that Te is more "explicit." People with Te view thinking as something that can be discussed and (at least in the case of Creative Te) debated. They like methods and definitions to be explicit. They like to show how what they're talking about is true, using clear, simple examples. People with Ti view thinking in a way that's not "shared." It's more "internal"; the methods and definitions are more private. People may even view the thinking in a way that's more subjective...e.g., not "shared" with the reality of others. In some cases (though not all), these people may be less inclined to be open to discussion, as it may appear fruitless to them.

Most socionists agree that Kant was an INTj, and that Hume was an INTp is also very likely. So, in a sense, the whole continental tradition is an expression of a Ti kind of thinking, whereas the analytical tradition is an expression of a Te kind of thinking.

[Nexus]

It is an inevitable logical consequence of Gödel's proof (also pointed out by for example Karl Popper in his Appendix to The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2) that there can't be any general criteria for truth. The only explanation I can think of for the fact that you misunderstand Gödel's proof on that point is that you somehow manage to confuse truth with provability, that is you don't understand the logical distinction between truth and knowledge. It does not follow (from the premise that there are no criteria for truth) that false propositions must also be true. What is implied is that there are true propositions that we don't know to be true. The set of proven (known) propositions is a subset of the larger set of true propositions. What you don't seem to understand is that Gödel's incompleteness theorems are applicable to all complex systems -- including the coherentist systems you are talking about. You say that they are necessarily incomplete, which means that they contain true propositions that you will never know to be true. There will always be propositions whose truth or falsity you cannot prove. But lack of provability is not the same thing as lack of truth. Coleridge once said that as a philosopher you are either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, and according to this very rough divide INTjs are Platonists, and INTps are Aristotelians. "Where Plato is rationalistic, dogmatic, and contemptuous of the world of the senses, Aristotle is empirical, cautious, and anxious to consult all relevant facts and opinions before making up his mind." (D. J. O'Connor, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, p. 47) As pointed out by Bertrand Russell in his History of Western Philosophy, some philosophers have been more influenced by mathematics and some others more influenced by the empirical sciences. Plato and Kant belong to the former group, whereas Democritus, Aristotle, Locke, Hume and other modern empiricists belong to the latter. The analytical tradition can be traced back to Aristotle. According to William James there are two fundamentally different types of philosophers: rationalists and empiricists. Rationalists are idealists, optimists, monists, tender-minded dogmatics. Empiricists are materialists, pluralists, pessimists, tough-minded skeptics. Most contemporary philosophers would probably agree that the "continental" tradition in philosophy emanates from Immanuel Kant, and that the "analytical" tradition in philosophy emanates from David Hume. In the analytical tradtion empiricism plays an important role. The proponents of this kind of philosophy usually thinks that philosophy should attempt to be scientific, and one thinks that it is important to develop reliable methods by which truth can be attained. In the attempt to make philosophy more scientific it is not uncommon to use mathematics and formal logic to express and/or analyze specific language expressions and ideas. This tradition is also characterized by an argumentative, polemical debate climate, where knowledge and understanding is reached by adherence to a collective, critical process. In the continental tradition the philosophers are more "self-contained". They proclaim their subjective views more independently of each other. The works in the continental tradition ares more similar to works of literature with its focus on rhetorics. The continental tradition focuses on the limitations of human knowledge, its essentially subjective nature. A typical trait of the continental tradition is the attempt to put a raster – a model – on reality. Everything is seen from a specific theoretical framework, for example marxism, phenomenology, structuralism, various postmodernist models etc. The style of writing is different if we compare these two traditions. The analytical tradition is characterized by its striving for clarity and simplicity, the continental for its obscurity and complex language constructions. The analytical philosophers are more interested in questions of Truth. What is truth? What is the correct way of living our lives? What is meant by the concept meaning? They try to construct something – theories, solutions to philosophical problems, theses etc. In contrast, the continental approach is sometimes to try to show that the philosophical questions themselves are misguided and don't need to be answered. With could say that continental philosophers are focused on Meaning. What does it mean to exist as human beings in the world? What does it mean to us? They are often sceptical of the attempts of the philosophers in the analytical tradition to construct an overall view of reality, and try instead to deconstruct and criticize the pretentious claims of the Enlightenment. The analytical philosophers way of seeing things is "timeless". The "eternal" philosophical questions are analyzed over and over again in an attempt to solve them, that is, find the true answers to them. The continental philosophers have a more historicist perspective. They don't believe in absolute truths. Instead they tend to think of truth in relation to a historical framework – they tend to be relativists and/ or historicists of some sort. They tend to see ideas, others and their own, as part of a historical process. Now, what is all this about? Compare what Jonathan writes about Te versus Ti in Alpha NTs and Gamma NTs. It is exactly the same thing that I have been talking about here and in the old thread "Socrates". If you look at the historical typings by Socionists of Gamma NTs vs. Alpha NTs, and the way Socionist talk about Te vs. Ti, it appears that Te is more "explicit." People with Te view thinking as something that can be discussed and (at least in the case of Creative Te) debated. They like methods and definitions to be explicit. They like to show how what they're talking about is true, using clear, simple examples. People with Ti view thinking in a way that's not "shared." It's more "internal"; the methods and definitions are more private. People may even view the thinking in a way that's more subjective...e.g., not "shared" with the reality of others. In some cases (though not all), these people may be less inclined to be open to discussion, as it may appear fruitless to them.

As a side note, IntjWurm is the name I picked after being designated INTJ in MBTT. Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem: For any consistent formal, recursively enumerable theory that proves basic arithmetical truths, an arithmetical statement that is true, but not provable in the theory, can be constructed. That is, any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. This may apply to coherentist formulations, but since they never claim to be complete and accommodate this concern from the outset, it does not tell us anything new. If there is a truth that cannot be proven within one coherentist system, then there is another coherentist system in which it can be proved. What lacks is a bridge of corresponding assertions between all of the systems (even contradicting ones) in which to associate truths.
Coherent System One:
1a. All dogs are brown.
1b. All baskets are dogs.
All baskets are brown. TRUE
All dogs are baskets. FALSE
Coherent System Two:
1a. No dogs are brown.
1b. No baskets are dogs.
No baskets are brown. FALSE
No dogs are baskets. TRUE
As you can see, systems one and two can not be joined because their fundamental axioms refute each other, even if each one is useful in isolation (has truths that cannot be proven in the other system). Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem: For any formal recursively enumerable (i.e., effectively generated) theory T including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability, T includes a statement of its own consistency if and only if T is inconsistent. This is inapplicable because it refers to infinitely recursive definitions, and coherent systems are finitely defined (to exclude inconsistencies). What of false statements that are true in a another system (No dogs are baskets)? Are they the truths that we don't know to be true? Logic does not allow for a middle ground: in a coherent (analytical) system, statements must be either true or false. Here I have been referring to 'Truth' as that which has been proven true in a system. If you are talking about a more general, absolute truth then you must clarify how such a concept is to be distinguished from non-truths. I think that the Plato-Aristotle divide that you mentioned is very interesting, I certainly identify more with Plato's theory of Forms and Particulars (though I have actually written a college paper on why they are in correct, which I can post if you are interested), because Plato, like Socrates, had no pretense of believing that he understood what he perceived (and that is why much of Plato is sill applicable today, whereas much of Aristotle has been replaced by modern empirical science). However, I must disagree with William James's synopsis of rationalism and empiricism, and I am not inclined to agree that the rationalists were continental philosophers, or that they did not seek to answer questions. Isaac Newton, who did not reside in continental Europe, contributed much to both mathematics (calculus) and science (gravitation, optics) and was a rationalist. Also, because you mentioned Johnathan's distinctions, do I appear to you to shun open discussion, definitions, methods, or examples? Do I seem to rely on private or subjective reasoning?

[Phaedrus]

As a side note, IntjWurm is the name I picked after being designated INTJ in MBTT.

And the fact that you consistently test as INTJ/INTj is a strong argument against INTp. You cannot be an INTp if you never test as one.

Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem: For any consistent formal, recursively enumerable theory that proves basic arithmetical truths, an arithmetical statement that is true, but not provable in the theory, can be constructed. That is, any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete.

This may apply to coherentist formulations, but since they never claim to be complete and accommodate this concern from the outset, it does not tell us anything new.

It tells us exactly what Gödel has proven. Of course coherentist formulations never claim to be complete -- no non-contradictory complex system can claim to be complete.

If there is a truth that cannot be proven within one coherentist system, then there is another coherentist system in which it can be proved.

So what? That applies to every system.

What lacks is a bridge of corresponding assertions between all of the systems (even contradicting ones) in which to associate truths.
Coherent System One:
1a. All dogs are brown.
1b. All baskets are dogs.
All baskets are brown. TRUE
All dogs are baskets. FALSE

The last proposition ("All dogs are baskets") is not known to be false within the system. You don't know that it is false.

Coherent System Two:
1a. No dogs are brown.
1b. No baskets are dogs.
No baskets are brown. FALSE
No dogs are baskets. TRUE

And it's the same here. You don't know that the proposition "No baskets are brown" is false. The fact that it is not logically implied by the premises does not imply that it is false.

As you can see, systems one and two can not be joined because their fundamental axioms refute each other, even if each one is useful in isolation (has truths that cannot be proven in the other system).

How do you know that the axioms are true? What is your point?

Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem: For any formal recursively enumerable (i.e., effectively generated) theory T including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability, T includes a statement of its own consistency if and only if T is inconsistent.

This is inapplicable because it refers to infinitely recursive definitions, and coherent systems are finitely defined (to exclude inconsistencies).

Irrelevant.

What of false statements that are true in a another system (No dogs are baskets)?

There are no false statements that are true in another system. A statement cannot be both true and false.

Are they the truths that we don't know to be true?

No. But here you reveal that you don't understand the logical distinction between truth and provability (knowledge). In this respect you think like a typical INTj.

Logic does not allow for a middle ground: in a coherent (analytical) system, statements must be either true or false.

Correct. So why do you tend to forget that fact in your own reasonings?

Here I have been referring to 'Truth' as that which has been proven true in a system.

Which is exactly what you shouldn't. Truth is never the same thing as that which has been proven true in a system.

If you are talking about a more general, absolute truth then you must clarify how such a concept is to be distinguished from non-truths.

A proposition "p" is true, if, and only if, p. And keep in mind that there are no general criteria for truth, and that that has been proven by Gödel.

I think that the Plato-Aristotle divide that you mentioned is very interesting, I certainly identify more with Plato's theory of Forms and Particulars (though I have actually written a college paper on why they are in correct, which I can post if you are interested), because Plato, like Socrates, had no pretense of believing that he understood what he perceived (and that is why much of Plato is sill applicable today, whereas much of Aristotle has been replaced by modern empirical science).

But don't interpret it too literally. I don't buy Aristle's specific views, but I identify more strongly with his general approach, which is naturalistic. I think we can say that one of the key differences between Platonists (including INTjs) and Aristotelians (including INTps) is that Platonists are non-naturalists (idealists, subjectivists, relativists, rationalists, anti-realists, believers in the supernatural, theists ...) whereas Aristotelians are naturalists (materialists, objectivists, realists, empiricists, atheists ...).

However, I must disagree with William James's synopsis of rationalism and empiricism, and I am not inclined to agree that the rationalists were continental philosophers, or that they did not seek to answer questions.

If we not focus to much on the details, we can see that William James's divide is roughly the same as the divide between non-naturalists and naturalists.

Isaac Newton, who did not reside in continental Europe, contributed much to both mathematics (calculus) and science (gravitation, optics) and was a rationalist.

No, Newton was not a rationalist in the sense we are talking about here. He was clearly an empiricist and a naturalist. A good example of a rationalist and a non-naturalist is Leibniz.

(Gödel was very fond of Leibniz, and in his later years Gödel converted to phenomenology, which is based on very obvious principles:

…there exists today the beginning of a science which claims to possess a systematic method for such a clarification in meaning, and that is the phenomenology founded by Husserl. Here clarification of meaning consists in focussing more sharply on the concepts concerned by directing our attention in a certain way, namely, onto our own acts in the use of these concepts, onto our powers in carrying out our acts, etc.

This is exactly what introverted thinking is, according to Jung. It's the essence of .)

Also, because you mentioned Johnathan's distinctions, do I appear to you to shun open discussion, definitions, methods, or examples?

No.

Do I seem to rely on private or subjective reasoning?

No, probably not. Hard to tell. But don't focus too much on the details in that scenario. It's the overall picture that is relevant to try to grasp.

[Phaedrus]

I certainly identify more with Plato's theory of Forms and Particulars (though I have actually written a college paper on why they are in correct, which I can post if you are interested)

It would of course be interesting to have a look at that paper if you are willing to post it. Maybe its form and/or content can help us to determine your correct type.

[FDG]

Shit, Huitz, that example with baskets and dogs is very bad logic for somebody that has joined 45234534534534 high-iq societies

[Nexus]

And the fact that you consistently test as INTJ/INTj is a strong argument against INTp. You cannot be an INTp if you never test as one.

It tells us exactly what Gödel has proven. Of course coherentist formulations never claim to be complete -- no non-contradictory complex system can claim to be complete.

So what? That applies to every system.

The last proposition ("All dogs are baskets") is not known to be false within the system. You don't know that it is false.

And it's the same here. You don't know that the proposition "No baskets are brown" is false. The fact that it is not logically implied by the premises does not imply that it is false.

How do you know that the axioms are true? What is your point?

Irrelevant.

There are no false statements that are true in another system. A statement cannot be both true and false.

No. But here you reveal that you don't understand the logical distinction between truth and provability (knowledge). In this respect you think like a typical INTj.

Correct. So why do you tend to forget that fact in your own reasonings?

Which is exactly what you shouldn't. Truth is never the same thing as that which has been proven true in a system.

A proposition "p" is true, if, and only if, p. And keep in mind that there are no general criteria for truth, and that that has been proven by Gödel.

But don't interpret it too literally. I don't buy Aristle's specific views, but I identify more strongly with his general approach, which is naturalistic. I think we can say that one of the key differences between Platonists (including INTjs) and Aristotelians (including INTps) is that Platonists are non-naturalists (idealists, subjectivists, relativists, rationalists, anti-realists, believers in the supernatural, theists ...) whereas Aristotelians are naturalists (materialists, objectivists, realists, empiricists, atheists ...).

If we not focus to much on the details, we can see that William James's divide is roughly the same as the divide between non-naturalists and naturalists.

No, Newton was not a rationalist in the sense we are talking about here. He was clearly an empiricist and a naturalist. A good example of a rationalist and a non-naturalist is Leibniz.

(Gödel was very fond of Leibniz, and in his later years Gödel converted to phenomenology, which is based on very obvious principles:

This is exactly what introverted thinking is, according to Jung. It's the essence of .)

No.

No, probably not. Hard to tell. But don't focus too much on the details in that scenario. It's the overall picture that is relevant to try to grasp.

I agree that I am hard to type, but because they are separately formulated theories I cannot advocate a direct analogy between socionics and MBTT. How is it irrelevant that Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem is inapplicable (unless you are simply agreeing with me; you implicated both theorems when you were describing the shortcomings in the comprehension of INTjs as exhibited by your father and I)? And how is calculus, which Newton developed in isolation, not a rationalist formulation? The physics that Newton defined also was not an (empirical) inductive taxonomy of anomalous empirical observations, it was an abstract set of principles that he adjusted (rationally) to fit well-known facts (the law of cooling, the theory of color, the concept of momentum, etc). You have still failed to demonstrate a criteria for separating truths from non-truths, so I will adhere to my definition (the conditional statment 'iff p, then p' does not allow 'p' to be rationally inferred from other circumstances and so invalidates the use of logic altogether; it also does not provide a mechansim for verifying 'p' as 'p' can only be distinguished from '~p' using conditional circumstances which you have already invalidated; lastly, if there are no general criteria for truth, then 'iff p, then p' cannot be one). If truth wasn't dictated by the circumstances, it would not be possible to propose a lie that would be considered untrue in some circumstances but not in others. You are also incorrect in asserting that a statement cannot be both true and false (they are known as paradoxes: 'nothing is impossible', 'this statement is false'). However, to make a statement that is not verified under the conditions of the system is only false, especially if it is inferred from the system itself. Because it may be true in another coherent system where it is fully described, the original system can be considered incomplete, but under the premises of the original system only propositions that are derived directly from the logic of the axioms can be considered true (here I am talking about axioms as the rules that are dictated in the system, not the implied grammatical structure that is common to the communication of syllogistic logic first derived in the square of opposition by none other than Aristotle himself). The axioms are analytically justified as concepts (though they may be Kant-like synthetic a priori propositions as described when reduced to the constituent elements of the language of origin, as long as they are independent of one another and the system, here a language, in which they are treated synthetically) because they define the criteria by which all other statements are judged true or false (this does not imply that if they turn out to be false then the statements that were falsified are true; each statement must be independently evaluated by the truth axioms of the new truth system). The conclusion 'all dogs are baskets' is an illegitimate convErsIon (for E and I claims), meaning that the converse is necessarily false (not true; this is evident in the construction of a truth table) because of the universal affirmatives (there is no capital A in convErsIon), though the premise may have value irl or in other systems. You are probably referring to the fallacy of impossible proof (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_impossibility) which dictates that a lack of disproving does not constitute proof, but this does not apply to syllogistic logic and is related more to Popper's criterion of falsification (which itself cannot be falsified anyway and so is inherently perverse). The second example is actually not a syllogism because it has two negative premises (this was actually an oversight on my part that leads to no useful conclusions except for 'no dogs are baskets', the converse of the second statement, which is still true because it contains a universal negative though it does not depend on the first statement; however because no conclusions can be reached, the other statement cannot be inferred and is necessarily false in a truth table). I will try to find the paper and post it as well; it is actually a critique of forms and particulars as presented in Plato's Phaedo, so the focus might actually be Socratic instead of Platonic (though the only surviving documentation of Socrates was written by Plato so it is impossible to tell).

[kensi]

And the fact that you consistently test as INTJ/INTj is a strong argument against INTp. You cannot be an INTp if you never test as one.

.

I dont like this kind of logic.

The tests are merely derivatives and instruments to point someone in the right direction to determining their type.
It is far better for a qualified person to spend 2 or 3 days with you and tell you from those insights there.

You can be just about any type even if you don't test as it. My brother, a clear ISFp, would always test as INTp. Somehow he was not able to disassociate his ego from coming up with superego answers to the questions. I know that there is no way in hell he is an INTp..try as he might.

[Nexus]

I dont like this kind of logic.

The tests are merely derivatives and instruments to point someone in the right direction to determining their type.
It is far better for a qualified person to spend 2 or 3 days with you and tell you from those insights there.

You can be just about any type even if you don't test as it. My brother, a clear ISFp, would always test as INTp. Somehow he was not able to disassociate his ego from coming up with superego answers to the questions. I know that there is no way in hell he is an INTp..try as he might.

On the other hand, he is using the same argument that Prom was using on RSV3's IntpWurm thread...and Prom is also INTp (but ultimately that's pretty faulty logic with respect to the determination of my type).

[Nexus]

Here it is, I wrote it in college so it has a different voice than the one I have now (maybe I was a different type? I certainly partied more...). This is just the introduction, the whole thing is 14 pages but I'm not particularly proud of it and I have refuted much of it (it is also only vaguely related to Platonic Theory) so I intend to leave the rest out:

Analysis of Platonic Ideology with Regard to the Existence of an Objective Reality

Of the pupils of Socrates, Plato may be considered the most successful. In addition to monopolizing all sources of his teacher’s ideology, he uses the fame and interest of Socrates to promote his own ideas (the Socratic problem [1]). Socrates describes the invisible world (the realm of truth from which one is otherwise blinded by biological rhythms) as one that can only be reached by reasoning, such that its contents (forms) are all the conclusions of rationalizations based on abstractions [Plato 29]. Recognition of forms transcends address by linguistic description because their qualities are always present absolutely in objects of their likeness (particulars), though one needn’t attentively recognize these in them constantly in time. A precise relationship between a form and its particulars is not necessary [Plato 51]. This clause allows infinite subjectivity but simultaneously provides a realm in which to experience like particulars without constraint. The imaginative entrepreneur might well invent novel forms to suit any explanation he desires (much as would the Sophists- the rivals of Socrates, who considered argument a skill and not a means). I believe that Plato uses knowledge of forms to distract himself from his desires of that which he considers ideal in impure objects, in a mentality of denial exhibiting the sour grapes rationale [Plato 25]. He believes that bodily needs distract him from the ability to consciously reproduce this recognition at all times, which is a practice fit for a philosopher of any inclination but hedonism [Plato 12].

The original basis of forms is the similarity found in objects that are mentally associated [Plato 23]. This concept is subjective, but he considers this to be another proof of the need for forms, in that the discrepancy arises from imperfection though we share knowledge of perfection. I feel that this proof in itself is invalidated by the possibility that upon learning to appreciate a style of art, one may see it as ideal relative to the collaborating forms of association (though this may only last for the period that the novel essence is a particular of “the Innominate”). This is also negated by the probability that two men of identical perspective will disagree on the presence of a commonly accepted characteristic in a perceived object, being that their vision is not considered the imperfect version of sight and that they are likely to consistently agree on the existence of separate characteristics. A likeness may also be subjectively applied (as to which elements are similar). In this way, all things resemble all forms in some degree or another (even if by some obscure association).

Another aspect of forms is the constancy of forms [Plato 29], such as “the Beautiful” (this must refer to the cause of like reactions in men, as it is found in conjunction with such diverse stimuli and presumes no certain influence). However, should man evolve lest the appreciation of beauty in its present conscious format become unfit, will the form continue to exist in its present state, affecting the dreams of man in ways the bare knowledge of the environment never could, or simply find reference in algorithms pertaining to the advantages secured by aesthetically pleasing phenomena? A truly perfect descriptive concept should not find a basis in something so subjective (contextual and also attitude-dependent) as an ideal. Also as such concepts (if constant) not only describe similar things but also are similar in themselves, there must be a continuity in form degree (reserving an ideal configuration of abstract notions for every contradiction of application that may occur along the scale), or at the very least a form to describe similarity among similar forms (either a massive redundancy or a contradiction that precipitates a tree of infinitely distinct connotations). I think it ironic that Plato does not specify whether the “Form of Formness” resides in the same plane as regular forms, or if it is fit for a special plane all its own, such that only “Form-Minds” can conceive of it.

[kensi]

And the fact that you consistently test as INTJ/INTj

Are you trying to synthsize the two systems in a non synthetic way...if so we are clearly going to end up with far more than 16 types.


Also.............it may be more advantageous for you to type someone who is an INTp and someone else who is INTj and ask each other if you agree with the V.I. and the typing.

eg. take Montel Williams.

[Phaedrus]

A few comments before I go to bed.

You have still failed to demonstrate a criteria for separating truths from non-truths, so I will adhere to my definition (the conditional statment 'iff p, then p' does not allow 'p' to be rationally inferred from other circumstances and so invalidates the use of logic altogether; it also does not provide a mechansim for verifying 'p' as 'p' can only be distinguished from '~p' using conditional circumstances which you have already invalidated; lastly, if there are no general criteria for truth, then 'iff p, then p' cannot be one).

You want me to demonstrate criteria for separating truths from non-truths, and you ask me to do it despite the indisputable fact that Gödel has proven that there cannot be any such criteria. How shall I understand that? That you still don't understand what Gödel has proven, or what?

That "p" is true, if, and only if, p is not a criterion for truth -- it is a definition (or if you prefer the form a truth definition). It is a necessary precondition for Gödel's incompleteness theorems. And whether the truth of the proposition "p" can be verified (or falsified) or not is totally irrelevant, because truth does not require verification or provability.

If truth wasn't dictated by the circumstances, it would not be possible to propose a lie that would be considered untrue in some circumstances but not in others.

I am not sure what you are talking about here. You seem to confuse different concepts.

You are also incorrect in asserting that a statement cannot be both true and false (they are known as paradoxes: 'nothing is impossible', 'this statement is false').

The Law of Non-Contradiction is universally valid. It is true in every possible universe. Therefore it is false to say that a statement can be both true and false, because that is logically equivalent to the necessary false proposition "A, and not A".

However, to make a statement that is not verified under the conditions of the system is only false, especially if it is inferred from the system itself.

No, you are wrong about that. You are misusing the concept truth. A non-verified statement is not the same thing as a false statement, and verification has nothing to do with truth, only with knowledge.

Because it may be true in another coherent system where it is fully described, the original system can be considered incomplete, but under the premises of the original system only propositions that are derived directly from the logic of the axioms can be considered true (here I am talking about axioms as the rules that are dictated in the system, not the implied grammatical structure that is common to the communication of syllogistic logic first derived in the square of opposition by none other than Aristotle himself).

You don't understand what is meant by saying that a statement (or a proposition) is "true". You don't understand the concept truth correctly. Maybe the reason is that you are a mathematician rather than a logican or a philosopher.

[Nexus]

A few comments before I go to bed.

You want me to demonstrate criteria for separating truths from non-truths, and you ask me to do it despite the indisputable fact that Gödel has proven that there cannot be any such criteria. How shall I understand that? That you still don't understand what Gödel has proven, or what?

That "p" is true, if, and only if, p is not a criterion for truth -- it is a definition (or if you prefer the form a truth definition). It is a necessary precondition for Gödel's incompleteness theorems. And whether the truth of the proposition "p" can be verified (or falsified) or not is totally irrelevant, because truth does not require verification or provability.

I am not sure what you are talking about here. You seem to confuse different concepts.

The Law of Non-Contradiction is universally valid. It is true in every possible universe. Therefore it is false to say that a statement can be both true and false, because that is logically equivalent to the necessary false proposition "A, and not A".

No, you are wrong about that. You are misusing the concept truth. A non-verified statement is not the same thing as a false statement, and verification has nothing to do with truth, only with knowledge.

You don't understand what is meant by saying that a statement (or a proposition) is "true". You don't understand the concept truth correctly. Maybe the reason is that you are a mathematician rather than a logican or a philosopher.

You cannot obtain knowledge from a syllogism, because the premises are not knowledge themselves, however you can determine whether statements can be verified in the system (this idea being the basis of both hypothetical questions and computer simulations), leading to the designation true, a word that is not special and only serves to validate the proposition within the system - whether the system and its conclusions are useful to know in the future, when there is more to be gained than the validating of propositions, cannot be determined using the premises of the system alone (if the conclusions that mechanically receive truth designations in the logic of the system correspond to observations of the external world, then we have a knowledge of the external world that is as complete as our premises are analogous). How can you say that the statement 'the assertion you are reading is false' is either true or false, but not both? If there is not a criterion of truth to support the claim that Gödel's proof (that there is not a criterion of truth) is true, or if it does not require verification (as you claim), then it might easily be false as well, because then there is nothing to prove that true things are different from false things. Also, I have never seen Gödel's Theorems used to support the concept of truth as you describe it, and until you provide the logic leading from the incompleteness theorems to the invalidity of a truth criterion I am thus inclined to doubt you.

[Logos]

Phaedrus, at what point did you start to seriously consider that Huitzilopochtli was INTj > INTp/ENTj?

[Nexus]

[kensi]

.....[font=Arial Narrow][size=2][font=&quot]Here it is]

You mightwant to consider the following choices based on a subtype disbursement and rule out the ones which simply don't make sense:

1. TiNe- the Ne of an INTp and the Ti of an ISTj
2. NiTe- the Ni of an INTj and the Te of an ISTj
3. TeNi- the Te of an ENTj and the Ni of an ENFj
4. TeNi- the Ni of an ENTj and the Te of an ESTj

I for some reason see ENTp the least likely of the 4 NT's

as you can imagine there are other scenarios in the very situations above.


Also... cosider identifying your :

• 1. 7th function of personal knowledge and how it relates to your 1st function ...as those two are tied together
  2. Your 8th function of concrete art.

...maybe somebody will jump in on the latter as i am still relatively unfamiliar with them....

anybody?

[Nexus]

You mightwant to consider the following choices based on a subtype disbursement and rule out the ones which simply don't make sense:

1. TiNe- the Ne of an INTp and the Ti of an ISTj
2. NiTe- the Ni of an INTj and the Te of an ISTj
3. TeNi- the Te of an ENTj and the Ni of an ENFj
4. TeNi- the Ni of an ENTj and the Te of an ESTj

I for some reason see ENTp the least likely of the 4 NT's

as you can imagine there are other scenarios in the very situations above.


Also... cosider identifying your :

• 1. 7th function of personal knowledge and how it relates to your 1st function ...as those two are tied together
  2. Your 8th function of concrete art.

...maybe somebody will jump in on the latter as i am still relatively unfamiliar with them....

anybody?

Hmmm...not many irrationals...the truth is that I too lack knowledge that pertains to the 7th function of knowledge and the 8th function of concrete art

[Phaedrus]

You cannot obtain knowledge from a syllogism, because the premises are not knowledge themselves,

I am not talking about knowledge, I am talking about truth. The premises in a syllogism can be true even if we can never know them to be true.

however you can determine whether statements can be verified in the system (this idea being the basis of both hypothetical questions and computer simulations), leading to the designation true, a word that is not special and only serves to validate the proposition within the system

You still misunderstand the concept truth. The concept true is not the same concept as any of the concepts verified, proven, etc. The way you insist on defining truth is logically incompatible with the results Gödel's incomopleteness theorems. You are not talking about truth, you are talking about provability, which is a different concept. Stop using the word "truth" for something that isn't the same concept.

How can you say that the statement 'the assertion you are reading is false' is either true or false, but not both?

The problem is not the statements truth value, the problem is what exactly is the statement, and what exactly is the statement about. Every correctly formed statement (proposition) is either true or false, nothing in between and never both. That is how the concept truth should be used. Every other, logically different, use of the word "truth" designates another concept than the concept truth.

You are simply not talking about truth in this discussion, and that means that you totally ignore Gödel's results and what I am saying about it. And you ignore it by insisting on defining your terms in a way that makes it impossible for you to see the logical distinctions that are necessary to grasp if you want to understand Gödel and me.

If there is not a criterion of truth to support the claim that Gödel's proof (that there is not a criterion of truth) is true, or if it does not require verification (as you claim), then it might easily be false as well, because then there is nothing to prove that true things are different from false things.

Here it becomes totally obvious that you don't understand what Gödel has managed to prove. You don't understand Gödel's proof, and you misunderstand it in a way that is typical of INTjs and other criteria philosophers. (Check Popper's Appendix in The Open Society and Its Enemies for a brief but very clear discussion about that.) You have talked about criteria philosophers yourself, if I recall correctly from one of your videos. Do you see yourself as one, and do you realize that you are a perfect target for Popper's general critique against criteria philosophers here?

Also, I have never seen Gödel's Theorems used to support the concept of truth as you describe it, and until you provide the logic leading from the incompleteness theorems to the invalidity of a truth criterion I am thus inclined to doubt you.

Read one or two books about it. Gödel used the concept truth in the same way as I do here. It's the Tarskian way, which captures the essence of the classical correspondence theory of truth. Gödel would turn in his grave if he could hear what you are saying about truth and his theorems here.

I think thing is almost totally obvious: You are not an INTp. All of the evidence seems to suggest INTj as your correct type, but maybe there is a very slight chance that you are an ENTj, I don't know. Anyway, you reason exactly like an INTj in my opinion, and your way of expressing yourself and your ideas is also typically INTj in structure. I don't think that it is just a consequence of your high IQ; it is language.

[Phaedrus]

Phaedrus, at what point did you start to seriously consider that Huitzilopochtli was INTj > INTp/ENTj?

Right from the start, from his first posts on SG's forum. I have never thought that some other type would be more likely for him than INTj.

[Exodus]

There is lots of both Te and Ti, but overall I think Ti leading makes the most sense - adhering to principles, caring about consistency, having a single foundation for all your beliefs, etc. LSI or LII.

[Nexus]

There is lots of both Te and Ti, but overall I think Ti leading makes the most sense - adhering to principles, caring about consistency, having a single foundation for all your beliefs, etc. LSI or LII.

Thank you, but I have to disagree. It is Phaedrus who is arguing for a single foundation of 'truth'; I believe that truth is a semantic construction that is dependent on context for meaning (like the word 'like', which I do not like) and is subject to the same idiomatic ambiguities as non-truths and claimless assertions (see 'bending the truth' and 'gibberish').

[Phaedrus]

I believe that truth is a semantic construction that is dependent on context for meaning (like the word 'like', which I do not like) and is subject to the same idiomatic ambiguities as non-truths and claimless assertions (see 'bending the truth' and 'gibberish').

What you say here proves that you are not an INTp and that you are not an ENTj. You are an INTj. That is now a proven fact.

And you have of course a totally incorrect understanding of the concept truth. In fact, you don't understand it at all.

[kensi]

I think thing is almost totally obvious: You are not an INTp. All of the evidence seems to suggest INTj as your correct type, but maybe there is a very slight chance that you are an ENTj, I don't know. Anyway, you reason exactly like an INTj in my opinion, and your way of expressing yourself and your ideas is also typically INTj in structure. I don't think that it is just a consequence of your high IQ; it is language.

But Prom, RSV3 (who claims to be INTj) does not believe that Huit(S.P)..is the same type as he is.

Have you got any idea what RSV3's type is?

[Phaedrus]

But Prom, RSV3 (who claims to be INTj) does not believe that Huit(S.P)..is the same type as he is.

So what? Niffweed does not believe that I am an INTp, despite the obvious fact that he and I are both INTps.

Have you got any idea what RSV3's type is?

I haven't investigated the problem in depth, but I have not yet seen any very strong reason to believe that he is not the type he says he is.

[Exodus]

Thank you, but I have to disagree. It is Phaedrus who is arguing for a single foundation of 'truth'; I believe that truth is a semantic construction that is dependent on context for meaning (like the word 'like', which I do not like) and is subject to the same idiomatic ambiguities as non-truths and claimless assertions (see 'bending the truth' and 'gibberish').

ok...but it's still structural logic, Ti.

[Nexus]

Having been given the opportunity to observe myself for a number of weeks, I am now certain that I am most active at night, because that is how long it takes my mind to become consistently structured enough for me to use.

You are not talking about truth, you are talking about provability, which is a different concept. Stop using the word "truth" for something that isn't the same concept.

I don't think that truth is any different than anything else. Since everything requires provability to make sense in the contexts of things that have been proved, truth does as well.

The problem is not the statements truth value, the problem is what exactly is the statement, and what exactly is the statement about. Every correctly formed statement (proposition) is either true or false, nothing in between and never both. That is how the concept truth should be used. Every other, logically different, use of the word "truth" designates another concept than the concept truth.

If the mighty, all-knowing Phaedrus was no longer with us, by what criterion could we determine what is true and what is false?

You have talked about criteria philosophers yourself, if I recall correctly from one of your videos. Do you see yourself as one, and do you realize that you are a perfect target for Popper's general critique against criteria philosophers here?

I wrote a gigantic post on this thread refuting Popper, who was most certainly a criteria philosopher himself (he advocated use of the criteria of falsification and though it is a criteria to determine what is false and not true, because you state that not just syllogisms but all statements are either true or false it is thus a criteria for stating the truth), and it began by stating that I loathe criteria philosophy (make sure you read the post that follows it which contains the greater segment of my argument that I was unable to fit into the original post).

Having been more of a solipsist than an excessively indulgent skeptic, I loathe to sympathize with the ever-enduring plight of criterion-seekers. However, I must conclude that if there is some method for efficiently accrediting a format for hypotheses, it is not to be found here. Lakatos seemed to realize this reality to some extent in the promotion of a vague scheme of progressive science, one that is tolerant of the many possibilities open to empirical verification (while Popper thinks nothing of “eliminating many bad theories, and inventing many new ones” in a process he likens to survival of the fittest, Lakatos recognizes the reluctance of scientists to simply “abandon a theory merely because facts contradict it” in attachment to their long-favored implements of perception) and less forgiving of the semantics and sophistry required for justifying a dissociated instance of falsification. Though Lakatos may be somewhat blind to the general incentive for scientific inquiry (he admits this in his opening statement), Popper’s reduced and axiomatic adulation of science fails to capture much of its own influence in the many branches of study.

[Mediator Kam]

I was right?????????

yay

[Phaedrus]

Having been given the opportunity to observe myself for a number of weeks, I am now certain that I am most active at night, because that is how long it takes my mind to become consistently structured enough for me to use.

Do your energy levels and working capacity fluctuate, or are they rather consistent from day to day? Which of the four temperaments -- EJ, IJ, EP, and IP -- do you identify most and least with?

I don't think that truth is any different than anything else. Since everything requires provability to make sense in the contexts of things that have been proved, truth does as well.

That is a very typical and INTj attitude. I totally disagree with what you say here, and that is an indication that we are not the same type.

If the mighty, all-knowing Phaedrus was no longer with us, by what criterion could we determine what is true and what is false?

How many times do I have to repeat this general truth: There is no general critierion for truth.

I wrote a gigantic post on this thread refuting Popper, who was most certainly a criteria philosopher himself (he advocated use of the criteria of falsification and though it is a criteria to determine what is false and not true, because you state that not just syllogisms but all statements are either true or false it is thus a criteria for stating the truth), and it began by stating that I loathe criteria philosophy (make sure you read the post that follows it which contains the greater segment of my argument that I was unable to fit into the original post).

You seem to have misunderstood Popper. He is not a criteria philosopher in the sense we (and he) are talking about here. Popper wants to call "scientific" only those theories that are falsifiable, but that is a way to draw a line between science and non-science, not a criterion for deciding what is true or false. Falsification is about knowledge, not truth. Popper is very clear and explicit on these things, and he explains all the relevant logical distinctions in his works. You have either not read what he has written on the subject, or you have misunderstood it.

[Mediator Kam]

Hi Phaedrus. Is it morning in Sweden?

apparently he woke up on the wrong side of the bed.

anyway it's about midnight there I think.

[Phaedrus]

Hi Phaedrus. Is it morning in Sweden?

Maybe you could call it a very early morning (about 20 minutes old). I am probably going to bed soon, even though it's rather untypical of me to go to bed before 1.00 AM. It's probably the wine that has made me feel somewhat tired.

[Phaedrus]

That's a good thing, right? Good wine? =)

Objectively good wine is a good thing, yes. That was what you meant, wasn't it?